Detailed Contents

Pre	eface ai	nd Acknowledgments	xvii
1.	Intro	duction	1
		I. CRIMINAL LAW AND THE MORALITY OF ASCRIBING RESPONSIBILITY	
2.	Mora	General Structure of the Criminal Law in Terms of Ascriptive l Principles	19
	I.	Anglo-American Theorizing about Criminal Law's General Part	20
	TT	The Variety of Theories in, about, or of Criminal Law	22
		Descriptive Theories of Areas of Law	24
		The General Part as a Descriptive Theory of the Special Part A. Describing the Doctrines of the Special Part in General,	27
		"Content-Neutral" Terms	27
	V.	B. The Moral Aspect to Any Theory of the Special Part Can There Be a Theory of the General Part, and If So,	31
	VI.	by What Criteria? The Content of the General Part of Anglo-American	35
	, 2,	Criminal Law	41
	VII.	The Specialness of the General Part	50
		II. THE CRIMINAL LAW'S SUPPOSITIONS ABOUT THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONS	
3.		an Actions at the Root of Moral Wrongdoing and Criminal Actus Reus	57
		Introduction	57
	II.	Rejection of the Causal Theory of Action by the	
		"New Mysterians" of Human Agency Are Bodily Movements Essential to Human Actions? Are Montal States Eligible to Pa Paleta in a Coursel Paletionship	59 63
	1 V.	Are Mental States Eligible to Be Relata in a Causal Relationship with Bodily Movements?	68

V. Must Mental States of Intention or Volition Cause the Bodily	
Movements that Are Their Immediate Objects, for Those	70
Movements to Be Human Actions?	76
Appendix to Chapter 3: The Moore/Yaffe Correspondence	, 0
4. Intention and Belief at the Root of Moral Culpability and Legal	
Mens Rea	87
I. The Roles of Intention in Assessing Responsibility in Law and	
Morals	87
II. Responsibility, Culpability, and Intentions	89
III Ordinary and Legal Concepts of Intention	93
IV. Suppositions about the Nature of Intention in Responsibility	20
Assessments	98
V. Suppositions about the Content of Intention in Responsibility	105
Assessments	105
VI. Conclusion	115
5. Further Questions about the Basic Distinction between Intention	
5. Further Questions about the Basic Distinction between 22	117
and Belief	118
I. Intention vs. Belief as to ResultII. Intention vs. Belief as to Circumstances	128
6. The Royal Road to the Criminal Law's Concept of the Psychology	143
of Persons: The Insanity Defense	
I. Introduction	143 144
The Medical Model of Legal Insanity	144
III. The Diverging Purposes of Law and Psychiatry in Deliting	147
"Mental Disease"	147
A. Legal Purposes in Defining "Insanity"	147
B. Psychiatric Purposes in Defining "Mental Disease,"	
"Schizophrenia," and Other Particular Mental Diseases, and	149
"Psychosis"	1 17
1. Psychiatric Purposes in Defining "Schizophrenia" and	150
Other Particular Mental Disorders Other Particular Mental Disorder" Generally	
2. Psychiatric Purposes in Defining "Mental Disorder" Generally	155
3. The Purposes behind Psychiatric Definition of "Psychosis"	
IV. The Weak Relevance of Medical Definitions to Excuses from	158
Responsibility and Punishment V. The Strong Relevance of Medical Definitions to Excuses from	
V. The Strong Relevance of Medical Bermanasa	166
Responsibility and Punishment A. On the Relevance of Having Some Particular Mental Disease	166
- I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	
Responsibility	167
C. The Implications of Being Psychotic for Responsibility	174
VI Why Craziness, by Itself, Eliminates or Reduces Responsibility	y 178

	VII.	HC	ow Do Medically Recognized Mental Disorders Generally,	
		and	d Psychoses More Specifically, Relate to Madness?	191
	VIII.	Sh	ould Norwegian Law on Insanity Be Changed?	197
				197
			1. Mental Illness Is Morally Relevant to Responsibility without	
			, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	197
			2. Mentally Ill Criminals Are Not Excused because Their	
			Mental Illness Was a Strong or Efficient Cause of Their	
				197
			3. Being So Mentally Ill as to Be Insane Is a Status Defense,	
			Not a Defense Requiring Lack of Control by an Accused of	
				198
			4. Only Very Seriously Mentally Ill Offenders Are Eligible for	
				198
			5. Being Psychotic Is Related to Being So Seriously Mentally Ill	
			- 1	198
		B.	,	199
		٠.	1. It Should Not Be Determinative of Legal Insanity Whether	
			or Not an Accused Is Properly Diagnosed for Medical	
			1 , 0 .	199
			2. The Cognitive Impairments Distinctive of Psychotic	
			Symptoms in Psychiatry Are Only a Rule of Thumb for	
			, . , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	199
			3. Psychiatrists Should Neither Make, Nor Have Dominant	
			Influence on Others Who Make, Decisions about Who Is	
				200
			4. Common-Sense Judgments of Insanity Do Not Need to Be	
				201
	IX	En	· ,	202
				204
	1 PP		in to diaptor of ourses of a ruestour running	
		T T 1	THE CHAILENIOECTO CDIMINAL LAW	
		111	I. THE CHALLENGES TO CRIMINAL LAW	
			BY NEUROSCIENCE	
7	Tha	hal	llenging Data of Neuroscience and the Challenges	
/ .				207
				207 207
				211
	11.		6	
				212
			1	217
	TTT		8 1	221
	III.		8	225
			8	225
		B.	The Determinist Challenges	228

X DETAILED CONTENTS

		C	. The Challenge of a Merely Epiphenomenal Will	233
		D	. The Challenge of a Merely Epiphenomenal Consciousness	237
		E.	The Challenge that Consciousness Is Not Veridical or Privileged	
			in Its Knowledge of Mental States	239
		F.	The Challenge of Secondary Agency	241
	IV.	П	ne Eleven Challenges and Two Possible Queries about Them	243
		A.	. Reductionist Challenges	244
			Determinist Challenges	244
			Epiphenomenalist Challenges	244
			Fallibilist Challenges	245
	App	enc	lix to Chapter 7: The Moore/Dennett Correspondence	248
			-	
		IV	THE HARD DETERMINIST CHALLENGE	
0	That			
ŏ.	ine I	lbe	ertarian, Fictionalist, and Compatibilist Responses	
			Determinism	265
	1.	Ta	xonomizing the Challenges of the Hard Determinist	265
		Α.	The Argument from Incapacity to Act Otherwise	266
		В.	The Argument from Lack of Ultimate Self-Determination	266
		C.	The Argument from Manipulation by Second Agents	267
	11.	Th	e Libertarian Answers to the Incapacity Challenge of Hard	
			eterminism	268
		A.	Metaphysical Libertarianism: Human Choice as Such Is Free	268
		В.	Occasional Libertarianism: Only Some Choices Are Free	270
		C.	Patchy Libertarianism: All Choices Are "Sort of" Free and	
			"Sort of" Not Free, in Varying Degrees	270
		D.	Causally Dualist Libertarianism: Human Behavior Is Caused	
			in Only a Secondary, Predisposing, Inclining, or Probabilistic	
			Sense of "Caused"	271
		E.	Epistemic Libertarianism: Our Present Ignorance of	
			Causation for Some Actions Makes Others Responsible for	
			Those Actions?	272
		F.	Selective Libertarianism: Only Some Kinds of (Full, Strong)	
			Causes Excuse	272
	III.	The	e Fictionalist Answers to the Incapacity Challenge of Hard	
			terminism	274
		A.	Making Do with Utilitarian "Responsibility": Deterring	
			Undesirable Behavior by Punishing People and Calling Them	
			"Responsible" Whenever They Are Deterrable	274
		B.	The Fictional Posits of Each Autonomous Discipline: We Can	
			Blame Some Actors as if They Were Responsible because	
			We Can Regard Their Choices "as if" They Were Free	274
		C.	Transcendental Fictionalism: Fictional Freedom and Fictional	
			Responsibility that We Cannot but Help Invent	276

		D.	Linguistic Fictionalism: It Is Senseless to Deny that We	
			Are Free and Responsible	276
		E.	Social Practice/Psychological Attitude Fictionalism: Our	
			"Reactive" Attitudes and Practices of Resentment Gratitude,	
			and the Like Depend on Our Not Regarding Ourselves as	
			Mere Products of Forces beyond Our Control	278
		F.	Pragmatic Fictionalism: It Is Useful to Regard Ourselves	
			as Free and Responsible Even if We Really Aren't	279
	IV.	Co	empatibilism(s)	282
		A.	Isolating the Kinds of Compatibilism by First Isolating the	
			Arguments for Incompatibilism	282
		B.	Logical Positivist Compatibilism: "Free" Means	
			"Uncompelled"	283
		C.	Classical Compatibilism	286
			1. Conditionalizing "Could"	287
			2. Moving from "Could Have if " to "Would Have if "	292
			3. Counterfactuals and Possible Worlds	296
		D.	New Conditionalist Compatibilism	298
			1. The Austinian Worry about "Unlucky" Failures	298
			2. The Chisholm Worry about Apparent Ability to Do	
			Otherwise when There Is an Inability to Choose to	
			Do Otherwise	298
			3. The Chisholm Worry about Infinite Regress of Choosing to	
			Choose To	299
			4. The Moorean Worry about "Sticky" vs. "Nonsticky" Choices	299
			5. The Worry about Finkish Dispositions	299
			6. Pettit's (and Others') Worry about the Constitutive Luck in	
			Having the Desires We Do	299
			7. The Worry about Aversions and the Impossibility of Certain	
			Desires	300
			8. Lehrer's Finkish Variations of Obsessive Desire/Aversion	
			Counterexamples	301
			9. The Worry about Compulsive Desires	303
		-	10. The Worry about Crazy Desires and Crazy Beliefs	303
		E.	The Supposed Irrelevance of the Freedom to Do or	205
	7.7	0	Will Otherwise	307
			onclusion	310
	~ ~		ix to Chapter 8: My Own Preferred Solution: The Revival	
			E. Moore's Classical Compatibilism as Amended with Ten	211
	A	mei	ndments to Avoid Eleven Historic Objections	311
0	D -	!	and a Walitian of Engage Comments of the Comme	
9.			g the Volitional Excuses from Compatibilism (the	212
			noot" Problem for Compatibilism)	313
	I.	Int	troduction	313

	11.	The Dependen	ice of Volitional Excuse on the Cant/ Wont	
		Distinction		314
		A. The Domain	n of Excuse	314
		B. The Domain	n of Volitional Excuses	317
		C. What Legal	Defenses Plausibly Involve Volitional Excuses?	322
			ying Principle of Volitional Excuse: The Actor	
			Have Done Otherwise	324
	III.		nology of Volitional Excuse	327
		•	n: The Psychology of Conflicting Desires in the	
			se Where There Is Responsibility	328
			ongest Desire, and Intention	329
			Form the Right Intention	331
		•	Execute the Right Intention	340
		,	of the Folk-Psychological Models of Compelled	
		Choice and		345
	IV.	Framing the A	ppropriate Counterfactual Conditionals that	
			acity within the Folk-Psychological Models	348
		, _	nt Conditions for Choosing and Acting	
		Otherwise		348
		1. The Cou	ınterfactual Analysis of Ability Revisited	348
			evant Counterfactual for the Ability to Choose	
			ise ("Free Will")	350
			evant Counterfactual for the Ability to Act	
			ise ("Free Action")	353
		B. Disquieting	Implications of the Possible Worlds Analysis	
		of the Coun	nterfactuals Involved in Capacities	355
	V.		ognitive Psychology/Neuroscience Help?	361
		_	mental Psychology Precisify or Verify the	
		-	ological Models?	361
		•	science (at Least Potentially) Help?	364
	VI.	Conclusion	21.0	372
	App	ndix to Chapte	er 9: MacArthur Foundation Law and	
		_	oject, Phase II Philadelphia, November 6,	
	20	10—Some Gen	eral Thoughts about Volitional Incapacity	
		chael Moore		373
		V THEE	EPIPHENOMENAL CHALLENGE	
		v. Ine e	EPIPHENOMENAL CHALLENGE	
10.	The	nitiation of the	e Epiphenomenal Challenge in the Work of	
		amin Libet	-1-1	379
	,		tention in Assessing Responsibility in Law and	
	1.	Morals	The state of the s	379
	II.		ng Findings of the Libet Experiments	382
	11.	III Ciluiterigh		502

	111.	Overview and Clarification of the Challenges to the Folk	
		Psychology from the Libet Experiments	383
		A. Persons Have No Free Will because Their Willings Are	
		Caused by Unwilled Brain Events	384
		B. Persons Have No Causally Efficacious Wills Because	
		Willings Are Always Epiphenomenal to the Actions They	
		Putatively Cause	386
		C. Persons Do Not Have Privileged Access to the Processes	
		Producing Actions Early Enough to Be in Control of Those	
		Actions	389
		D. Persons Do Not Have Phenomenal Awareness of the Processes	
		Producing Actions Early Enough to Be in Control of Those	
		Actions	390
		E. Two Questions about the Three Epiphenomenal Skepticisms	391
	IV.	The Moral and Legal Relevance of the Three Epiphenomenal	
		Claims	391
		A. The Moral Relevance of Willing Being Merely Epiphenomenal	
		with (and Not Causal of) the Bodily Movements Willed	392
		B. The Moral Relevance of Privileged Access of Willing Being	
		Merely Epiphenomenal with (and Not Causal of) the Bodily	
		Movements Willed	394
		C. The Moral Relevance of Phenomenal Awareness Being	
		Merely Epiphenomenal with (and Not Causal of) the Bodily	
		Movements Willed	397
	V.	The Truth of These Three Epiphenomenal Claims	398
		A. The Alleged Epiphenomenal Status of the Will	398
		B. The Alleged Epiphenomenal Status of Consciousness	
		(Nonobservational Knowledge) of Willing	405
		C. The Alleged Epiphenomenal Status of Consciousness	
		(as Phenomenal Awareness) of Willing	410
	VI.	Conclusion	411
11.	The	Limited Compatibilism of Epiphenomenalism with	
	Resp	onsibility	413
	I.	Introduction	413
	II.	Review of the Epiphenomenal Challenge of Contemporary	
		Neuroscience	417
	III.	Noncausal Control of Epiphenomenal Forks	420
	IV.	Three Responses to Claims of Non-Cause-Based Control	425
		A. Response One: We Can Generally Control the Past?	426
		B. Response Two: Denial of There Ever Being Any Control	
		of the Past	428
		C. Response Three: Control of the Strongly Necessary and	
		Immediate Past?	429

VI. THE CHALLENGE OF A REDUCTIONIST PHYSICALISM

12. Nothing But a Pack of Neurons	437			
I. Introduction				
II. From What Mind-Brain Metaphysical Views Does the Distinct	:			
Reductionist Challenge Arise?	440			
A. Classically Reductionist Physicalism	441			
B. "Nonreductionist" Physicalism	443			
C. Skeptical Physicalisms: Eliminative Materialism	445			
D. The Quietist Metaphysics of Componential Mechanism	448			
E. The Sui Generis Metaphysics of "Grounding"	449			
III. The Salient Data of Neuroscience Making Some Form of				
Physicalism/Mechanism Plausible	450			
A. Actions as Brain-Caused Bodily Movements	451			
B. Mental States as Brain States	458			
C. The Metaphysical Interpretation of Current and Imagined				
Neuroscientific Data	461			
 The Data under Four Reductionist Interpretations 	461			
2. Dualism in Neuroscience?	461			
3. Eliminative Materialism	464			
IV. The Implications of the Astonishing Hypothesis on Moral	4 - 5			
Responsibility	465			
A. Framing the Question	465			
B. Three Possible Answers to the Question	466			
1. Moral Responsibility Requires Dualism to Be True, and	166			
Physicalism Shows Dualism to Be False	466			
2. Reduction as Demotion: Reduced Properties and Entities as				
Second-Class Citizens in Ontology's Republic	468			
3. The Reductions of Mind to Brain, and Actions to Bodily	450			
Processes, Are "Skeptical Reductions"	470			
V. Conclusion	473			
VII. NEUROSCIENCE AS THE HELPER RATHE	R			
THAN THE CHALLENGER OF CRIMINAL LAW				
THAN THE CHALLENGER OF CRIMINAL EAW				
13. Addiction, Responsibility, and the Potential Contributions of				
Neuroscience	477			
I. Introduction	477			
II. Conceptualizing What Addictions Are	479			
III. The Folk-Psychological Explanation(s) of Addiction	490			
A. A Schema of Practical Rationality	490			
B. Applying the Schema to Explain the Behavior of Addicts:	17.0			
The Rational Choice Model of Addiction	497			

	C.	Indirectly Applying the Schema to Explain the Behavior of			
		Ad	dicts in Terms of Less than Full Practical Rationality	499	
		1.	Failures to Form an Intention—"Automaticity" Models of		
			Addiction	500	
			a. The Seeming Automaticity of Preconscious Actions	500	
			b. Too Many Rather than Too Few Intentions	501	
			c. Addictive Cravings as a Kind of Emotion-Driven		
			Bypassing of Intention	502	
			d. "Halfway" to Intention Models?	503	
		2.	Failures in the Intention that Is Formed and on which One		
			Acts, to Match What One Most Wants or Most Values	504	
			a. Cognitive Failure: Not Keeping Degrees of Belief		
			Responsive to the Evidence Available to Support It	504	
			b. Motivational Failure: Not Integrating One's Desires into		
			What One Most Wants	504	
			c. Normative Failure: Acting and Wanting against One's		
			Better Judgment	506	
		3.	Failures of One's Actions to Match One's Intentions	507	
		4.	Failures of Experiential Satisfaction to Match What One		
			Wants and Chooses	508	
	D.	Co	mbining These Explanations into One Overall Folk-		
			ychological Explanation of Why Addicts Use and Acquire		
			ugs	509	
IV.	Ad		tion as a Moral Excuse and Legal Defense	510	
			ree (More) Ways in which Not to Talk about This Issue	511	
			Addiction Excuses because Addicts Do Not Have the		
			Capacity Not to Have the Craving Distinctive of Addiction	511	
		2.			
			It More Costly for Addicts Not to Use or Steal than It Is for		
			Nonaddicted Persons	512	
		3.	Addicts Are Not Excused for Acts as Addicts because They		
			Are Responsible for Being Addicts in the First Place	514	
	В.	Th	e Main Normative Question: Are Addicts Partially or Wholly		
			cused by Their Addiction for Acquiring and Using Drugs?	517	
		1.	The Fully Rational Addict	518	
		2.	The Addicts Who Act on "Automatic Pilot"	519	
		2.	a. Habits and Preconscious Actions	519	
			b. Emotion-Caused Automaticity	520	
			c. Dual Intentions Automaticity	522	
		3.	The Addicts Who (Unlike Addicts on Automatic Pilot) Do		
		٥.	Choose to Take Drugs But Whose Choices Do Not Match		
			What They Most Want or Most Value	523	
			a. The Moral Relevance of Cognitive Failures by the Wish-	343	
			Caused Erosion of Rational Beliefs	523	
			Chase Library of Image Delicis	240	

xvi DETAILED CONTENTS

	b. Motivational Failures to Form an Intention that	
	Matches What One Most Wants	525
	c. Normative Failure to Form an Intention that Matches	323
	What One Most Values	528
	4. The Akratic Addicts Who Act against Their Own Intentions	320
	Not to Take Drugs	530
	5. Addicts Who Most Want or Most Value What They	230
	Do Not Like	533
V.	The Promise of Neuroscience to Deepen Our Explanatory	000
	and Evaluative Understandings of Addictive Behavior	534
	A. The Two Potentials for Neuroscience: Changing (Broadening)	
	Deepening, Correcting) Our Folk-Psychological Explanation	
	of Addiction and Changing or Justifying Our Present	
	Doctrines of Moral and Legal Excuse	534
	B. The Neuroscientific Explanation of Addiction	536
	1. The Explanation for Nonaddicted Drug Use that Risks	
	and Sometimes Causes Addiction	537
	2. The Explanation of the Continued Use of Drugs by Addicts	547
	C. Basing an Expanded Moral Excuse and Legal Defense on the	
7.77	Neuroscientific Explanation of Addiction	562
V 1.	Conclusion	568
Index		
THUEX		572