

# European Competition Law Review

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#### **Behavioural economics in court: “bright future” or interesting curio?** 45

Mrs Justice Rose, a judge of the English High Court with considerable experience of competition law, recently predicted that behavioural economics has “a bright future in competition law litigation”. Three competition judgments are discussed by her to support this “prediction”—*Enron v EWS Railway*, *Flynn Pharma & Pfizer v CMA* and *Streetmap v Google*. An inspection of these show that they neither gave rise to behavioural concerns or that the courts would have been assisted by behavioural economics.

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