

Contents

List of Tables	XI
List of Figures	XIII
List of Abbreviations	XV
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Puzzle.....	1
1.2 Research Question and Argument.....	6
1.3 Political and Academic Relevance.....	9
1.4 State of Research	11
1.4.1 NATO and Its Operations	12
1.4.2 EU, CFSP/CSDP, and Its Operations.....	14
1.4.3 NATO-EU Relations.....	17
1.4.4 NATO-EU Relations with a Special Emphasis on Operations	18
1.4.5 Research Gap	24
1.5 Methods	25
1.5.1 Data Collection	25
1.5.2 Data Analysis	29
1.6 Overview.....	34
2 The Conduct of Military Crisis Management Operations by NATO and the EU	39
2.1 Operationalization of the Dependent Variable.....	39
2.2 NATO and the EU as International Organizations	40
2.2.1 NATO	40
2.2.2 The EU and Its CFSP/CSDP	43

2.2.3	The Relationship between NATO and the EU	47
2.3	The Member States of NATO and the EU	48
2.4	The Operations of NATO and the EU	52
2.4.1	NATO Operations 1990 – 2017	53
2.4.2	EU Operations 2003 – 2017	61
2.5	Universe of Cases Based on the Military Crisis Management Operations of NATO and the EU 2004 – 2016	68
2.6	Case Selection on the Dependent Variable	70
3	The Principal-Agent Explanation for Agent Selection	73
3.1	Theory Selection	73
3.2	The Principal-Agent Explanation	78
3.2.1	Literature Review of the Principal-Agent Approach	78
3.2.2	Agent Selection Based on Agent Characteristics	89
3.2.3	Operationalization of the Independent Variable	93
3.2.4	The Causal Mechanism between the Independent Variable and the Dependent Variable	96
3.3	Alternative Explanations	103
3.3.1	The State-Centric Institutional Explanation	103
3.3.2	The Neorealist Explanation	105
4	The Decision for a NATO Operation in Libya in Early 2011	109
4.1	Armed Conflict in Libya	109
4.2	The Principal-Agent Explanation in the Case of Libya	110
4.2.1	The Value of the Independent Variable	110
4.2.2	Process Tracing Concerning the Causal Mechanism	115
4.3	Alternative Explanations in the Case of Libya	142
4.3.1	The State-Centric Institutional Explanation	143
4.3.2	The Neorealist Explanation	144
4.4	Operation Unified Protector in Libya	147
4.5	Interim Conclusion	150
5	The Decision for an EU Operation in Chad/CAR in Late 2007	153
5.1	Armed Conflict in Chad/CAR	153
5.2	The Principal-Agent Explanation in the Case of Chad/CAR	154

5.2.1	The Value of the Independent Variable	155
5.2.2	Process Tracing Concerning the Causal Mechanism	160
5.3	Alternative Explanations in the Case of Chad/CAR	184
5.3.1	The State-Centric Institutional Explanation	184
5.3.2	The Neorealist Explanation.....	186
5.4	EUFOR Tchad/RCA in Chad/CAR	189
5.5	Interim Conclusion	193
6	The Decision for NATO Operations and an EU Operation off the Horn of Africa in Late 2008	195
6.1	Piracy off the Horn of Africa	195
6.2	The Principal-Agent Explanation in the Case of the Horn of Africa	197
6.2.1	The Value of the Independent Variable	197
6.2.2	Process Tracing Concerning the Causal Mechanism	202
6.3	Alternative Explanations in the Case of the Horn of Africa	228
6.3.1	The State-Centric Institutional Explanation	228
6.3.2	The Neorealist Explanation.....	230
6.4	Operation Allied Provider, Operation Allied Protector, Operation Ocean Shield, and EUNAVFOR Atalanta off the Horn of Africa.....	233
6.5	Interim Conclusion	237
7	Conclusion.....	239
7.1	Summary of the Findings.....	239
7.2	Avenues for Further Research	252
7.3	Policy Recommendations.....	257
	References.....	265
	Interviews	325