Contents

	List of figures	ix
	List of tables	xi
	Acknowledgments	xiii
	List of abbreviations	XV
	Glossary	xix
	Introduction	1
	tes and violence testing the dysfunctional	1
1	A throne of bayonets: what is personalism and	,
	why does it matter:	6
	1.1 The context 6	
	1.2 I ne internal aynamics of one-man rule 10	
	1.3 Capturing personalist behavior 13	
	1.4 Operationalizing personalism 16	
	1.5 How and when do regimes personalize? 20	
	1.6 Research questions 25	
	Summary 173	
2	Fear and greed: four pillars of personalist regime behavior	29
	2.1 Pillar I – coup-proofing 30	
	2.2 Pillar II – gatekeeping 38	
	2.3 Pillar III – repression 45	
	2.4 Pillar IV – hoarding 51	
	2.4 I that IV - hourding 51	
3	Framing the vicious circle: modeling transitions	
3		57
	from personalist rule	3/
	3.1 The indirect impact of personalism – hypotheses H1 58	
	3.2 Framing the vicious circle – hypotheses H2 61	
	3.3 A word on research methodology 68	

Madagascar (1975-1993) 38. estera suolen antonominasio.

V1	Contents

4	Divide and rule: testing the relational aspects of the model	75
	4.1 Does ethnicity matter in personalist regimes? 76	
	4.2 Yahya Jammeh – the conqueror of rivers in	
	The Gambia (1994–2017) 81	
	4.3 Didier Ratsiraka – the red admiral of	
	Madagascar (1975–1993) 88	
	4.4 François Bozizé – the grim legacy of the emperor in the	
	Central African Republic (2003–2013) 96	
	4.5 Summary 101	
5	Resource curses: testing the functional aspects of the model	110
	5.1 Untangling rents & rulers 111	
	5.2 Sani Abacha – Nigeria in the General's leprous grip	
	(1993–1998) 125	
	5.3 Baré Maïnassara – a throne of sand in	
	Niger (1996–1999) 130	
	5.4 Summary 137	
6	Votes and violence: testing the dysfunctional	
	aspects of the model	144
	6.1 Channeling dissent 145	
	6.2 Lansana Conté – democracy on a dark diet in Guinea	
	(1984–2008) 148	
	6.3 Blaise Compaoré – the puppet master of Burkina Faso	
	(1987–2014) 154	
	6 4 Jerry John Rawlings - a safe landing in	
	Ghana (1981–2001) 160	
	6.5 Summary 173	
7	Findings on the impact of personalist rule: comparing African	
	cases and structuring causal factors	184
	7.1 Explaining variation of violent anti-regime	
	contestation 197	
	7.2 The impact of security gaps 194	
	73 The impact of institutions 100	
	7.4 The impact of resource curses 204	
	7.5 The impact of paysonalist smalls 200	
	7.6 Conclusion 213	

Reof Course of Cordestanon and Pertonalist Lemnias.