
CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----|
| <i>List of Sponsors</i> | vii |
| <i>Table of Cases</i> | ix |
| INTRODUCTION | xix |
| PANEL ONE: POLICY OBJECTIVES, ENFORCEMENT TOOLS AND ACTORS, TYPES OF ABUSES, THE CASE OF EXCESSIVE PRICING | 1 |
| 1 PANEL DISCUSSION | 3 |
| Introductory Statement by Mario Monti | 3 |
| Discussion | 3 |
| 2 Working Papers | 51 |
| I John Fingleton: <i>De-Monopolising Ireland</i> | 53 |
| II Eleanor M. Fox: <i>Abuse of Dominance and Monopolisation: How to Protect Competition Without Protecting Competitors</i> | 69 |
| III Nicholas Green: <i>Problems in the Identification of Excessive Prices: The United Kingdom Experience in the Light of NAPP</i> | 79 |
| IV Massimo Motta and Alexandre de Streel: <i>Excessive Pricing and Price Squeeze under EU Law</i> | 91 |
| V Robert Pitofsky: <i>Policy Objectives of Competition Law and Enforcement</i> | 127 |
| VI Hans-Jürgen Ruppelt: <i>Abuse Control – Objectives, Restrictive Practices and Institutions</i> | 135 |
| VII John Vickers: <i>How Does the Prohibition of Abuse of Dominance Fit with the Rest of Competition Policy?</i> | 147 |
| PANEL TWO: PRICING ABUSES (OTHER THAN EXCESSIVE PRICING) | 157 |
| 1 PANEL DISCUSSION | 159 |
| 2 Working Papers | 195 |
| I Einer Elhauge: <i>Why Above Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are not Predatory – And the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power</i> | 197 |
| II Calvin Goldman and Crystal L Witterick: <i>Abuse of Dominant Position – The Canadian Approach</i> | 267 |

| | | |
|------|--|-----|
| III | Luc Gyselen: <i>Rebates – Competition on the Merits or Exclusionary Practice?</i> | 287 |
| IV | Santiago Martínez Lage and Rafael Allendesalazar: <i>Community Policy on Discriminatory Pricing: A Practitioner's Perspective</i> | 325 |
| V | Petros C. Mavroidis and Damien J. Nevin: <i>Bronner Kebab – Beyond Refusal to Deal and Duty to Cooperate</i> | 355 |
| VI | Robert O'Donoghue: <i>Over-Regulating Lower Prices – Time for a Rethink on Pricing Abuses under Article 82 EC</i> | 371 |
| VII | John Ratliff: <i>Abuse of Dominant Position and Pricing Practices – A Practitioner's Viewpoint</i> | 427 |
| VIII | Derek Ridyard: <i>Article 82 EC Price Abuses – Towards a More Economic Approach</i> | 441 |
| | PANEL THREE: NON-PRICING ABUSES | 461 |
| | 1 PANEL DISCUSSION | 463 |
| | 2 Working Papers | 501 |
| I | Ian S. Forrester: <i>EC Competition Law as a Limitation on the Use of IP Rights in Europe – Is There a Reason to Panic?</i> | 503 |
| II | Cecilio Madero Villarejo: <i>Abuses of a Dominant Position in Information Technology Industries (IT)</i> | 523 |
| III | David S. Evans, Jorge A. Padilla and Michael A Salinger: <i>A Pragmatic Approach to Identifying and Analysing Legitimate Tying Cases</i> | 557 |
| IV | James F. Rill and Mark C. Schechter: <i>International Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Global Dissonance and Convergence</i> | 573 |
| V | John F. Temple Lang: <i>Anticompetitive Abuses under Article 82 Involving Intellectual Property Rights</i> | 589 |
| | BIBLIOGRAPHY | 659 |