Contents

Acknowleds Introduction	gements n by the editor	ix xi
PART I	 SURVEYS Friedrich Schneider and Bruno S. Frey (1988), 'Politico-economic Models of Macroeconomic Policy: A Review of the Empirical Evidence', in Thomas D. Willett (ed.), Political Business Cycles. The Political Economy of Money, Inflation and Unemployment, Chapter 9, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 239-75 William D. Nordhaus (1989), 'Alternative Approaches to the Political Business Cycle', Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 1-49 and 66-8 Manfred Gärtner (1994), 'Democracy, Elections, and Macroeconomic Policy: Two Decades of Progress', European Journal of Political Economy, 10, 85-109 	3 40 92
PART II	FORERUNNERS	
	4. Michael Kalecki (1943), 'Political Aspects of Full Employment', Political Quarterly, 14, 322-31	119
	5. Johan Åkerman (1947), 'Political Economic Cycles', Kyklos, 1, 107-17	129
	 Bruno S. Frey and Lawrence J. Lau (1968), 'Towards a Mathematical Model of Government Behaviour', Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie, 28 (3/4), 355-80 	140
PART III	EMPIRICAL ACCOUNTS	
	7. Yoram Ben-Porath (1975), 'The Years of Plenty and the Years of Famine – A Political Business Cycle?', Kyklos, 28 Fasc. 2, 400-403	169
	8. Edward R. Tufte (1978), 'The Electoral-economic Cycle', in Political Control of the Economy, Chapter 1, Princeton, NJ:	170
	Princeton University Press, 3-27 and notes 9. Martin Paldam (1979), 'Is there an Electional Cycle? A Comparative Study of National Accounts', Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 81, 323-42	173201
PART IV	VOTE MAXIMIZING MODELS 10. Gavin Wright (1974), 'The Political Economy of New Deal	
	Spending: An Econometric Analysis', Review of Economics and Statistics, LVI (1), 30-38	223

	11.	William D. Nordhaus (1975), 'The Political Business Cycle', Review of Economic Studies, XLII (2), 169-90	232
PART V	PAI	RTISAN MODELS	
	12.	Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. (1977), 'Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy', American Political Science Review, 71 (4), 1467-87	257
	13.	• • •	278
	14.		304
PART VI	VO'	ΓE-CUM-PARTISAN	
	15.	Bruno S. Frey and Friedrich Schneider (1978), 'An Empirical Study of Politico-economic Interaction in the United States', Review of Economics and Statistics, LX (2), 174-83	319
	16.	Gebhard Kirchgässner (1984), 'On the Theory of Optimal Government Behaviour', Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 8, 167-95	329
	17.	Stephen E. Haynes and Joe A. Stone (1990), 'Political Models of the Business Cycle Should be Revived', <i>Economic Inquiry</i> , XXVIII , July, 442-65	358
PART VII	RA'	TIONAL POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES	
	18.	Kenneth Rogoff and Anne Sibert (1988), 'Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles', Review of Economic Studies, LV, 1-16	385
	19.	Steven M. Sheffrin (1989), 'Evaluating Rational Partisan Business Cycle Theory', <i>Economics and Politics</i> , 1 (3), November, 239-59	401
PART VIII	SON	ME EXTENSIONS	
IAKI VIII	20.		425
	21.	Friedrich Schneider, Werner W. Pommerehne and Bruno S. Frey (1981), 'Politico-economic Interdependence in a Direct Democracy: The Case of Switzerland', in Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. and Heino Fassbender (eds), Contemporary Political Economy, Chapter 13, North Holland Publishing Company,	723
	22.	231-48 Jean-Dominique Lafay (1981), 'Empirical Analysis of Politico-economic Interaction in East European Countries', Soviet	437
		Studies, XXXIII (3), July, 386-400	455

Political	Business	Cucles
ouncu	DUSTRESS	CYCLES

	٠
33	

PART IX	POLICY	RELEVANCE
---------	--------	-----------

23.	Assar Lindbeck (1976), 'Stabilization Policy in Open Economies
	with Endogenous Politicians', American Economic Review, 66
	(2), May, 1–19

Name Index