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Table of Contents

Articles

MATTHEW O'REGAN

The Competition Appeal Tribunal: a new venue for challenging restrictive covenants? 393

The Consumer Rights Act 2015 extended the Competition Appeal Tribunal's jurisdiction and introduced a new, "fast track", procedure. This procedure is intended to enable individuals and SMEs to bring claims under the Competition Act 1998 quickly and at low cost. This article considers how this new procedure can be used to challenge restrictive covenants contained in property and business sale agreements.

DANIEL MANDRESCU

One Stop Shop Leniency: The case of DHL Express v Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (C-428/14) 397

The case at hand discusses the idea of a one-stop-shop for leniency procedures in the context of the current EU legal framework. The Court of Justice of the European Union finds in this case that the leniency procedure administered by the Commission and by the national competition authorities are not legally connected in manner that would allow for the establishment of a one-stop-shop. Consequently this judgment provides a look into the shortcomings of the current practice in light of the absence of a harmonised leniency programme procedure.

ROB VAN DER LAAN

The IBER renewal discussion: a public policy failure? 403

We currently witness the discussion on whether or not to extend the Insurance Block Exemption Regulation. Looking at the incentives of the European Commission and other stakeholders, this article argues that consultation is not likely to provide the information required to take a decision that maximizes overall welfare.

YI HENG ALVIN SNG

Tying conduct under article 102 TFEU: can intervention against Google be justified? 406

The tying conduct prohibited in art.102 TFEU is notoriously difficult to apply to dynamic/high-technology industries. Economic theories suggested in competition case law are often hypothetical and vulnerable to challenge. Google may arguably have engaged in anti-competitive ties, in light of the *Microsoft* decision. The extent to which intervention may be merited in relation kinds of conduct will be discussed.

DAVID MWONI NDOLO

EU v the US: an analysis of the laws on refusal to supply essential facilities - the Google case 413

This article critically examines the regulatory framework in the EU and the US in relation to the refusal to supply essential facilities. It considers how the frameworks aim to justify the circumstances in which an undertaking may be compelled to supply its own facility to its competitors in order to promote competition.

VILHELM SCHRÖDER

Can "external" bilateral competition law provisions have an interpretative effect within the framework of the WTO dispute settlement system? 418

In this article, the potential interaction between competition and IP law on an international level is discussed. The specific question examined is whether external bilateral competition law provisions could have an interpretative effect on TRIPS in a WTO dispute.

ALEXANDER WAKSMAN

The benefit of hindsight: a comparison of individual exemption under EU and Hong Kong competition law 422

EU rules on restrictive agreements strongly influence equivalent rules in Hong Kong's nascent competition regime. An important difference concerns the procedures for applying individual exemptions. This article considers whether Hong Kong rules address criticisms leveled at EU practices, and identifies the different factors underlying a decision to notify.

Utility of leniency program in detection of cartels: comparative study of Indian leniency regime v US leniency regime 427

Cartels have often been described as one of the most serious anti-competitive activities across all antitrust jurisdictions, which severely affect fair play in the market. On various occasions it was found that most competition enforcement agencies have faced issues in detection and busting of cartels leading to effective prosecution, owing to the fact that cartels are so secretive and complex in nature that without the aid of the parties involved, prosecution never gains any speed. Thus, to incentivize and promote such acts of whistle-blowing, many jurisdictions viz. EU, the US and India have introduced leniency policies to provide some sort of safeguard to the party providing invaluable first-hand information about a cartel's existence. Thus, such policies play a crucial role in maintaining the relevance of any competition regime. Hence the present article focuses on the analysis of the newly introduced Leniency Regulation in India on the parameters of its effectiveness through a comparative analytical study of US leniency policy. This article also emphasizes and lays its foundation in the crucial provision of EC Leniency Regulations. This article further dwells upon the lacunas of the existing Leniency Regulation in India and concludes by providing a future path of possible improvements in the form of certain recommendations.

Book Reviews

PAUL R. HUGHES

Intellectual Property and EU Competition Law, 2nd edn 432**National Reports****Canada****MERGERS****Sodium chlorate N-125****Canada****MERGERS****Retail gasoline N-126****Canada****ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS****E-book publishing N-126****Germany****ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS****Online banking services N-127****Spain****ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS****Adult diapers N-128****Spain****ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS****Sherry N-128****Spain****PROCEDURE****Dawn raids N-129****Spain****ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS****Port of Valencia N-130****Spain****LEGISLATION****Antitrust damages N-130****Spain****PROCEDURE****Dawn raids N-133****Spain****GENERAL****Annual report N-134****Spain****MERGERS****In-depth investigation N-135****Turkey****ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION****Online meal ordering N-136**