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book, *The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism*, is the second volume, and contains the centerpiece of the argument, of Sir Karl Popper's long-awaited *Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. Although it was written in the mid-fifties, it has never before been published. Yet it contains the most sustained and important treatment of the problems of determinism and indeterminism of which I know.

The *Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery* was written mainly during the years 1951-56, at the time when *Logik der Forschung*, Popper's first published book (1954), was being translated into English as *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*.

The different volumes of the *Postscript* were originally part of a series of Appendices to *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, in which Popper proposed to correct, expand, and develop the ideas of his first book. Some of these Appendices were in fact included in *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* when it was published in 1959. But one group of the Appendices took on a life of its own, and gradually grew into a single, closely-integrated work—far exceeding the original *Logik der Forschung* in length. It was decided to publish this new work—called the *Postscript: After Twenty Years*—as a sequel or companion volume to *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. And it was accordingly set in type, in galley proofs, in 1956-57.

Within a few months of the anticipated publication, however, the project came grinding to a halt. In *Unended Quest*, his intellectual autobiography, Sir Karl has reported of these galley proofs: 'Proof reading turned into a nightmare: . . . I then had to have operations on both eyes. After this I could not read