

Contents

Foreword	ix
Foreword to the Previous Edition	xi
Author's Note to the Original Edition	xix
Part I Why Warning Intelligence And What Is It? Some Fundamentals	
1 General Nature of the Problem	1
2 Definitions of Terms and Their Usage	9
3 What Warning Is and Is Not	14
4 Warning and Collection	30
5 Intentions versus Capabilities	41
Part II Organization and Tools of the Trade	
6 Problems of Organization and Management	49
7 Indicator Lists	59
8 The Compiling of Indications	66
9 Can Computers Help?	71
Part III Introduction to the Analytical Method	
10 Some Fundamentals of Indications Analysis	77
11 Some Specifics of the Analytical Method	91
12 What Makes a Good Warning Analyst?	102

Part IV Specific Problems of Military Analysis

13	Importance of Military Indications	113
14	Order-of-Battle Analysis in Crisis Situations	119
15	Analysis of Mobilization	129
16	Logistics Is the Queen of Battles	143
17	Other Factors in Combat Preparations	155
18	Coping with Extraordinary Military Developments	163

Part V Specific Problems of Political, Civil and Economic Analysis

19	Importance of Political Factors for Warning	169
20	Basic Political Warning—A Problem of Perception	177
21	Some Specific Factors in Political Warning	188
22	Economic Indicators	199
23	Civil Defense	207
24	Security, Counter-Intelligence and Agent Preparations	217

Part VI Some Major Analytical Problems

25	Warning from the Totality of Evidence	227
26	The Impact on Warning of Circumstances Leading to War	238
27	Reconstructing the Enemy's Decision-Making Process	247
28	Assessing the Timing of Attack	266
29	Deception: Can We Cope with It?	280

Part VII Problems of Particular Types of Warfare

30	Analysis with Hostilities Already in Progress	307
31	Problems Peculiar to Guerrilla Warfare and "Wars of Liberation"	315
32	Hypothetical Problems of the Coming of World War III	329

Part VIII Reaching and Reporting the Warning Judgment

33	Vital Importance of the Judgment	346
34	What Does the Policy Maker Need, and Want to Know?	352
35	How to Write Indications or Warning Items	368
36	Assessing Probabilities	381
37	Some Major Factors Influencing Judgments and Reporting	397
38	Most Frequent Errors in the Judgment and Reporting Process	406

Part IX Conclusions

39 A Summing Up, With Some Do's and Don'ts for Analysts and Supervisors	420
About the Authors	433

Foreword

On the wall of my office is a framed poster proclaiming the only book ever written by Cynthia Grabo. The poster announces a talk and book signing by the author to be held on March 3, 2005, in a small bookstore in downtown Washington, D.C. That evening about forty people more than were expected after work to attend the event in the early evening hours. Her book, *Strategic Warming*, had just been released. She was excited that a book she started over three decades earlier was finally published. She would receive the recognition due a published author. Of course, Cynthia was already well known in the U.S. intelligence community as an excellent analyst. But this was her coming-out party. Her talk lasted about fifteen minutes, followed by another twenty minutes of questions, discussions, and book signing. I was not there, but I doubt Cynthia noticed the umbrellas and raincoats. She wanted the audience to understand the role and importance of intelligence analysis in U.S. policy.

In 1972 the *Handbook of Strategic Warming* was published. This book was supposed to be her first book (if you could call it that), because with each new book, new chapters were declassified and made available to the public. Now, after another five years, all thirty-nine chapters of her original manuscript written between 1968 and 1972 are available in this edition. (To avoid repeating the arduous journey of this manuscript, the foreword to the previous edition has been republished behind this foreword.)

This book can be viewed in the following context: