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Amnesty Plus has had great success in detecting cartels in the US. However, the Amnesty Plus tool has, as yet, not been utilised in Europe. By first assessing the nature of cartels, this article will then examine the potential effectiveness and compatibility of Amnesty Plus in the EU Leniency programme.

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Applying for the first time the doctrine developed by the Court of Justice in *TeliaSonera*, the Commission adopts in *Slovak Telekom* a rather loose and formalistic legal test to detect the existence of unlawful margin squeeze. In the author’s opinion the Commission should have adopted instead a more effect-based approach.

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