

Contents

Acknowledgments	9
Preface	11

1. Reason-giving Explanations

1. Introducing intentional acts	15
2. The reason-giving relation	19
3. Explaining with reasons	33
4. Conclusion	40

2. Reason-giving Explanations as Causal Explanations: the Argument from Conditionals

1. Conditional claims implied by reason-giving explanations	42
2. Causal explanations and conditionals	45
3. Davidson's minimal causal account	49
4. Non-causal conditional links	55

3. Intentional Theory and Conceptual Connections

1. Intentional theory	60
2. Can intentional laws be completed?	68
3. Intentional kinds as natural kinds?	70

Contents

4. The logical connection argument	73
5. Conclusion	84

4. Anti-reductionism and Psycho-physical Laws

1. The orthodoxy	85
2. What is reduction?	86
3. Classical models and the unity of science	88
4. Arguments against reduction	92
5. Psycho-physical laws	99
6. Conclusion	104

5. Supervenience and Reduction

1. Supervenience	105
2. Supervenience vs. reduction	112
3. Supervenience and token identity	116
4. Physicalist arguments for reduction	118
5. Conclusion	122

6. Functionalism

1. What is functionalism?	123
2. Arguments for functionalist reduction	127
3. Problems with functionalist reduction	131
4. Anti-reductionist materialism	139

Contents

**7. Postscript: Individualism and
Intentional Explanation**

1. Individualism vs. the world-dependence of thought	145
2. Arguments for individualism	146
3. The world-dependence of thought	148
4. Some revisionist proposals	151
5. Challenging the individualist's motivation	160
6. Conclusion	166
 Bibliography	 167
Index	172