

# Contents

<i>Preface</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xvii
<i>List of Most Common Acronyms</i>	xix
<i>List of Figures</i>	xxi

## Part I. Philosophy's Open Questions

1. What is a Philosophical Question?	3
Summary	3
1. Introduction: Russell's 'such ultimate questions'	3
2. The Variety of Questions	4
3. A Resource-oriented Approach to the Nature of Questions	6
4. Three Kinds of Question	7
5. Philosophical Questions as Open Questions	8
6. First Objection: There are No Open Questions	10
7. Second Objection: There are Too Many Open Questions	13
8. Third Objection: Open Questions are Unanswerable	15
9. Fourth Objection: Open Questions are Indiscriminate	20
Conclusion: Philosophy as Conceptual Design	23
2. Philosophy as Conceptual Design	27
Summary	27
1. Introduction: From the User's Knowledge to the Maker's Knowledge	28
2. Plato's Wrong Step	31
3. The Maker's Knowledge Tradition	35
4. A Constructionist Methodology	38
5. Minimalism	39
6. The Method of Levels of Abstraction	41
7. Constructionism	47
Conclusion: Against Degenerate Epistemology	49
3. Constructionism as Non-naturalism	53
Summary	53
1. Introduction: A Plea for Non-naturalism	54
2. The Nature of Naturalism	57
3. Two Indefensible Non-naturalisms: The <i>Supernatural</i> and the <i>Preternatural</i>	62
4. Two Defensible Non-naturalisms: The Normative and the Semantic	63
5. In Defence of Non-naturalism	65
Conclusion: The Artefactual Nature of the Natural	67

## Part II. Philosophy as Conceptual Design

4. Perception and Testimony as Data Providers	71
Summary	71
1. Introduction: The Relationship between Knowledge and Information	71
2. A First Potential Difficulty	73
3. Some Background	73
4. Perception and the Phaedrus' Test (Plato)	75
5. Testimony and the Parrot's Test (Descartes)	76
6. Data Providers	77
7. A Second Potential Difficulty	79
8. More Background	80
9. The Vice Analogy	81
10. The Constructionist Interpretation of Perception and Testimony	82
11. Informational Realism: Structures, Interactions, and Causality	92
Conclusion: The Beautiful Glitch	97
5. Information Quality	101
Summary	101
1. Big Data	101
2. The Epistemological Problem with Big Data	104
3. From Big Data to Small Patterns	104
4. Information Quality	106
5. The Epistemological Problem with Information Quality	107
6. A Bi-categorical Approach to Information Quality	110
Conclusion: Back to Fit-for-Purpose	112
6. Informational Scepticism and the Logically Possible	113
Summary	113
1. Introduction: History and Analysis of Scepticism	114
2. The Two Faces of Scepticism	117
3. Non-naturalism and the Foundational Problem in German-speaking Philosophy	119
4. Coherentism, Naturalism, and the Refutation of Scepticism in British Philosophy	122
5. Pragmatist Epistemologies in American Philosophy	124
6. Possible Worlds and Borel Numbers	126
7. The Edit Distance as a Modal Metrics	131
8. Informational Scepticism or the Sceptical Challenge Reconstructed	135
9. The Redundancy of Radical Informational Scepticism	137
10. The Usefulness of Moderate Informational Scepticism	141
11. Objections and Replies	142
Conclusion: From Descartes to Peirce	147
7. A Defence of Information Closure	149
Summary	149
1. Introduction: The Modal Logic of Being Informed	149
2. The Formulation of the Principle of Information Closure	151



3. The Sceptical Objection	155
4. A Defence of the Principle	156
5. Objection and Reply	159
Conclusion: Information Closure and the Logic of Being Informed	160
8. Logical Fallacies as Bayesian Informational Shortcuts	162
Summary	162
1. Introduction: A Greener Approach to Logic	162
2. What are Logical Fallacies?	163
3. Do Formal Logical Fallacies Provide Any Information?	163
4. Formal Logical Fallacies and Their Explanations	164
5. Bayes' Theorem	165
6. Bayes' Theorem and the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent	166
7. Bayes' Theorem and the Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent	167
8. Logical Formal Fallacies and Their Bayesian Interpretation	168
9. Advantages of the Bayesian Interpretation of Formal Logical Fallacies	169
Conclusion: Rationality Regained	170
9. Maker's Knowledge, between A Priori and A Posteriori	171
Summary	171
1. Introduction: The Question about Maker's Knowledge	172
2. Maker's Knowledge: Same Information	174
3. Maker's Knowledge: Different Account	177
4. Maker's Knowledge: <i>ab anteriori</i>	180
Conclusion: Some Consequences of the Analysis of the Maker's Knowledge	185
10. The Logic of Design as a Conceptual Logic of Information	188
Summary	188
1. Introduction: Two Modern Conceptual Logics of Information	189
2. Design, Contradictions, and Dialetheism	195
3. The Logic of Design as a Logic of Requirements	197
Conclusion: From <i>Mimesis</i> to <i>Poiesis</i>	204
Afterword—Rebooting Philosophy	207
Introduction	207
Scholasticism as the Philosophical Enemy of Open Questions	207
Philosophical Questions Worth Asking	209
A Philosophical Anthropology to Approach Philosophical Questions	210
How to Make Sense of the World and Design It Today	211
Conclusion: Creative Destruction in Philosophy	212
References	215
Index	231