

CONTENTS

PREFACE	ix
1. Conjectural Knowledge	1
1.1. The Problem of Induction	1
1.2. Outline of Falsificationism	6
1.3. Conclusion	13
2. Popper's Solution of the Problem of Induction	15
2.1. Enumeration of Objections	15
a. The Presuppositions of Science	15
b. The Content of Science	16
c. The Empirical Basis	16
d. The Repeatability of Tests	17
e. The Law of Diminishing Returns	18
f. Goodman's Paradox	19
g. The Pragmatic Problem of Induction	20
h. Methodology and Verisimilitude	23
i. The Miracle Argument	24
2.2. Elimination of Objections	25
a. The Presuppositions of Science	25
b. The Content of Science	27
c. The Empirical Basis	29

d. The Repeatability of Tests	30
e. The Law of Diminishing Returns	32
f. Goodman's Paradox	35
g. The Pragmatic Problem of Induction	38
h. Methodology and Verisimilitude	45
i. The Miracle Argument	46
2.3. Conclusion	48
Technical Note	49
3. A Critique of Good Reasons	51
3.1. Introduction: The Constitution of Rationalism	51
3.2. Three Independent Theses	55
3.3. The Unobtainability of Good Reasons	55
3.4. The Unusability of Good Reasons	63
3.5. The Unnecessariness of Good Reasons	66
Technical Notes	72
4. Comprehensively Critical Rationalism: An Assessment	75
4.1. Bartley	75
4.2. Comprehensively Critical Rationalism	77
4.3. Criticisms of CCR	81
a. Trivialities	82
b. Reinforced Dogmatisms	83
c. Vacuity of CCR	84
d. Paradoxicality of CCR	86
e. The Uncriticizability of Logic	90
f. Reaction to Criticism	92
5. Hume: Bacon = Gödel: Hilbert	95
5.1. Introduction	95
5.2. Hilbert and Gödel	95
5.3. Bacon and Hume	97
5.4. Gödel and Hume	98
5.5. Response to Gödel	100
5.6. Four Responses to Hume	101
a. Positivism	102
b. Instrumentalism	102
c. Conventionalism	103

d. Apriorism	103
5.7. Three More Responses to Hume	103
e. Inductivism	104
f. Probabilism	104
g. Cognitivism	105
5.8. Falsificationism and Some Variants	106
h. Falsificationism	106
i. Possibilism	106
j. Cosmetic Rationalism	107
5.9. Two Final Responses to Hume	108
k. Nihilism	108
l. Naturalism	109
5.10. Conclusion	109
 6. Three Lost Labours of Deductivism	 111
6.1. Deductivism	111
6.2. Preferences among Theories	113
6.3. Scotching Scepticism	114
6.4. Cosmetic Rationalism	121
6.5. Pure Bayesianism	125
Technical Note	133
 7. On the Maximization of Expected Futility	 135
7.1. Introduction	135
7.2. The Requirement of Total Evidence	136
7.3. Good's Answer	137
7.4. Acquiring a Necktie	139
7.5. Criticism of Good's Answer	141
7.6. Probability Kinematics	144
7.7. Acquiring a Necktie (continued)	147
7.8. Conclusion	150
 8. Diverging Distributions	 153
8.1. Introduction	153
8.2. The Logistic Function	153
8.3. The Binomial Distribution	156
8.4. A Chaotic Distribution	157
8.5. Another Chaotic Distribution	161

8.6. Scientific Objectivity	168
8.7. Approximate Distributions	170
8.8. Conclusion	171
Technical Note	172
9. Objective Probabilities	175
9.1. Introduction	175
9.2. The Frequency Interpretation of Probability	175
9.3. The Falsifiability of Probability Statements	178
9.4. The Propensity Interpretation of Probability	182
9.5. Criticisms of the Propensity Interpretation	186
9.6. Probability as Instantaneous Frequency	190
10. Truth, Truthlikeness, Approximate Truth	195
10.1. The Problem of Verisimilitude	195
10.2. Verisimilitude as an Aim	198
10.3. An Alternative Approach	202
10.4. Some Logical Notes	209
a. Popper's Theory	209
b. Distance Functions	210
c. Degrees of Truth	214
d. Language Dependence	216
11. Impartial Truth	219
BIBLIOGRAPHY	233
INDEX	253