

Contents

Preface	xi
Introduction: What is Analytic Philosophy?	1
<i>Leading Analytic Philosophers</i>	6
1 Russell and Moore	8
<i>Empiricism, Mathematics, and Symbolic Logic</i>	8
<i>Logicism</i>	12
<i>Russell on Definite Descriptions</i>	20
<i>G. E. Moore's Philosophy of Common Sense</i>	27
<i>Moore and Russell on Sense Data</i>	30
<i>Moore's and Russell's Anti-Hegelianism</i>	33
<i>Summary</i>	38
2 Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, and Logical Positivism	46
<i>Introduction</i>	46
<i>Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</i>	48
<i>Historical Note: The Vienna Circle and their Allies</i>	58
<i>The Elimination of Metaphysics and the Logical Positivist Program</i>	59
<i>The Demise of the Vienna Circle</i>	68
<i>The Influence of the Logical Positivists</i>	69
3 Responses to Logical Positivism: Quine, Kuhn, and American Pragmatism	76
<i>Introduction</i>	76
<i>The Demise of the Verifiability Criterion of Meaningfulness</i>	78
<i>Quine's Rejection of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction</i>	82
<i>Quinean Empiricism without the Dogmas</i>	86
<i>American Pragmatists after Quine: Nelson Goodman, Richard Rorty, and Hilary Putnam</i>	101

Contents

4	Oxford Ordinary Language Philosophy and Later Wittgenstein	119
	Introduction	119
	The Attack on Formalism – Strawson and Ryle	124
	Philosophy of Language – Austin and Wittgenstein	128
	Philosophy of Mind – Ryle, Strawson, and Wittgenstein	138
	The Rejection of Sense Data Theory	147
	The Legacy of Ordinary Language Philosophy	153
5	Responses to Ordinary Language Philosophy: Logic, Language, and Mind	160
	Part 1: Formal Logic and Philosophy of Language	161
	Gödel and Tarski	161
	Davidson	166
	Grice	174
	Carnap – Meaning and Necessity	178
	Chomsky	180
	Part 2: Philosophy of Mind	183
	Functionalism	183
	Objections to Functionalism – Bats and the Chinese Room	188
	Anomalous Monism	192
	The Problem of Mental Causation	194
6	The Rebirth of Metaphysics	204
	Modal Logic	204
	Possible Worlds	212
	Problems with the Canonical Conception of Possible Worlds	216
	Transworld Identity and Identification	223
	The Modal Version of the Ontological Argument	229
7	Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds: Kripke, Putnam, and Donnellan	239
	Introduction	239
	The Traditional Theory of Meaning and Reference	240
	Kripke's and Donnellan's Criticism of the Traditional Theory: Names and Descriptions	243
	Natural Kind Terms	247
	Problems for the New Theory of Reference	253
	Applications of the New Theory of Reference to the Philosophy of Mind	257
	The Social, Cultural, and Institutional Basis of Meaning and Reference	260
8	Ethics and Metaethics in the Analytic Tradition	264
	Introduction	264
	G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica	266

<i>The Non-Cognitivism of C. L. Stevenson</i>	269
<i>The Universal Prescriptivism of R. M. Hare</i>	272
<i>The Return to Substantive Ethics</i>	275
<i>Questioning the Fact/Value Divide</i>	278
<i>Peter Singer and Animal Liberation</i>	281
<i>John Rawls' Theory of Justice</i>	285
 9 Epilogue: Analytic Philosophy Today and Tomorrow	 299
<i>Analytic Philosophy since 1980</i>	299
<i>What is the Future of Analytic Philosophy?</i>	321
 References	 327
Index	337

Analytic philosophy was the dominant Anglo-American philosophical movement of the twentieth century, and remains dominant today. Enough time has now passed that we are able to have historical perspective on this vital philosophical tradition. My aim with this book is to provide a general overview of the leading philosophers, theories, movements, and controversies of analytic philosophy, as well as some idea of its cultural, political, and social setting.

The Anglo-American analytic tradition starts with Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore at the beginning of the twentieth century. The most recent works that I focus on are from the 1970s. The Epilogue is a brief discussion of the development of analytic philosophy from 1980 to the present day, and a look to the future.

I have not assumed that the reader has any formal background in philosophy. Analytic philosophy is technical, however. It grew out of developments in logic and the foundations of mathematics. Leaving out all technicalities would mean leaving out many interesting and central aspects of analytic philosophy. Rather than clutter the text with explanations of terms and issues that would be familiar to those readers who have studied philosophy, I have provided background snippets at the end of each chapter. These are indicated in the text as [Background n.m.—Subject]. Those who would find the background helpful can flip to the end of the chapter. Others can skip them. The use of symbolic logic at places in the text is unavoidable. At the end of Chapter 1 I have provided a background on basic symbolism for those unfamiliar with symbolic logic. At the end of each chapter I have appended an annotated list of further readings for those interested in pursuing topics in more depth or following out other tentacles.

For each philosopher that I discuss I have given relevant and representative quotes to illustrate my expositions. I want the philosophers to have a chance to speak for themselves, and to give a sense of how