

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE	v
CHAPTER 1. Introduction	1
Sec.	1
1.1 The Lawyer's Role	2
1.2 A Preliminary Overview of Acquisition Mechanics	6
A. The Merger	6
B. The Sale of All or Substantially All Assets	9
C. The Tender Offer	9
D. Negotiated or Open Market Purchases	13
E. The Proxy Contest	14
1.3 Glossary of Takeover Terminology	14
CHAPTER 2. Tools of the Trade: An Introduction to Economic Analysis	18
Sec.	18
2.1 Introduction	18
2.2 Law and Economics: An Overview	19
A. Positive v. Normative Law and Economics	20
B. The Wealth Maximization Norm	21
1. Evasive Maneuvers	21
2. The Partial Concession Gambit	22
C. Rational Choice	24
2.3 The Theory of the Firm	27
A. Transaction Costs	28
B. The Corporation as Nexus of Contracts	30
1. Command and Control by Contract	30
2. Implications of the Contractarian Model	31
3. Choosing Default Rules: The Hypothetical Bargain	32
4. Criticisms of the Contractarian Model	34
C. Agency Costs	36
D. Summary	39
2.4 The Economics of Securities Markets	39
A. Efficient Capital Markets	39
B. Portfolio Theory	42
2.5 Putting the Tools to Work: Takeover Motives and Wealth Effects	46
A. The Urge to Merge: Various Motives for Takeovers	46
1. Creating Value by Displacing Inefficient Managers	47
2. Strategic Acquisitions	49
B. Do Takeovers Create New Wealth?	51
1. Target v. Acquirer Shareholders	51
2. Investors v. Nonshareholder Constituencies	53
3. The Downward Sloping Demand Curve Hypothesis	55

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 3. The Corporation: A Review of the Basics	57
Sec.	57
3.1 What is a Corporation?	58
A. Some Fundamental Distinctions	59
B. Some Key Terminology	60
3.2 Essential Attributes	61
A. Alternatives to the Corporation	61
B. Formal Creation	62
C. Legal Personality	63
D. Separation of Ownership and Control	65
E. Indefinite Duration	67
F. Transferability	67
G. Limited Liability	68
3.3 Sources of Corporate Law	69
A. State Corporate Law	70
B. Federal Law	72
3.4 Federal Securities Law: An Overview	74
A. Registration of Securities	74
B. Registration Statement Disclosures	77
C. Exemptions from Registration	78
1. Private Placements	79
2. Reg D	80
3. Intrastate Offerings	81
D. Civil Liabilities for Securities Fraud and Other Violations	83
1. Securities Act § 11	85
2. Securities Act § 12(a)(2)	87
3. Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5	89
E. Becoming a Reporting Company: Registration Under the Securities Exchange Act	96
3.5 The Boundary Between State Corporate and Federal Securities Law	97
3.6 Corporate Governance: Herein of Director Primacy	104
A. Consensus and Authority	104
B. The Allocation of Corporate Decisionmaking Power	107
C. The Separation of Ownership and Control	108
1. The Separation of Ownership and Control in Historical Perspective	108
2. The Separation of Ownership and Control in Economic Perspective	110
3. Consequences of the Separation of Ownership and Control	119
3.7 Director Primacy in Action: The Law and Economics of the Business Judgment Rule	121
A. A Substantive Standard or a Rule of Abstention?	122
1. Shlensky and Abstention	122

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2. Technicolor and Substantive Review	125
3. Where is Delaware Now?	128
B. The Business Judgment Rule and the Director Primacy Model	130
1. First Principles	130
2. Defending Deference to Board Authority	133
C. The Law of Business Judgment	148
1. The Nature of the Rule	148
2. Preconditions	149
CHAPTER 4. Mergers, Asset Sales and Other Statutory Acquisitions	154
Sec.	154
4.1 The Merger	155
4.2 The Sale of All or Substantially All Corporate Assets	157
4.3 Choosing Between a Merger and an Asset Sale	160
4.4 Triangular Transactions	161
4.5 Deciding to Merge	162
A. The Role of the Board of Directors	162
B. The Necessity of Process Due Care when Deciding to Merge	166
4.6 Disclosure of Merger Negotiations	172
4.7 The Acquisition Agreement	173
A. The Letter of Intent	174
B. The Acquisition Agreement	175
C. Due Diligence	177
4.8 Ensuring Exclusivity	179
A. Exclusive Merger Agreements	180
B. Lockups	191
4.9 The Appraisal Remedy	192
A. Mechanics	193
1. Availability of Appraisal	193
2. Eligibility for Appraisal	194
3. Exclusivity of Appraisal	194
B. Valuation in Appraisal Proceedings	194
1. Valuation Basics: The Time Value of Money and Discounting to Present Value	195
2. Valuation Methods Based on the Present Value of Future Dividends	196
3. The Delaware Block Method	197
4. Weinberger and its Discounted Cash Flow Progeny	200
5. Elements of Value Arising from the Merger	202
C. Marketability and Minority Discounts	204
4.10 De Facto Mergers	206
4.11 Freeze-out Mergers, Sales of Control, and Similar Controlling Shareholder Transactions	208
A. Identifying Controlling Shareholders	209

TABLE OF CONTENTS

B.	The Background: Parent–Subsidiary Transactions	210
C.	Sales of Control	213
1.	The General Rule	214
2.	Sale to a Looter	214
3.	Sale of Office	215
4.	Usurping a Corporate Opportunity	216
5.	Building a Better Approach to Sales of Control	218
6.	Refusals to Sell	219
D.	Freeze-out Mergers	222
1.	The Business Context: Why Freeze–Out the Minority?	223
2.	The Business Purpose Test	224
3.	Freeze-outs and Fairness	226
4.	Freeze-outs, Fiduciary Duties, and Appraisal	228
5.	Effect of Shareholder Ratification	230
E.	Conducting the Sale	231
CHAPTER 5. Proxy Contests		233
Sec.		233
5.1	Shareholder Voting: State Law	234
A.	Overview	234
B.	Notice, Quorum, and Votes Required	235
C.	Election of Directors	236
1.	Cumulative Voting	236
2.	Classified Boards	238
D.	Shareholder Inspection Rights	238
5.2	Federal Regulation of Proxies	241
A.	Origins	241
B.	The Regulatory Framework	242
1.	What is a Solicitation of Proxies?	243
2.	The Proxy Rules	245
C.	Proxy Contests	250
1.	Reimbursement of Expenses	250
2.	Shareholder Apathy and Related Problems	251
3.	The Proxy Contest’s (Slight) Resurgence	252
D.	Proxy Litigation	253
1.	The Implied Private Right of Action	253
2.	Key Elements of the Proxy Cause of Action	256
5.3	Shareholder Voting Rights: An Economic Analysis	262
A.	The Necessity of Authority	263
1.	Information	263
2.	Interests	264
B.	The Inefficiency of Multiple Constituencies	264
C.	Why Only Shareholders?	267
D.	Then Why Not Shareholder Democracy?	270
1.	Disincentives to Shareholder Activism	271
2.	Shareholder Activism and Agency Costs	273
3.	The Costs of Shareholder Activism	274

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 6. Tender Offers	277
Sec.	277
6.1 The Forms of Nonstatutory Acquisitions	277
A. Share Purchases v. Tender Offers	277
B. Tender Offers v. Proxy Contests	278
6.2 A Brief History of Federal Regulation of Tender Offers	280
6.3 Beachhead Acquisitions	281
A. The Obligation to Disclose	281
B. The Content of a Schedule 13D Disclosure Statement	284
C. Section 13(d) Litigation	286
6.4 Tender Offer Disclosure and Procedural Rules	288
A. Definition of Tender Offer	289
B. Commencement of a Tender Offer	291
C. Content of Required Disclosure	292
D. Procedural Rules	295
E. Target Obligations	296
6.5 Tender Offer Litigation	298
6.6 Insider Trading and Tender Offers	303
A. Rule 14e-3	304
B. Misappropriation	306
1. Origins	306
2. O'Hagan and Bryan: The Misappropriation Theory is Called into Question	308
3. O'Hagan	309
CHAPTER 7. Target Defenses Against Hostile Takeover	
Bids	311
Sec.	311
7.1 Takeover Defenses: The Arsenal	312
A. Shark Repellents	312
1. Classified Boards	312
2. Supermajority Vote Requirements	314
3. The Fair Price Variant	315
4. Supermajority and Fair Price Provisions in Action	316
B. Poison Pills	316
1. First Generation Pills	316
2. Second Generation Pills	321
3. Redemption Provisions	322
4. Variants on the Second Generation Pill	323
5. The Third Generation: Dead Hand and No Hand Pills	323
C. Dual Class Stock	324
1. SEC Rule 19c-4 and the Business Roundtable Decision	326
2. Policy: An Economic Analysis of Dual Class Stock	332
D. Other Defenses	337
1. Pre-offer Planning	337
2. Early Warning Systems	338
3. Defensive Acquisitions	338

TABLE OF CONTENTS

4. Stock Repurchases	338
5. Lock-ups	339
7.2 The Propriety of Target Board Resistance to Unsolicited Offers	340
A. Cheff v. Mathes: Delaware's First Try	342
B. The Academic Critique of Cheff	344
C. Unocal and Revlon: Delaware Tries Again	346
1. Unocal	347
2. Revlon	350
D. Striking a Balance Between Authority and Accountability	352
1. The Question of Comparative Advantage	354
2. The Bypass Argument	355
3. The Structural Argument (a.k.a. Shareholder Choice)	356
4. The Conflicted Interest Argument	359
E. Evaluating Delaware's Balance	366
1. The Evolution Towards a Motive-Based Inquiry	368
2. The Merits of a Motive-Based Inquiry	372
3. The Pivotal Paramount Cases	373
4. Unitrin	385
5. Summation	386
F. The Special Problem of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills	386
1. Takeover Defenses as Precommitment Strategies	388
2. Carmody v. Toll Bros.: Validity of Dead Hand Pills	388
3. Quickturn: The Validity of No Hand Pills	390
4. Statutory Analysis	391
5. Effect on Other Precommitment Strategies	392
6. Why Might Delaware Object?	396
7. Board Precommitments and Director Primacy	397
8. A Better Standard	399
7.3 Consideration of Nonshareholder Constituency Interests	402
A. Delaware Case Law	403
B. A Note on the ALI Principles' Approach	405
C. Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes	405
CHAPTER 8. State Anti-Takeover Legislation	411
Sec.	411
8.1 The First Generation and MITE	411
A. Preemption Standards	412
B. Did the Williams Act Preempt the IBTA?	413
8.2 The Second Generation and CTS	415
A. The Second Generation Statutes	415
B. Powell's CTS Opinion	417
C. Interpreting CTS	419
1. A Meaningful Opportunity for Success	420
2. Amanda Acquisition	421
3. Choosing a Standard	422
4. Commerce Clause Issues	426
D. The Third Generation	426

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CASES	433
INDEX	443

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