

# Contents

## Acknowledgments

viii

1	Inferentialism: State of Play	1
1.1	What is meaning?	1
1.2	Inferentialism and logic	3
1.3	Brandom's inferentialism	6
1.4	'Normative' inferentialism vs. 'causal' inferentialism	8
1.5	Is inferentialism circular?	11
1.6	Plan of the rest of the book	14
1.7	Summary of Chapter 1	17

## Part I Language, Meaning, and Norms

2	Words as Governed by Rules	21
2.1	Ross's 'Noît-cif tribe'	21
2.2	<i>Tû-tû</i> vs. <i>ownership</i> vs. <i>fun</i>	23
2.3	Material inference	25
2.4	Empirical vocabulary	29
2.5	Inferences into and out of language?	32
2.6	Spinning in the void?	37
2.7	Is language dispensable?	39
2.8	Summary of Chapter 2	41
3	Meanings as Inferential Roles	43
3.1	Use theories of meaning	43
3.2	Dispositions vs. proprieties	47
3.3	Inferential potential and inferential significance of a sentence	50
3.4	Inferential roles	52
3.5	A toy language	55
3.6	Which inferences determine meaning?	57
3.7	Are inferential roles compositional?	60
3.8	Are there inferential roles, really?	63
3.9	Summary of Chapter 3	66
4	The Rules of Language	68
4.1	Implicit rules?	68
4.2	Following rules vs. bouncing off them	71

4.3	Rule following as a behavioral pattern	74
4.4	Normative attitudes	76
4.5	Is meaning normative?	79
4.6	Normativity and human practices	85
4.7	Inside and outside of the rules of language	88
4.8	Summary of Chapter 4	91
5	Our Language Games	92
5.1	From meaning to linguistic practices	92
5.2	Game-theoretical perspectives	96
5.3	The builders' game	100
5.4	The space of reasons and the game of giving and asking for reasons	104
5.5	The 'embodiment' of the game of giving and asking for reasons	108
5.6	Meaning and truth	115
5.7	Summary of Chapter 5	116
6	Rules and Evolution	118
6.1	Rules and cooperation	118
6.2	Why rules?	121
6.3	Sellars on rules and pattern-governed behavior	125
6.4	Integrative vs. standalone rules	129
6.5	Virtual spaces again	131
6.6	Evolution and language	133
6.7	Summary of Chapter 6	136

## Part II Logic, Inference, and Reasoning

7	Inference in logic	139
7.1	A disambiguation and first steps to explication	139
7.2	Going substructural	143
7.3	Inference vs. consequence	146
7.4	What is consequence?	149
7.5	Bridging the gap	154
7.6	Omega rule	156
7.7	What makes inferences reliable?	159
7.8	Summary of Chapter 7	162
8	Logical Constants	163
8.1	Tonk	163
8.2	'Reasonable' and 'unreasonable' inferential patterns	167
8.3	Inference and truth-valuations	171

8.4	Inference structures and semantic systems	174
8.5	Inferentialism and classical logic	177
8.6	Varieties of inference	179
8.7	Structured systems of sentences	181
8.8	Summary of Chapter 8	184
9	Logic as Making Inference Explicit	186
9.1	Inferentially native operators	186
9.2	Anti-deductor?	190
9.3	Multi-conclusion inference?	194
9.4	Necessity	196
9.5	Incompatibility	198
9.6	Logical operators as structural markers and substructural logics	201
9.7	Summary of Chapter 9	203
10	Rules of Logic	204
10.1	Substantiation of logical rules	204
10.2	How do we know that the rules of logic hold?	208
10.3	What is MP?	210
10.4	The dilemma of triviality and contingency	214
10.5	To accept MP is to have implication	217
10.6	What is it we study when we study logical rules?	219
10.7	Summary of Chapter 10	221
11	Logic and Reasoning	222
11.1	Logic and 'belief management'	222
11.2	Do the rules of logic tell us how to reason?	224
11.3	The social and normative nature of belief	227
11.4	Logical laws as laws of demonstration	230
11.5	Reasoning as inner argumentation	232
11.6	Laws of logic as constitutive	234
11.7	Truth once more	235
11.8	Summary of Chapter 11	237
	Postscript: Inferentialism on the Go	238
	Appendix: Proofs of Theorems	240
	Notes	247
	References	260
	Index	271