## European Competition Law Review

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The interdiction of resale-price-maintenance (RPM) is strictly applied in many countries, e.g. in Germany. This is in contrast to the United States, where the Supreme Court in 2007 has transformed the former per se interdiction into a rule of reason-standard. Today there is wide consensus that the RPM can have, in a competition perspective, positive effects. Guidelines of the EU Commission are based on this view. Negative effects are much harder to detect, as a cartel or monopoly problem is at stake. A specific regulation of the RPM is not necessary. Little was heard about vertical price fixing in Germany for a long time, but recent decisions and Guidelines have reopened the debate, which is shaped by the reliance on a number of myths and loose thinking.

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