

# Full contents

<i>Preface</i>	xii
<i>Table of cases</i>	xvi
<i>Introduction</i>	xxv
<i>Abuses of dominance: the Intel judgement of the Court of Justice</i>	xxix
<i>Abuses of dominance: the Google decision (search)</i>	xxxiii
<b>1 The Treaty, objectives and the Single Market</b>	<b>1</b>
A. The objectives of EU competition policy	1
B. Institutions and procedures	8
1. From Regulation 17/62 to Regulation 1/2003	9
2. The innovations brought about by Regulation 1/2003	10
Note on the effects-based approach	12
3. The private enforcement of EU competition law	15
C. Introduction to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU	16
Note on the notion of undertaking	18
D. Market integration and the blockage of imports	20
1. Overview	20
2. Parallel imports	21
a. <i>Consten and Grundig v. Commission</i> (Cases 56–58/64)	21
b. Development of the rule against market partitioning	27
Conclusion	31
<b>2 Cartels</b>	<b>33</b>
A. Cartels and the economics of competition	35
B. Proof of cartels	40
1. The Quinine case	41
<i>ACF Chemiefarma v. Commission</i>	
(Case 41/69) ('Quinine')	41
2. The Dyestuffs case	45
<i>Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v. Commission</i>	
(Cases 48, 49, 51–57/69) ('Dyestuffs')	46
3. The Sugar Cartel case	47
4. The Wood Pulp case	49
<i>Ahlström Osakeyhtiö v. Commission</i> (Cases C-89, 104,	
114, 116–117, 125–129/85) ('Wood Pulp')	49

C.	World cartels and offshore cartels: jurisdiction, comity, and cooperation	54
1.	Effects, sovereignty, and restraint	54
	<i>Ahlström Osaakeyhtiö v. Commission</i> (Cases C-89, 104, 114, 116–117, 125–129/85) ('Wood Pulp')	55
2.	Cooperation, and seeds of a global regime	61
D.	May cartels be justified? Crisis cartels	62
	<i>Competition Authority of Ireland v. Beef Industry Development Society Ltd</i> (Case C-209/07) ('BIDS')	62
<b>3</b>	<b>Horizontal restraints</b>	69
A.	Agreements among competitors: general	69
	Note on the notion of '(block) exemption'	70
B.	The reach of Article 101(1)	71
1.	'By object' restrictions	72
	<i>Groupeement des Cartes Bancaires (CB) v. Commission</i> (Case C-67/13 P)	73
2.	'By effect' restrictions	77
	Note on market definition	78
	<i>Mastercard v. Commission</i> (Case C-382/12 P)	82
	Note on agreements of minor importance ('de minimis')	88
C.	Article 101(3): Effects of the agreement on competition, efficiency, innovation	91
1.	Introduction and guidelines	91
2.	Loose agreements	93
a.	Agreements to exchange information	93
	Note on <i>John Deere Ltd v. Commission</i>	94
	Note on <i>Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl</i>	96
	<i>Asnef-Equifax v. Asociación De Usuarios De Servicios Bancarios</i> (Case C-238/05)	97
b.	Standard setting	100
3.	Tighter agreements	101
	<i>European Night Services Ltd v. Commission</i> (Cases T-374–375, 384 and 388/94)	101
4.	Relationship to innovation and competitiveness	106
D.	Article 101(1) and (3): public policy and non-competition goals	108
1.	Labour	108
	<i>Albany International BV and Textile Industry Pension Funds</i> (Case C-67/96)	108
2.	The liberal professions	112
	<i>Wouters et Cie</i> (Case C-309/99)	113

3. The environment and competitiveness	116
CECED	118
E. Block exemptions	120
1. Research and development	120
2. Specialization	121
<b>4 Vertical restraints</b>	123
A. Vertical restraints and their effects	123
Note on the effect of modernisation	124
B. Is there an agreement within Article 101(1)?	125
C. Parallel imports and exports, and dual pricing	126
<i>Consten and Grundig v. Commission</i> (Case 56/64)	126
Note on <i>Distillers Company Ltd v. Commission</i>	127
<i>GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission</i>	
(Case T-168/01) (Spanish price ceiling)	128
<i>Sot. Lelos KAI SIA EE v. GlaxoSmithKline AVEE</i>	
(Joined Cases C-468 to 478/06)	132
D. Resale price maintenance: Europe, and a view from the US	135
<i>Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.</i>	136
E. Single branding (exclusive purchasing), tying and related foreclosures	144
<i>Stergios Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu AG</i> (Case C-234/89)	144
<i>Schöller Lebensmittel v. Commission</i> (Case T-9/93)	147
<i>Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique v. Président de l'Autorité de la Concurrence</i> (Case C-439/09)	152
F. Block exemptions: history and reform	156
<b>5 Abuses of dominance</b>	159
A. Dominance	161
Note on collective dominance	163
B. Abusive conduct	164
1. Excessive and discriminatory prices and unfair terms	165
<i>British Leyland Plc v. Commission</i> (Case 226/84)	165
<i>United Brands Co. v. Commission</i> (Case 27/76)	167
2. Exclusionary conduct	171
a. Refusal to deal	172
(i) Essential facility and duty to give access	172
(ii) Other duties to deal that may or may not involve an essential facility	174



	<i>Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano Spa v. Commission</i> (Joined Cases 6 and 7/73) ('Commercial Solvents')	174
	<i>Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko</i>	177
(iii)	The special relevance of intellectual property <i>Radio Telefis Eireann v. Commission</i> (Joined Cases C-241 and C-242/91 P) ('Magill')	180
	<i>IMS Health GmbH &amp; Co.</i> (Case C-418/01)	181
(iv)	Interoperability <i>Microsoft Corp. v. Commission</i> (Case T-201/04)	184
b.	Exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates <i>Hoffmann-La Roche &amp; Co. AG v. Commission</i> (Case 85/76)	186
	Note on <i>British Airways Plc v. Commission</i>	193
	<i>Tomra Systems ASA v. Commission</i> (Case C-549/10 P)	194
	Note on <i>Intel Corp. v. Commission</i>	197
	<i>Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet</i> (Case C-23/14) ('Post Danmark II')	199
c.	Tying and bundling <i>Microsoft Corp. v. Commission</i> (Case T-201/04)	201
d.	Price predation and price discrimination (continued) <i>AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission</i> (Case C-62/86)	204
	<i>Brooke Group Ltd v. Brown &amp; Williamson Tobacco Corp.</i>	207
	Note on <i>France Telecom SA v. Commission</i> ('Wanadoo')	209
	<i>Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrencerådet</i> (Case C-209/10) ('Post Danmark I')	211
e.	Margin squeeze Note on <i>Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc.</i>	212
	<i>Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission</i> (Case C-280/08 P)	215
	<i>Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige</i> (Case C-52/09)	218
f.	Abusive leveraging	220
<b>6</b>	<b>Merger control</b>	223
A.	The Merger Regulation	234
1.	Coverage and procedures	235
2.	The substantive standard	237

B.	The economics of merger analysis	239
1.	Competition-lessening effects	239
2.	Positive effects	241
3.	Competitiveness	241
4.	Markets, concentration, barriers, and efficiencies	242
C.	Substantive law under the Merger Regulation	244
1.	Mergers of competitors that create or increase dominance	244
a.	Note on Aerospatiale-Alenia/De Havilland	245
b.	Note on Boeing/McDonnell Douglas	246
c.	Contemporary mergers to monopoly	250
d.	The failing firm defence	253
	<i>France v. Commission</i> (Joined Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95) ('Kali + Salz')	253
2.	Mergers that create unilateral or non-coordinated effects	255
3.	Mergers of competitors that facilitate coordinated behaviour (collective dominance)	257
	<i>Gencor Ltd v. Commission</i> (Case T-102/96)	258
	<i>Airtours v. Commission</i> (Case T-342/99)	261
4.	Mergers other than mergers of competitors: vertical and conglomerate effects	265
	<i>Tetra Laval BV v. Commission</i> (Case C-12/03 P) ('Tetra/Sidel')	266
D.	The international dimension	269
	Note on <i>Gencor Ltd v. Commission</i>	270
<b>7</b>	<b>The State and competition</b>	274
A.	State ownership, and a note on liberalization	276
	<i>Merici Convenzionali Porto di Genova v. Siderurgica Gabrielli SpA</i> (Case C-179/90)	279
B.	State monopolies of a commercial character: application of Articles 34 and 37 TFEU	282
	<i>Franzen</i> (Case C-189/95) ( <i>Swedish alcohol monopoly</i> )	284
C.	Exclusive privileges: Article 106 TFEU	290
	<i>Hofner v. Macrotron GmbH</i> (Case C-41/90)	290
	<i>Commission v. DEI</i> (Case C-553/12 P) ( <i>Greek lignite</i> )	293
	<i>Albany International BV and Textile Industry Pension Funds</i> (Case C-67/96)	296
D.	State measures that restrict competition or facilitate private restrictions	299
1.	State responsibility	299
	<i>Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi</i> (Case C-198/01) ('Italian matches')	301

	<i>Cipolla v. Fazari and Macrino v. Meloni</i> (Joined Cases C-94 and C-202/04)	303
2.	Private responsibility	306
	<i>Commission and France v. Ladbroke Racing Ltd</i> (Joined Cases C-359 and C-379/95 P)	306
	<i>Commission v. Italy</i> (Case C-35/96) ('CNSD')	308
E.	State aid	311
1.	Notion of State aid	312
a.	State aid criteria and ex-ante review	312
b.	Compatible aid	313
c.	The market economy operator test	314
d.	Public service compensation	315
e.	State v. private resources	315
f.	Selectivity	316
2.	State aid policy	319
	Note on tax rulings and Apple	329
	<i>Afterword</i>	334
	<i>Index</i>	335