

CONTENTS

<i>Table of Cases</i>	xiii
<i>Table of Legislation</i>	xvii
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xli
<i>Author Biographies</i>	xlvi
<i>List of Contributors</i>	xlvi

I GENERAL ASPECTS

1. The Economic Consequences of Europe's Banking Union

Nicolas Véron

I. The Impact so Far: A Shift of Expectations	1.03
II. Six Developments to Watch	1.20
III. Conclusion	1.64

2. European Banking Union: Effectiveness, Impact, and Future Challenges

Kern Alexander

I. Introduction	2.01
II. Single Supervisory Mechanism—Setting the Context	2.05
III. SSM and EU Agencies and Institutions	2.31
IV. Bank Resolution, the SSM, and the Single Resolution Board (SRB)	2.49
V. SSM, Macroprudential Tools, and National Competent Authorities	2.67
VI. Member State Perspectives on the SSM	2.114
VII. Banking Union and the Banking Industry	2.121
VIII. Conclusion	2.136

3. Judicial Protection of Supervised Credit Institutions in the European Banking Union

Tomas M C Arons

I. Introduction	3.01
II. Judicial Protection for Credit Institutions under the SSM	3.07

III. Judicial Protection for Credit Institutions under the SRM	3.37
IV. Substantive Review by the CJEU	3.66
V. Liability of the ECB and the SRB	3.86
VI. Conclusion	3.94

II SINGLE SUPERVISION AND CRD IV

4. The Single Supervisory Mechanism for Banking

Supervision: Institutional Aspects

Eddy Wymeersch

I. Historical Introduction	4.01
II. The New Regulatory Framework: The Banking Union	4.09
III. Applicable Bodies of Law in Banking Supervision	4.15
IV. The Choice of the ECB as the Prudential Supervisor	4.31
V. Application to the Euro Area or Beyond?	4.38
VI. The Single Supervisory Mechanism	4.46
VII. Legal Position of the Supervisory Board in the ECB	4.104
VIII. Independence and Accountability	4.114
IX. Review of SSM Decisions	4.136
X. Conclusion	4.143

5. The Single Rulebook and the SSM: Regulatory Polycentrism vs. Supervisory Centralization

Guido Ferrarini and Fabio Recine

I. Introduction	5.01
II. A Short History of the EU Regulatory Framework	5.04
III. The Allocation of Regulatory and Supervisory Powers	5.17
IV. The Decoupling of Regulatory and Supervisory Powers in the SSM	5.28
V. Evolutionary Dynamics of the EU Institutional Regulatory Framework	5.53
VI. Conclusion	5.68

6. CRD IV Framework for Banks' Corporate Governance

Peter O Mülbert and Alexander Wilhelm

I. Introduction	6.01
II. Banking Structures in the European Union	6.03

III. Historical Development	6.05
IV. CRD IV Corporate Governance Standards	6.10
V. Conceptual Concerns	6.46
VI. Functional Concerns	6.87
VII. Conclusion and Outlook	6.106
 7. Fit and Proper Assessments within the Single Supervisory Mechanism	
<i>Danny Busch and Annick Teubner</i>	
I. Introduction	7.01
II. Key Terms and Definitions	7.02
III. Fit and Proper Assessments as an Element of Corporate Governance	7.06
IV. Division of Responsibilities Between the Banks, the ECB, and the NCAs	7.11
V. Relevant Sources of Substantive Requirements	7.23
VI. Convergence	7.28
VII. National Variations and Limits	7.78
VIII. Concluding Observations	7.96
 8. The EU Framework Dealing with Non-Performing Exposures: Legal and Economic Analysis	
<i>Emilios Avgouleas</i>	
I. Introduction	8.01
II. Causes and Consequences of NPL Accumulations	8.14
III. Structural Measures	8.21
IV. Market-based Solutions: Asset Management Companies and NPL Platforms	8.31
V. Prudential and Supervisory Policies for Tackling NPLs	8.38
VI. Conclusion	8.57
 III SINGLE RESOLUTION AND THE BRRD	
 9. Governance of the Single Resolution Mechanism	
<i>Danny Busch</i>	
I. Introduction	9.01
II. General Aspects	9.04
III. Financing of the Fund	9.46

IV. Resolution	9.75
V. Conclusion	9.121
10. Recovery and Resolution Plans of Banks in the Context of the BRRD and the SRM: Fundamental Issues	
<i>Victor de Serière</i>	
I. Introduction	10.01
II. The Making of Recovery and Resolution Plans: A Theoretical Exercise?	10.03
III. Experience with Some Bank Failures	10.17
IV. Some Intermediate Conclusions	10.27
V. The Authority to Impose <i>Ex Ante</i> Measures	10.29
VI. Remedies Against Imposed <i>Ex Ante</i> Measures	10.35
VII. A Difficult Debate on the Need for <i>Ex Ante</i> Measures	10.39
VIII. The Wider Context in which <i>Ex Ante</i> Measures Are Imposed	10.49
IX. Bottlenecks	10.65
X. Some Concluding Comments	10.98
11. Bail-in: Preparedness and Execution	
<i>Anna Gardella</i>	
I. Introduction	11.01
II. Bail-in: Main Features	11.06
III. Building-up Bail-in Preparedness: TLAC/MREL	11.12
IV. Bail-in Execution	11.49
12. Bank Resolution in Practice: Analysis of Early European Cases	
<i>Guido Ferrarini and Alberto Musso Piantelli</i>	
I. Introduction	12.01
II. Crisis Management Pre-BRRD	12.13
III. Crisis Management in the Transition to the New EU Regime	12.20
IV. The New Regime: Crisis Management in Italy	12.30
V. The New Regime: The Resolution-like Liquidation of Venetian Banks	12.40
VI. The New Regime: Crisis Management in Spain	12.64
VII. Conclusions	12.81

13. The Architecture of the BRRD—A UK Perspective

Simon Gleeson

I. Introduction	13.01
II. Scope of the Legislation	13.04
III. Approach	13.15
IV. Tools	13.24
V. Other Powers	13.37
VI. MREL & TLAC	13.72
VII. Brexit and Bank Resolution	13.77
VIII. Conclusion	13.82

IV THE EUROPEAN DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES

14. European Deposit Insurance System (EDIS): Cornerstone of the Banking Union or Dead End?

Veerle Colaert and Gilian Bens

I. Introduction	14.01
II. Why Is There a Need for a Fully-fledged Third Pillar in the Banking Union?	14.04
III. Legislative Proposals for EDIS	14.20
IV. Main Features of the EDIS Proposals	14.33
V. Conclusion	14.69

15. Doom Loop or Incomplete Union? Sovereign and Banking Risk

Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Giacomo Calzolari, José Manuel Mansilla-Fernández, and Alberto Franco Pozzolo

I. Introduction	15.01
II. Are Sovereigns Risky?	15.13
III. What Was Done and Should Have Been Done? Banks and Sovereigns during the Crisis and the Specificities of a Monetary Union	15.22
IV. The Long Run Equilibrium: Sovereign Exposures under 'Normal Conditions'	15.46
V. Summing-up, Transition, and Notes of Caution	15.77

16. Bank Resolution in Europe: The Unfinished Agenda of Structural Reform	
<i>Jeffrey N Gordon and Wolf-Georg Ringe</i>	
I. Introduction	16.01
II. The Regulatory Aftermath of 2007–2008 and the Emergence of EU Bank Resolution	16.08
III. The Path to Single Point of Entry Resolution in the US	16.25
IV. The US Path to Holding Companies	16.35
V. SPE for Europe: The Structural Reform Project	16.38
VI. Conclusion	16.49
17. Financial Conglomerates in the European Banking Union	
<i>Arthur van den Hurk and Michele Siri</i>	
I. Introduction	17.01
II. Consolidated Supervision in the Banking Sector	17.05
III. Group Supervision in the Insurance Sector	17.09
IV. Consolidated Supervision vs Group Supervision	17.15
V. Background of Financial Conglomerate Supervision	17.24
VI. Institutional Framework for Conglomerate Supervision	17.29
VII. Purpose, Content, and Design of Conglomerate Supervision	17.34
VIII. Evolution of Financial Conglomerate Supervision	17.63
IX. Recovery and Resolution of Financial Conglomerates	17.74
X. Conclusion	17.89
<i>Index</i>	665