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The limited dependencies between chapters mean that several routes may be taken through the book.

- At a minimum, you should study Chapters 2 (Nash Equilibrium Theory) and 5 (Extensive Games with Perfect Information Theory).
- Optionally you may sample some sections of Chapters 3 (Nash Equilibrium Illustrations) and 6 (Extensive Games with Perfect Information Illustrations).