

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	<i>page</i> xii
<i>List of Tables</i>	xiv
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xvi
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xix
I	Introduction
1.1	Two Puzzles About Authoritarian Institutions
1.2	Examining Regime Outcomes: Personalist Rule and Institutionalized Systems
1.3	Sometimes Window Panes, But Often Window Dressing
1.4	Autocratic Regime Institutionalization: A Deeper Look
1.5	Causes of Regime Institutionalization
1.6	Consequences of Regime Institutionalization
1.7	This Book's Contributions: Authoritarian Regimes
1.8	Why Africa? This Book's Contributions to African Politics
1.9	Plan of the Book
2	Why Do Leaders Institutionalize?
2.1	Institutions as Commitment Devices
2.2	A Theoretical Model
2.3	Solving the Baseline Model
2.4	Model Extension: Uncertainty About the Future
2.5	Conclusion
3	Two Illustrative Cases
3.1	The Formal Model Summarized
3.2	Cameroon Under Ahidjo: High Levels of Regime Institutionalization

Contents

3.3	Côte D'Ivoire Under Houphouët: Low Levels of Regime Institutionalization	79
3.4	Empirical Analysis of Power Sharing in Presidential Cabinets	89
3.5	Conclusion	91
4	How Should Institutionalization Be Measured?	93
4.1	Conceptualizing Authoritarian Regime Institutionalization	94
4.2	Measuring Regime Institutionalization	101
4.3	Executive Constraints in Sub-Saharan Africa: General Trends and Patterns	111
4.4	Regime Typologies	116
4.5	Comparisons with Other Existing Datasets	123
4.6	Conclusion	126
5	What Are the Causes of Regime Institutionalization?	134
5.1	Observable Implications of the Theoretical Argument	135
5.2	Justifying the Model's Assumptions	136
5.3	Cross-sectional Design: Data and Measurement	140
5.4	Cross-sectional Design: Empirical Strategy and Findings	147
5.5	Differences-in-differences Design: The End of the Cold War	157
5.6	Conclusion	161
6	What Are the Consequences of Institutionalization on Autocratic Stability?	186
6.1	Are Constitutional Rules Actually Followed In Dictatorships?	187
6.2	Empirical Disagreement: Do Institutions Promote Regime Stability?	189
6.3	Problems with Existing Approaches	190
6.4	Estimating the Effects of Endogenous Institutionalization	192
6.5	Empirical Analysis and Findings	195
6.6	Conclusion	199
7	What Are the Consequences of Institutionalization on Leadership Succession?	205
7.1	Do Dictators Care About Leadership Succession?	207
7.2	How Does Succession Planning Promote Regime Stability?	209

Contents

7.3	Designating Informal Successors	212
7.4	Disaggregating Autocratic Constitutions: Succession Policies Versus Term Limits	213
7.5	Endogenous Institutionalization Reconsidered	214
7.6	Data and Descriptive Statistics	216
7.7	Descriptive Statistics	218
7.8	Empirical Analysis	219
7.9	Conclusion	221
8	Conclusion	226
8.1	Taking Stock: Authoritarian Institutions Reconsidered	226
8.2	Empirical Contribution: Reexamining Regime Institutionalization	229
8.3	Theoretical Contribution: The Origins and Consequences of Regime Institutionalization	232
8.4	Looking Ahead: Implications for Institutional Design, Democratization, and Democratic Backsliding	237
	<i>References</i>	239
	<i>Index</i>	249