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# CONTENTS

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<i>Foreword by Dr John Temple Lang .....</i>	ix
<i>Preface .....</i>	xi
<i>Case Law, Commission Decisions, Legislation, EU Documents,</i>	
<i>Other Documents.....</i>	xxi
<b>1. In the General Interest?.....</b>	1
A. Introduction .....	1
B. The Nature of the Problem .....	3
C. The Mechanics of Article 106(2) .....	6
1. Services of General Economic Interest.....	6
2. Entrustment with Particular Tasks .....	9
3. Necessity .....	10
4. Proportionality .....	11
5. The Effect on the Development of Trade.....	12
D. The Essence of Government Failure and its Cost .....	13
1. A Primer on the Concept of Government Failure.....	13
2. The Cost of Government Failure.....	15
E. This Book.....	16
1. Objectives .....	16
2. Approach .....	17
3. Elements .....	19
<b>2. The Pathology of Government Failure.....</b>	21
A. Introduction .....	21
B. Government Failure and Market Failure .....	22
C. The Constitutional Grounding for Government Failure Control Under Article 106(2) .....	24
D. Approaches to Government Failure .....	26
1. Wolf's Theory of Government Failure.....	27
2. Le Grand's Critique of Wolf.....	28
3. Röller et al's Refined Economic Approach for State Aid .....	29
E. Government Failure Under Article 106(2).....	31
1. The Risk of Government Failure in SGEI Formulation .....	31
2. Diagnosing Government Failure in SGEI Verification .....	33
(a) Context.....	33
(b) Forms of Market Failure .....	35

3.	Market Feasibility as the Critical Government Failure Concern in SGEI Verification.....	40
4.	Diagnosing Government Failure in Disapplication Review .....	41
	(a) Limitations of Government Failure Theories for the Purposes of Disapplication Review .....	41
	(b) Adapting Insights from Government Failure to Assess Disapplication Review.....	43
F.	Conclusions .....	45
3.	<b>The Contestation and Indeterminacy of Article 106(2).....</b>	46
A.	Introduction .....	46
B.	The Political, Constitutional and Administrative Battleground.....	47
	1. The Trigger—Article 106(3) .....	47
	2. An Evolving Constitutional Position for SGEIs.....	49
	(a) Article 16 Treaty Establishing the European Community....	49
	(b) The Public Service Broadcasting Protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty .....	50
	(c) The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (TECE)....	51
	(d) Article 14 of the TFEU Introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon....	52
	(e) Protocol 26 to the Treaty of Lisbon .....	53
	3. The Commission’s SGEI Containment Strategy.....	55
	(a) The Commission’s Soft Law Guidance .....	55
	(b) Avoiding a Framework Directive .....	57
	(c) Stylising Services of General Economic Interest.....	58
	4. Manifest Error and the Problem of Legitimacy .....	60
	(a) Judicial Approval .....	60
	(b) An Open Standard.....	61
C.	Accounts of Article 106(2) .....	62
	1. Prosser’s Solidarity-based Account of SGEIs .....	62
	2. Ross’s Communautaire Core Reading of <i>BUPA</i> .....	63
	3. Ølykke and Møllgard’s Network Component Theory of SGEIs ...	65
	4. Sauter and Schepel’s Pre-emption-based Account of Proportionality Review Under Article 106(2) .....	66
D.	Conclusions .....	69
4.	<b>A Most Contingent Exemption .....</b>	70
A.	Introduction .....	70
B.	Contestation—The Scope of Article 106(2) <i>Ratione Materiae</i> .....	70
	1. Introduction .....	70
	2. The Public Authority Exception .....	71
	3. The Solidarity-based Exception and Undertakings.....	76
C.	Competition—The Free Movement Derogations .....	83
	1. Introduction .....	83
	2. Direct Effect and Scope.....	83

(a) The Free Movement Derogations .....	83
(b) Article 106(2).....	86
3. Hard Limits on Article 106(2)?.....	89
4. A Preference Revealed .....	91
5. Explaining the Court's Preference .....	94
D. Subordination—The State Aid Rules .....	95
1. Introduction .....	95
2. Procedural Relationship Between Article 106(2) and State Aid Enforcement .....	95
3. <i>Altmark</i> as a Proxy for Article 106(2).....	97
E. Conclusions .....	99
<b>5. Government Failure in Assessing Market Feasibility .....</b>	<b>102</b>
A. Introduction .....	102
B. Telecommunications .....	103
1. The Economics of the Telecommunications Sector .....	104
2. Universal Service Obligations as the Exemplary SGEI .....	105
3. The Digital Revolution.....	106
(a) Technological Transformation.....	106
(b) Economic Reordering.....	107
4. Broadband and Hybrid-Market Failure .....	107
5. The Curtailment of Permissible SGEIs .....	110
C. Environmental Protection .....	113
1. The Economics of Environmental Protection .....	114
2. The Constitutional Treatment of Environmental Issues.....	115
3. Environmental Arguments and SGEIs.....	116
4. The Presumptive Environmental SGEI .....	117
5. Market Failure Deconstructing the Presumptive SGEI .....	120
6. Environmental Public Goods as SGEIs .....	123
D. Broadcasting .....	125
1. The Economics of Broadcasting.....	125
(a) Market Failures in Broadcasting.....	125
(b) The Merit Goods Argument for PSB .....	127
2. The Informed Citizenry Justification for PSBs.....	128
3. Digitalisation and the Emergence of the Consumer Sovereignty Paradigm .....	129
(a) The Transformation of Broadcasting Through Digitalisation .....	129
(b) The Erosion of the Market Failure Case for Intervention .....	129
4. PSB and Market Feasibility Under Article 106(2) .....	131
(a) Defining PSB and its Treatment as a Conclusive SGEI.....	131
(b) Renouncing Market Feasibility .....	134
5. Digital Switchover and Market Failure .....	136
E. Conclusions .....	138

<b>6. Government Failure in Disapplication Review .....</b>	141
A. Introduction .....	141
B. The First Phase—The Strict Exception .....	142
1. Introduction .....	142
2. Transparency and Proof.....	142
3. Necessity and Proportionality .....	144
(a) The General Position.....	144
(b) Pragmatism Portended.....	146
4. Efficiency—The Manifest Incapacity Doctrine and Article 106(2).....	148
C. The Second Phase—Permissive Derogation .....	150
1. Introduction .....	150
2. Transparency and Proof.....	150
3. Necessity and Proportionality .....	153
(a) The Necessity of the Intervention.....	153
(b) Proportionality of Means.....	159
4. Efficiency.....	160
(a) The Limits of the Manifest Incapacity Doctrine.....	161
(b) Pre-eminence as to SGEI Definition Precluding Efficiency Scrutiny .....	161
D. The Third Phase—Partial Revival .....	163
1. Introduction .....	163
2. <i>Altmark</i> and the Transformation of Article 106(2) .....	164
(a) Altmark and the Mitigation of Government Failure .....	164
(b) Initial Stasis.....	165
3. Elements of Disapplication Analysis post <i>Altmark</i> Implementation.....	166
(a) Transparency and Proof .....	166
(b) Necessity and Proportionality.....	167
(c) Efficiency .....	172
E. Conclusions .....	174
<b>7. Contours of a Better Exemption .....</b>	176
A. Introduction .....	176
B. Government Failure Redux.....	176
1. The Problem of Government Failure Under Article 106(2) .....	176
2. Implications of the Exposure of Government Failure.....	178
(a) A Single Strict Proportionality Standard Under Article 106(2) is not Viable .....	178
(b) The Contingency of Article 106(2) is Irreversible in Significant Respects .....	180
(c) Greater Deference is Required from the Commission in the Supervision of General Interest Interventions that are not Market Failure Related .....	180

C.	Proposals for a Reorientation of the Law with Respect to SGEIs .....	181
1.	Clarify the Nature of Manifest Error Control under Article 106(2).....	182
2.	Establish Market Feasibility Testing as the Basis of SGEI Verification .....	183
3.	Distinguish Between Existing and New Special or Exclusive Rights Underpinned by SGEIs.....	185
4.	Make Compliance with Relevant Sectoral Legislation a Condition of Article 106(2) Qualification .....	187
5.	Revisit the Public Authority and Solidarity Exclusions.....	188
D.	Concluding Observations .....	188
	 <i>Bibliography</i> .....	191
	<i>Index</i> .....	207