

Contents

Part I Law as a Complex Practice: The Rule-Based Model

1	Legal Theory as a Scientific Discipline and the Variety of Rules	5
1.1	Preliminary.....	5
1.2	Austin and the Autonomy of Legal Theory	6
1.3	Kelsen and the Scientific Amendment of Legal Positivism.....	10
1.4	Beyond Commands and Imperatives: The Puzzle of Secondary Rules	13
2	Legal Validity and the Problem of Rule-Acceptance	19
2.1	Preliminary.....	19
2.2	Four Notions of Acceptance	21
2.3	The Ambiguities of Acceptance as Observance	27
3	Reflective Acceptance: Reasons for Action and Criterion-Rules	31
3.1	Preliminary.....	31
3.2	Internal Point of View and Rule-Government	33
3.3	Rules as Reasons for Action	36
3.4	Habits, Rules and the Limits of Hart's Approach.....	38
3.5	A Quasi-Wittgensteinian Reading of the Practice Theory.....	41
3.6	Criterion-Rules and Conditions of Thinkability	46
4	The Legal Practice and Its (Vanishing) Borders	49
4.1	Preliminary.....	49
4.2	The 'Payne Problem': Relevant Population and Lay People	50
4.3	Rule-Based Model of What?.....	54
4.4	Law as a Practice Among Practices	60

Part II Law as a Selective Practice: The Social and the Legal

5	The Pluralist Divide	67
5.1	Preliminary.....	67
5.2	The Reasons for Legal Pluralism: Pragmatic and Conceptual Arguments.....	68
5.3	First Type of Pluralism: Law as Organisation.....	71
5.3.1	Eugen Ehrlich: The Living Law of Associations.....	72
5.3.2	Santi Romano: Institutions as Legal Orders	76
5.4	Second Type of Pluralism: The Artificial Character of Law	79
5.4.1	Sally Falk Moore: The Dialectic Spontaneity/Artificiality.....	79
5.4.2	Marc Galanter: The Historicity of Legal Borders.....	83
5.5	Third Type of Pluralism: The Dissolution of Legal Pluralism.....	86
5.5.1	Sally Engle Merry: Law as Frame of Significance	87
5.5.2	Brian Tamanaha: The Praxiological Way-Out	90
5.6	Legal Pluralism: A Provisional Assessment	94
6	Legal Pluralism Revised: Law as the Product of Selection.....	99
6.1	Preliminary.....	99
6.2	The Root of All Evils: The Malinowski Problem.....	99
6.3	Legal Selection and Legitimate Coercion: Hoebel's View	105
6.4	Towards a Concept of Law as a Selective Practice	111
7	Classic Institutionalism: Jural Reality and Legal Selection	113
7.1	Preliminary.....	113
7.2	Institutions, Inner Orders, and Romano's Dilemma	114
7.3	Jural Reality and Official Law	119
7.4	Integrating Institutionalism: Thin Functionalism	125
8	Exploring the Jural Continuum	127
8.1	Preliminary.....	127
8.2	The Background of Social Practices	128
8.3	Criterion-Rules, Instance-Rules, Norm-Rules	132
8.4	The Jural Continuum: Practices, Institutions, Organisations.....	139
8.5	Relevant Population and Lay People Reconsidered.....	144

Part III The Law as a Special Practice: Legal Field and Social Reality

9	Negotiating Reality: Knowledge and Categories in the Legal Field.....	151
9.1	Preliminary.....	151
9.2	Law as a Trans-Sectional Venue	152
9.3	Law and Its Custodians: The Paradigmatic Case of the Roman <i>ius</i>	157

9.4	The Semiotic Circuit of Law: The Intriguing Case of <i>Mekgwa Le Melao</i>	162
9.5	Is Productive Circularity Really Distinctive? A Theoretical Objection.....	167
9.6	The Indispensable Self-sufficiency	173
10	The Ritual Dimension of Law: Normality, Normativity, and Critique.....	177
10.1	Preliminary.....	177
10.2	Ritual and the 'Question of Plausibility'	178
10.3	Law's Nondiscursive Dimension: Normality and Normative Facts	187
10.4	Law's Discursive Dimension: The Space for Critique.....	190
	Epilogue	195
	Defending a Pluralist Critical-Institutional View of Law	195
	Bibliography	201
	Author Index	209
	Subject Index	213