CONTENTS

Acknowledgements *page* xii
Table of Cases xv

1 Introduction 1
1.1 The Court's Interpretive Equipment in the Populist Age 1
1.2 Outline of the Analytical Framework and Chapter Summary 7
1.3 The Key Claims of the Book 14
1.4 The Investigation in a Broader Scholarly Context 17

2 Authoritarian Populism: An Insidious Threat to the Court's 'Democratic Society' 23
2.1 Mapping the Research Gap 24
2.1.1 The Constitutionalist Response and Its Limits 25
2.1.2 Beyond the Constitutionalist Lens 30
2.2 Identifying the Tension between Populism and the Court 33
2.3 The Puzzle of the Book 34
2.4 The Court's Foundational Purpose and the Relevance of Authoritarian Populism 35
2.5 Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Founding Moments of the Convention System 36
2.6 Existential Threats to Democracy 40
2.7 Militant Democracy and Its Limits 43
2.8 Moving Forward 47

3 Populism: Distorting Democracy and Corrupting the Rule of Law 48
3.1 The Ideational Core of Populism 49
3.2 Populism and the Constitution 49
3.3 Populism and Democracy 56
3.3.1 Populism and Deliberation 58
3.3.2 Populism and Representation 63

3.4 Populism and the Rule of Law 68
3.5 Moving Forward 71

4 The Court's 'Democratic Society': Preliminaries 74
4.1 Subsidiarity and the Procedural Turn 77
4.2 Justifying Subsidiarity 81
4.3 Procedural Review 83
4.4 Procedural Only in the Name? 90
4.5 The Court's 'Democratic Society' and Proportionality 92
4.6 Moving Forward 100

5 The Effects of Populist Rule: An Overview 102
5.1 Three Relevant Domains 104
5.1.1 Zooming In on Media Capture 108
5.1.2 Zooming In on the Rule of Law and the Independence of Justice 120
5.1.3 Zooming In on the Electoral System 124
5.2 Moving Forward 128

6 Deliberative Pluralism and the Media 130
6.1 Can the Court Address Infrastructural Effects? 132
6.2 The Substantive Principles of Article 10 133
6.3 Deliberative Pluralism as Populist Detector: Preliminaries 137
6.4 The Procedural Principles of Article 10 139
6.5 Evaluating the Court's Equipment 145
6.6 Deliberative Pluralism and Media Infrastructure(s) 150
6.7 Moving Forward 156

7 The Rule of Law and the Independence of Justice 158
7.1 The Rule of Law in the Court's Practice 159
7.1.1 Article 6 and a 'Tribunal Established by Law' 163
7.1.2 Article 6 and the Broadening of 'Access to a Court' 168
7.2 Article 18 and the 'Pandora's Box' of the Convention 172
7.2.1 'Beyond Proof': Over What? 175
7.2.2 Delineating the Normative Domain of Article 18 178
7.3 Moving Forward 180

8 The Electoral Ecosystem 183
8.1 P1-3 within the Court's 'Democratic Society' 187
8.2 The Right to Vote and the Right to Stand for Election 191
8.3 Minimalism in Proportionality Analysis 195

8.4 Minimalism in Procedural Terms 199
8.5 Moving Forward 205

9 Proportionality as Anti-populist Detector and Responder 206
9.1 Towards a More General Argument 209
9.2 The Structure and Meaning of Proportionality 212
9.3 Proportionality and Democratic Deliberation 213
9.4 The Grounding Value: Justifiability among Free and Equal Moral Agents 216
9.5 The Purpose Test and Democratic Infrastructure 219
9.6 Mutual Justifiability and the Purpose Test 219
9.7 The Court's Record of Infrastructural Reasoning 224
9.8 'Procedural Safeguards' and Article 18: Symptom or Remedy? 229

10 Conclusion 235

Bibliography 244
Index 260