

Contents

Abbreviations and Conventions

xvii

1. Introduction

1

1. Ethics and Its History

1

2. The Possibility of Philosophical Conversation

2

3. What Is Ethics About? Socrates' Question

3

4. How to Answer Socrates' Question

4

5. The Right and the Good

5

6. Conceptions of the Good

6

7. My Good and the Good of Others: Duty and Interest

6

8. Reason and Desire

7

9. Meta-Ethical Questions

7

10. Periods in the History of Ethics

9

11. Aims of This Book

9

2. Socrates: The Choice of Lives

11

12. Morality in Peace and War

11

13. How Ought We to Live?

13

14. Happiness and Virtue: Some Preliminaries

13

15. Socrates' Inquiries: The Examined Life

14

16. Socrates' Convictions

16

17. Assumptions About the Virtues

16

18. Virtue Is Necessary and Sufficient for Happiness

17

19. Happiness is Maximum Pleasure

18

20. Why Is Knowledge Sufficient for Virtue?

19

21. An Argument against Hedonism

20

22. An Adaptive Conception of Happiness

20

23. The One-Sided Successors of Socrates

21

24. The Cyrenaic Version of Hedonism

22

25. The Cynic Defence of Socrates

22

3. Plato

24

26. Plato and Socrates

24

27. Definitions and the Metaphysics of Morals: Moral Objectivity

24

28. Rational v. Non-Rational Desires

26

29. Rational and Non-Rational Aspects of the Virtues

27

30. An Unanswered Question: The Problem of Justice

28

31. Why Justice Is Always Better than Injustice

29

32. An Objection: Is Plato's Argument Irrelevant to the Question?

30

33. Plato's Answer: A Diagnosis of Injustice

31

34. The Outlook of Reason Requires Other-Directed Justice

31

35. Morality, Reason, and Self-Interest

33

4. Aristotle	34
36. Aristotle and Plato: What Is Happiness?	34
37. The Right Method Requires the Systematic Examination of Initially Plausible Beliefs	34
38. Since Happiness Is the Ultimate End, It Must Be the Complete Good	35
39. Happiness Has to Be Understood through the Human Function	36
40. This Conception Is Preferable to Other Conceptions of Happiness	38
41. Happiness Is Partly, But Not Wholly, Vulnerable to External Circumstances	39
42. Happiness Requires Virtue of the Rational and the Non-Rational Soul	39
43. A Virtue of Character Is a State That Elects	40
44. The Virtues Lie in a Mean State, in Actions and in Feelings	41
45. Pleasure in the Appropriate Objects Is Necessary for Virtue	42
46. Vice and Virtue Are Different from Incontinence and Continence	43
47. Virtue of Character Requires Practical Reason and Deliberation	44
48. Virtues of Character Include an 'Ought' That Is Directed towards the Fine	45
49. Are Aristotelian Virtues Moral Virtues?	46
50. Are We Better Off if We Have the Virtues?	48
51. Friendship Connects One's Own Good with the Good of Others	48
52. Two Conceptions of Happiness?	49
5. Scepticism	51
53. The 'Hellenistic' World and Later Antiquity	51
54. Hellenistic Ethical Theories Are Systematic	52
55. The Sceptics Describe a Route to Suspension of Judgment	53
56. Aristotle Argues That Variation Does Not Support Scepticism	54
57. Tranquillity: Does the Sceptic Achieve Happiness?	55
58. If Sceptics Have No Beliefs, Are They Inactive?	55
59. What Sort of Life Can Sceptics Live without Beliefs?	56
6. Epicurus: Happiness as Pleasure	58
60. A New Defence of Hedonism	58
61. Pleasure Is the Ultimate End	58
62. Tranquillity Maximizes Pleasure: A Reply to Callicles	59
63. Epicureans Achieve Tranquillity, and Overcome the Fear of Death	60
64. What Should a Hedonist Choose? Epicurus, Aristippus, and Callicles	60
65. Is Pleasure the Only Non-Instrumental Good? Epicurus and Aristotle	61
66. An Enlightened Hedonist Chooses the Virtues	62
67. Difficulties in a Hedonist Defence of the Virtues	63
7. The Stoics: Happiness as Virtue	64
68. Socrates, the Cynics, and the Stoics	64
69. The Development of Virtue	64
70. Only the Right Is Good	65
71. Objections to the Stoic Account of Happiness	66
72. Appropriate Actions Aim at Preferred Indifferents	67
73. Indifferents Matter, Though They Are Neither Good Nor Bad	67
74. Passions Are Mistaken Assents	68
75. The Stoics Apply Their Ethics to Social Theory	69

76. The Cosmos Displays Intelligent Design and Providence	70
77. A Question About Stoic Determinism: Aristotle's Conditions for Responsibility	71
78. Epicurus: To Defend Responsibility, We Must Reject Determinism	72
79. The Stoics: Determinism Must Allow Co-determination	73
80. The Stoics: We Are Responsible for Our Co-determined Actions in a Deterministic Cosmos	74
8. Christian Belief and Moral Philosophy: Augustine	76
81. Connexions between Christian Doctrine and Moral Theory	76
82. Divine Commands and Rational Morality	76
83. The Letter and the Spirit of the Moral Law: Jesus and Paul	77
84. The Moral Law and Sin	78
85. Sin and Free Will	78
86. Grace, Justification, and Free Will	79
87. Christian Morality in the World	81
9. Aquinas	83
88. From Ancient to Mediaeval	83
89. The Rediscovery of Aristotle	84
90. Ancient and Mediaeval: Questions About Morality	85
91. The Place of Ethics in Aquinas' Philosophy	86
92. We Have both a Rational Will and Non-Rational Passions	87
93. If We Have a Rational Will, We Pursue the Ultimate Good	89
94. Human Happiness Is Imperfect in This Life, but Perfect in the Afterlife	89
95. Rational Agency Is Free Agency	90
96. Virtue of Character Is the Right Use of Free Will	92
97. Practical Reason Is Concerned both with Means and with Ends	93
98. How Can Natural Law Be a Law?	94
99. Natural Law Consists of Rational Principles	94
100. From Natural Law to the Virtues	95
101. Natural Law Requires Social Virtues	96
102. Why Does My Good Require the Good of Others?	97
103. Sin and Grace	98
104. Acquired and Infused Virtues	99
10. Scotus and Ockham	101
105. Critics of Aquinas	101
106. The Will Is Free because It Is Undetermined	101
107. The Desire for Happiness Cannot Be the Basis of Morality	103
108. Impartial Concern for the Just Is the Basis of Morality	104
109. Can the Will Be both Rational and Free? A Difficulty for Scotus	105
110. An Objection to Aquinas on Divine Freedom and the Natural Law	105
111. The Natural Law Depends on God's Free Choice	106
112. God's Freedom and God's Justice: A Question About Voluntarism	107
11. Morality and Social Human Nature: Suarez and Grotius	109
113. The Reformation	109
114. The Renaissance	110

115. The Scientific Revolution	110
116. Modern States and Philosophical Traditions	110
117. The Continuity between Modern and Mediaeval Moral Philosophy	112
118. Suarez: A Middle Way Resolves the Dispute About Natural Law	113
119. Suarez: This Middle Way Provides a Partial Defence of Voluntarism	113
120. Suarez: The Middle Way Provides a Defence of Naturalism	114
121. Suarez: Why Is the Middle Way Best?	115
122. Should Suarez Have Accepted an Imperative Conception of Morality?	116
123. Nature Is the Basis of the Human Good and of Human Goodness	117
124. Grotius: Natural Law Is Relevant both in War and in Peace	117
125. Grotius: Natural Law Rests on Facts About Human Nature	118
126. Grotius: Scepticism About Morality Is Mistaken	119
12. Hobbes: Natural Law without Social Human Nature	120
127. Hobbes v. Grotius on Natural Law	120
128. The Will Is Not Rational Desire	121
129. In the State of Nature Practical Reason Does Not Recommend Morality	122
130. Practical Reason Shows Us the Way Out of the State of Nature	123
131. Some, but Not All, Obligations Rest on Commands	124
132. Morality Can Be Defended by Its Consequences: Indirect Consequentialism and Indirect Egoism	125
133. Is Morality Justified Only by the Preservation of Peace?	126
134. The Fool Raises a Question about Indirect Egoism	127
13. Voluntarism, Naturalism, and Moral Realism: Pufendorf, Shaftesbury, Cudworth, and Clarke	130
135. Objections to Hobbes	130
136. Pufendorf: A Voluntarist Argument Refutes Hobbes	130
137. Pufendorf's Arguments for Voluntarism: (1) Moral Properties Are Not Natural, but Are Imposed on Nature	131
138. Pufendorf's Arguments for Voluntarism: (2) Natural Goodness Is Insufficient for Morality	132
139. Pufendorf's Arguments for Voluntarism: (3) Only Voluntarism Explains the Disinterested Character of Morality	133
140. Critics of Hobbes and Voluntarism	133
141. Shaftesbury: Moral Realism Opposes both Egoism and Voluntarism	134
142. Cudworth: Voluntarism Cannot Account for the Stability of Moral Principles	135
143. Hobbes and Pufendorf: A Defence of Voluntarism?	136
144. Clarke: Hobbes Has to Recognize Morality in the State of Nature	137
145. Clarke: Moral Facts Are About Fitness	137
146. Clarke: Basic Moral Principles Are Easily Recognized	139
147. Clarke: Morality Requires Benevolence, Regulated by Justice	139
14. Sentimentalism: A Non-Rational Ground for Morality—Hutcheson and Hume	141
148. Reason v. Sentiment: The Basic Division	141
149. The Basis of Moral Judgments	142

150. Hobbes and Hutcheson: Practical Reason Is Subordinate to Non-Rational Desire	142
151. Hume: Reason Has Only Limited Functions in Action	144
152. Hume: We Tend to Confuse Passion and Reason	145
153. Hutcheson: Since We Have a Moral Sense, Hobbesian Egoism Is False	146
154. Hutcheson v. Shaftesbury: Objectivist v. Subjectivist Conceptions of the Moral Sense	147
155. Moral Judgments Include Emotions	148
156. How Are Moral Judgments Connected to Motivation?	149
157. Moral Facts Are Not Objective	149
158. We Cannot Derive 'Ought' from 'Is'	150
159. The Moral Sense Takes the Viewpoint of an Impartial Observer	151
160. Correct Moral Judgments Are About Utility	152
161. Is Hume's Position Consistent?	153
162. The Moral Sense Explains Rightness and Wrongness	154
163. A Utilitarian Conception of the Moral Sense	155
164. Is the Outlook of the Moral Sense Utilitarian?	155
165. Hume: The Moral Sense Approves of both Natural and Artificial Virtues	157
166. Justice Is Not Based on a Contract, but on a Convention for Mutual Advantage	158
167. Our Moral Sentiment Approves of Justice	159
168. Our Moral Sentiment Approves of Indirect Utilitarian Rules	160
169. The Sensible Knave Questions the Supremacy of Morality	161
170. Hume: A Sentimentalist Can Give Good Reasons to Care About Morality	161
171. Questions About Hume's Reply to the Knave	163
15. Rationalism: A Rational Ground for Morality—Butler, Price, and Reid	164
172. Butler: Nature Is the Basis for Prudence and Morality	164
173. Butler: 'Nature' and 'Natural' Have Three Senses	165
174. Butler: Some Choices Are Based on Superior Principles	166
175. Butler: Reasonable Self-Love Is a Superior Principle	167
176. Reid: Sentimentalists Underestimate the Functions of Practical Reason	168
177. Price and Reid: The Moral Sense Gives Us Knowledge of Objective Moral Properties	169
178. Reid: Contrary to Hume, Moral Rightness Is Objective	169
179. Price: Sentimentalists Do Not Understand Moral Properties	171
180. Price: Contrary to Hume, We Can Derive 'Ought' from 'Is'	172
181. Balguy: Sentimentalists Cannot Explain the Correction of Moral Judgments	173
182. Price: Sentimentalism, Scepticism, and Nihilism	174
183. Butler: Conscience Is the Supreme Practical Principle	175
184. Butler: The Utilitarian Elements of Morality Depend on the Rational Principle of Benevolence	177
185. Butler: Since Conscience Is Different from Benevolence, Morality Is Different from Utility	178
186. Reid: The Moral Goodness of Agents Is Distinct from the Moral Goodness of Actions	179

187. Reid: Justice Does Not Depend on Utility	179
188. Price: Indirect Utilitarianism Is No More Plausible than Indirect Egoism	180
189. Price: Utilitarian Reasons Are Not the Only Moral Reasons	181
190. Price: There Is No One Supreme Principle of Morality	182
191. How Rationalism Casts Doubt on Utilitarianism	184
192. Butler: We Have Good Reason to Care About Morality	184
193. Butler: Not All Our Actions Aim at Our Own Pleasure	185
194. Butler: Benevolence and Conscience Do Not Conflict with Self-Interest	186
195. Butler: Self-Love and Conscience Agree	187
16. Kant and Some Critics	188
196. Critique, Enlightenment, Rousseau	188
197. From Enlightenment to Morality	189
198. Reactions to Kant	191
199. Intuitive Views About Morality	192
200. Is Morality Based on Preferences?	193
201. Some Reasons Do Not Depend on Preferences	194
202. Moral Reasons Do Not Depend on Preferences	195
203. Morality Requires both Rational and Non-Rational Motives	197
204. The Categorical Imperative Requires Universal Law	198
205. Does the Categorical Imperative Simply Require Consistency?	199
206. Consistency and Fairness Are Not Enough for the Categorical Imperative	200
207. The Categorical Imperative Requires Us to Treat Rational Nature as an End	201
208. We Treat Rational Nature as an End through Respect for Ourselves and Others	202
209. The Principle of Respect for Persons Supports Rationalism against Utilitarianism	203
210. Respect for Persons Underlies the Categorical Imperative	204
211. Autonomy and Freedom	205
212. The Importance of Freedom to Morality	206
213. The Freedom of Responsibility	207
214. The Freedom of Autonomy	208
215. Morality Reveals Personality	209
216. A Further Formulation of the Categorical Imperative: Universally Legislating Agents	210
217. Morality and the Highest Good Are Necessarily Connected	211
218. Morality and Religion	212
219. The Final Formulation of the Categorical Imperative: The Community of Ends	213
17. Schopenhauer: Kant's Insights and Errors	214
220. Schopenhauer and Kant	214
221. Self-Interest Conflicts with Morality	214
222. Pure Practical Reason Requires Consistency, but Nothing More	215
223. The Source of Egoism Is Failure to Recognize the Equal Reality of Others	216

224. The Source of Compassion Is Recognition of the Unreality of the Distinction between Oneself and Others	216
225. Is Compassion a Sufficient Basis for Morality?	217
18. Hegel: Beyond Kantian Morality	220
226. Moral Philosophy Should Understand Social Actuality	220
227. The Free and Rational Will Is the Starting Point of Morality	221
228. Kant's Insights and Errors About the Rational Will	221
229. Ethical Life Corrects Kantian Morality	222
230. Does Kantian Morality Correct Ethical Life?	223
19. Nietzsche: Against Kant and Morality	226
231. Objections to Morality	226
232. We Can Learn About Morality by Examining Its Origins	227
233. Why We Should Reject Morality	228
234. Should We Reject Morality?	229
235. Subjectivism and Self-Refutation	230
20. Utilitarianism: Mill and Sidgwick	232
236. Earlier and Later Utilitarians	232
237. Varieties of Utilitarianism: Conservative, Progressive, and Radical	234
238. Moral Theory and Empirical Argument	235
239. Different Strategies of Argument for Utilitarianism	236
240. Utilitarianism Needs Secondary Principles	237
241. The Principle of Utility Systematizes Secondary Principles	238
242. Some Secondary Principles Seem to Oppose Utilitarianism	239
243. Justice and Other Secondary Principles Can Be Defended on Utilitarian Grounds	239
244. Doubts About the Utilitarian Account of Justice	240
245. Defences of Hedonism	242
246. Sidgwick: Hedonism Offers the Only Plausible Account of the Good	242
247. Objection to Sidgwick: The Relation between Pleasure and Belief	243
248. Sidgwick: Foundationalist Epistemology Supports Hedonism	244
249. Mill's Qualitative Hedonism: Higher Pleasures Differ in Quality from Lower Pleasures	245
250. Can Qualitative Hedonism Explain Why Higher Pleasures Are Higher?	245
251. Mill's Holism: Happiness Has Parts That Are Chosen for Their Own Sakes	246
252. Is Holism Consistent with Hedonism?	247
253. Social and Political Consequences of Quantitative Hedonism	248
254. An Axiomatic Argument Offers an Alternative to Common-Sense Morality	248
255. Mill's Proof of Utilitarianism	249
256. Sidgwick's Axiomatic Argument for Utilitarianism	250
257. The Relation between Impartiality and Maximization	251
258. The Argument from Prudence to Utilitarianism	252
259. Sidgwick: The Dualism of Practical Reason	252
260. Questions About Morality and Self-Interest	254

21. Beyond Kantian and Utilitarian Morality: An Idealist Alternative—Green and Bradley	256
261. The Idealist Reply to Utilitarianism	256
262. Self-Realization	257
263. What Is Wrong with Utilitarian Morality?	258
264. The False and the True Elements in Kantian Morality	258
265. Self-Realization Requires Social Morality	259
266. Self-Realization Requires Kantian Morality	260
267. Practical Implications?	262
22. Meta-Ethics: Objectivity and Its Critics	264
268. Positivism and Meta-Ethics	264
269. Moore: Not All Ethical Concepts Have Naturalistic Definitions	265
270. How Non-Naturalism Allows Moral Knowledge	267
271. A Positivist Response to Moore: Non-Cognitivism	267
272. The Significance of the Division between Facts and Values	268
273. Do Emotivists Misunderstand the Meaning of Moral Judgments?	270
274. Do Prescriptivists Also Misunderstand the Meaning of Moral Judgments?	271
275. An Inconsistency in Non-Cognitivism?	272
276. An Argument for Nihilism: Moral Properties Do Not Fit into a Scientific World-View	272
277. Do Disagreement and Relativity Rule Out Objectivity?	273
278. Why Does Moral Objectivity Matter?	275
279. Back to Moore: Can Moral Concepts Be Defined?	276
280. Can Moral Properties Be Defined?	277
23. Utilitarianism and Its Critics: Some Further Questions	279
281. Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics	279
282. Lewis: Utilitarianism Can Be Defended from an Impartial Point of View	279
283. Hare: Utilitarianism Can Be Derived from Preferences	280
284. Ross: Utility Is Not the Ground of Rightness	282
285. Ross: Pluralist Intuitionism	283
286. Rawls: Considered Judgments Are a Suitable Starting Point for Moral Theory	284
287. The Original Position Underlies a Social Contract	285
288. The Features of the Original Position	286
289. In the Original Position Two Principles of Justice Are Chosen	287
290. Utilitarians May Endorse the Two Principles	287
291. Justice, Morality, and Utility	288
292. The Kantian Interpretation of Justice as Fairness	289
293. What Does the Kantian Interpretation Show?	290
<i>Bibliography</i>	291
<i>Index</i>	299