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AstraZeneca sets the antitrust standard for dealings with the patent office and regulatory authorities. The EU Court of Justice's judgment brings this long-running saga to an end. Though a loss for *AstraZeneca*, the EU Court pulls back from the more extreme dicta of the General Court. The latter found unlawful any objectively misleading statement before the patent office, regardless of whether it was honestly made or promptly withdrawn. The Court of Justice concludes that no liability arises for ordinary fallibility in patent office dealings. But as the article examines, by failing to articulate an alternative test, it leaves the law in doubt. The precise boundaries of the legal standard of liability will be the subject of future litigation. But the industry and patent practitioners now have some basis for claiming that day-to-day patenting practices should generally escape antitrust liability.

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