

Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	<i>xi</i>
<i>Prologue</i>	<i>xv</i>
CHAPTER ONE: The Maze and the Masses	1
1. The Maze and the Masses	3
2. On the Meaning of Democracy	10
3. The Domain of Democratic Reason and the Circumstances of Politics	13
4. Democratic Reason as Collective Intelligence of the People	17
5. Overview of the Book	23
CHAPTER TWO: Democracy as the Rule of the Dumb Many?	27
1. The Antidemocratic Prejudice in Contemporary Democratic Theory	29
2. What's Wrong with the People?	31
CHAPTER THREE: A Selective Genealogy of the Epistemic Argument for Democracy	53
1. The Myth of Protagoras: Universal Political Wisdom	55
2. Aristotle's Feast: The More, the Wiser	59
3. Machiavelli: Vox Populi, Vox Dei	64
4. Spinoza: The Rational Majority	67
5. Rousseau: The General Will Is Always Right	69
6. Condorcet: Large Numbers and Smart Majorities	70
7. John Stuart Mill: Epistemic Democrat or Epistemic Liberal?	75
8. Dewey: Democracy and Social Intelligence	82
9. Hayek: The Distributed Knowledge of Society	85
CHAPTER FOUR: First Mechanism of Democratic Reason: Inclusive Deliberation	89
1. Deliberation: The Force of the Better Argument	90
2. Deliberation as Problem Solving: Why More Cognitive Diversity Is Smarter	97
3. Why More-Inclusive Deliberating Groups Are Smarter	104

4. Representation	105
5. Election versus Random Selection	108
CHAPTER FIVE: Epistemic Failures of Deliberation	118
1. General Problems and Classical Solutions	120
2. A Reply from Psychology: The Argumentative Theory of Reasoning	123
Conclusion	143
CHAPTER SIX: Second Mechanism of Democratic Reason: Majority Rule	145
1. The Condorcet Jury Theorem	147
2. The Miracle of Aggregation	156
3. Models of Cognitive Diversity	160
Appendix 1: The Law of Large Numbers in the Condorcet Jury Theorem	166
Appendix 2: The Logic of Cognitive Diversity in Judgment Aggregation	169
Appendix 3: Information Markets and Democracy	173
CHAPTER SEVEN: Epistemic Failures of Majority Rule: Real and Imagined	185
1. Politics of Judgment versus Politics of Interest and the Irrelevance of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem	185
2. The Problem of Informational Free Riding	193
3. The Problem of Voters' Systematic Biases and Their "Rational Irrationality"	195
Conclusion	206
CHAPTER EIGHT: Political Cognitivism: A Defense	208
1. Political Decision Making as Imperfect Procedural Justice	210
2. Political Cognitivism: Weak versus Strong	211
3. The Three Sides of Political Questions	213
4. Political Cognitivism: Culturalist versus Absolutist	217
5. Implications for the Epistemic Argument for Democracy	219
6. Status of the Standard: Postulate or Empirical Benchmark?	219
7. The Antiauthoritarian Objection	223
Conclusion	230

CONCLUSION: Democracy as a Gamble Worth Taking	232
1. Summary	232
2. Preconditions of Democratic Reason	233
3. Limits of the Metaphor of the Maze	234
4. Empirical Segue to the Theoretical Epistemic Claim	238
5. The Wisdom of the Past Many and Democracy as a Learning Process	239
6. Reason and Rationality	241
<i>Bibliography</i>	243
<i>Index</i>	265