

# Contents

## Preface

vii

---

## ■ 1 ESCALATION

|                                                        |    |
|--------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 1.1. Introduction                                      | 1  |
| 1.2. Game-Tree Analyses                                | 3  |
| 1.3. Limitations and Back-of-the-Envelope Calculations | 10 |
| 1.4. Statement of O'Neill's Theorem                    | 14 |
| 1.5. Conclusions                                       | 16 |
| Exercises                                              | 17 |

---

## ■ 2 CONFLICT

|                                              |    |
|----------------------------------------------|----|
| 2.1. Introduction                            | 21 |
| 2.2. Dominant Strategies and Nash Equilibria | 25 |
| 2.3. Prisoner's Dilemma                      | 26 |
| 2.4. A Game-Theoretic Model of the Arms Race | 29 |
| 2.5. Chicken                                 | 31 |

|                                                        |    |
|--------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 2.6. Game-Theoretic Models of the Cuban Missile Crisis | 33 |
| 2.7. Conclusions                                       | 35 |
| Exercises                                              | 35 |

---

### ■ 3 YES-NO VOTING

|                                                                                                      |    |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 3.1. Introduction                                                                                    | 45 |
| 3.2. Swap Robustness and the Nonweightedness of the<br>Federal System                                | 51 |
| 3.3. Trade Robustness and the Nonweightedness of the<br>Procedure to Amend the Canadian Constitution | 54 |
| 3.4. Statement of the Characterization Theorem                                                       | 57 |
| 3.5. Conclusions                                                                                     | 58 |
| Exercises                                                                                            | 59 |

---

### ■ 4 POLITICAL POWER

|                                                          |    |
|----------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 4.1. Introduction                                        | 63 |
| 4.2. The Shapley-Shubik Index of Power                   | 65 |
| 4.3. Calculations for the European Economic<br>Community | 71 |
| 4.4. A Theorem on Voting Blocs                           | 75 |
| 4.5. The Banzhaf Index of Power                          | 78 |
| 4.6. Two Methods of Computing Banzhaf Power              | 80 |
| 4.7. Ordinal Power: Incomparability                      | 85 |
| 4.8. Conclusions                                         | 90 |
| Exercises                                                | 90 |

---

### ■ 5 SOCIAL CHOICE

|                                                               |     |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 5.1. Introduction                                             | 96  |
| 5.2. Five Examples of Social Choice Procedures                | 100 |
| 5.3. Four Desirable Properties of Social Choice<br>Procedures | 105 |
| 5.4. Positive Results—Proofs                                  | 108 |



|                                   |     |
|-----------------------------------|-----|
| 5.5. Negative Results—Proofs      | 113 |
| 5.6. The Condorcet Voting Paradox | 121 |
| 5.7. A Glimpse of Impossibility   | 123 |
| 5.8. Conclusions                  | 126 |
| Exercises                         | 127 |

---

## ■ 6 MORE ESCALATION

|                                                                                   |     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 6.1. Introduction                                                                 | 134 |
| 6.2. Statement of the Strong Version of O'Neill's Theorem                         | 135 |
| 6.3. Proof (by Mathematical Induction) of the Strong Version of O'Neill's Theorem | 141 |
| 6.4. Vickrey Auctions                                                             | 143 |
| 6.5. Vickrey Auctions as a Generalized Prisoner's Dilemma                         | 147 |
| 6.6. Conclusions                                                                  | 150 |
| Exercises                                                                         | 151 |

---

## ■ 7 MORE CONFLICT

|                                          |     |
|------------------------------------------|-----|
| 7.1. Introduction                        | 155 |
| 7.2. The Yom Kippur War                  | 156 |
| 7.3. The Theory of Moves                 | 158 |
| 7.4. Models of Deterrence                | 166 |
| 7.5. A Probabilistic Model of Deterrence | 171 |
| 7.6. Two-Person Zero-Sum Games           | 176 |
| 7.7. Conclusions                         | 182 |
| Exercises                                | 183 |

---

## ■ 8 MORE YES-NO VOTING

|                                                   |     |
|---------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 8.1. Introduction                                 | 188 |
| 8.2. A Magic Square Voting System                 | 189 |
| 8.3. Dimension Theory and the U.S. Federal System | 192 |

|                                     |     |
|-------------------------------------|-----|
| 8.4. Vector-Weighted Voting Systems | 196 |
| 8.5. Conclusions                    | 201 |
| Exercises                           | 202 |

---

## ■ 9 MORE POLITICAL POWER

|                                       |     |
|---------------------------------------|-----|
| 9.1. Introduction                     | 205 |
| 9.2. The Johnston Index of Power      | 206 |
| 9.3. The Deegan–Packel Index of Power | 209 |
| 9.4. The Power of the President       | 211 |
| 9.5. Ordinal Power: Comparability     | 224 |
| 9.6. The Chair’s Paradox              | 231 |
| 9.7. Conclusions                      | 237 |
| Exercises                             | 238 |

---

## ■ 10 MORE SOCIAL CHOICE

|                                                   |     |
|---------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 10.1. Introduction                                | 241 |
| 10.2. Social Welfare Functions                    | 242 |
| 10.3. May’s Theorem for Two Alternatives          | 245 |
| 10.4. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem               | 248 |
| 10.5. Single Peakedness—Theorems of Black and Sen | 259 |
| 10.6. Conclusions                                 | 268 |
| Exercises                                         | 269 |

|                     |     |
|---------------------|-----|
| <b>Attributions</b> | 273 |
| <b>References</b>   | 277 |
| <b>Index</b>        | 281 |