Contents

| Acknowled | ments | ix | | |
|-------------------------|--|-----|--|--|
| General Ini | duction Howard R. Vane and Chris Mulhearn | xi | | |
| PART I JOHN C. HARSANYI | | | | |
| Introductio | o Part I: John C. Harsanyi (1920–2000) | 3 | | |
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| PART II | OHN F. NASH, Jr. | | | |
| Introductio | o Part II: John F. Nash, Jr. (b. 1928) | 65 | | |
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| PART III | REINHARD SELTEN | | | |
| Introduction | o Part III: Reinhard Selten (b. 1930) | 105 | | |
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 178

168

219

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vi

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Name Index

543

375