

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations	11
Acknowledgments	13
1. The Puzzle of Chinese Sanctions	15
1.1 Arguments and implications	17
1.2 Chapter overview	20
2. On Sanctions and China	25
2.1 Thinking about sanctions	25
2.1.1 Coercive sanctions	28
2.1.2 Constraining sanctions	29
2.1.3 Signalling sanctions	30
2.2 China and sanctions: existing explanations	33
2.2.1 Explanation 1: China was not yet powerful enough	33
2.2.2 Explanation 2: The Chinese leadership was constrained by its domestic actors	37
2.2.3 Explanation 3: China's participation in the WTO shaped its sanctions behaviour	39
2.2.4 Explanation 4: History and culture shaped China's sanctions behaviour	41
2.3 Conclusion	44
3. When Does Talk Become Costly?	51
International Audience Costs and China's Sanctions Behaviour	
3.1 International audience costs	53
3.1.1 On audience costs	53
3.1.2 What are 'international audience costs' and why do they matter?	59
3.1.3 Condition 1: The offender needs to be concerned about international opinion	63
3.1.4 Condition 2: There must be at least one rhetorical actor present	65
3.2 The effects of international audience costs on China's sanctions behaviour	71
3.2.1 China's quest for recognition and higher international status	71

3.2.2	Sanctions rhetoric as China's counter-stigmatisation strategy	75
3.3	Conclusion	78
4.	Stigmatising Sanctions and China's Counter-Stigmatisation	85
4.1	Stigmatising sanctions and stigma management strategies	87
4.1.1	Defining stigma and stigmatising sanctions	87
4.1.2	Stigma management strategies and their implications	88
4.1.3	China and stigmatising sanctions	92
4.2	US and Europe's stigmatising sanctions against China, 1949 onwards	94
4.2.1	The inception of sanctions against China, 1949-1971	94
4.2.2	Motivations behind US sanctions against China	96
4.2.3	China's response to Cold War sanctions	99
4.2.4	China's admission to the UN	104
4.2.5	The road to China's UN admission	105
4.2.6	China's reaction to its UN admission	108
4.2.7	The lifting of Cold War sanctions and beginning of US-led sanctions after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident	110
4.2.8	The extent of post-Tiananmen sanctions, 1989-1993	111
4.2.9	China's response to the Tiananmen sanctions	113
4.2.10	Post-Tiananmen debates, 1993 onwards	116
4.3	China's counter-stigmatisation: its sanctions frame at the UNSC, 1997-2016	119
4.3.1	Method of analysis	120
4.3.2	China's stated standards of sanctions legitimacy at the UNSC, 1997-2016	121
4.4	Conclusion	126
5.	China and United Nations Security Council Sanctions	137
5.1	China and UNSC sanctions: correlation analysis and case study selection	138
5.1.1	Correlation analysis: methodology	139
5.1.2	Correlation analysis: the relevance of the rhetoric-based hypothesis	141
5.1.3	Selection of case studies	146
5.1.4	China and sanctions: five competing hypotheses	148
5.2	China and sanctions against the DPRK: from resistance to cooperation	149
5.2.1	Background of UNSC sanctions against the DPRK	149

5.2.2	Competing explanations concerning China's behaviour towards DPRK sanctions	151
5.2.3	Playing up China's non-proliferation commitments: the US as a rhetorical actor	153
5.2.4	Conclusion of the DPRK case	160
5.3	China's rejection of proposed sanctions against Syria	161
5.3.1	Background of proposed UNSC sanctions against Syria	161
5.3.2	Competing explanations for China's behaviour towards sanctions against Syria	164
5.3.3	Explaining China's behaviour: discourse on human rights, intervention, and the Libya effect	166
5.3.4	Conclusion of the Syrian case	172
5.4	China's support for sanctions against Guinea-Bissau: a failed test?	173
5.4.1	Background of the Guinea-Bissau case	173
5.4.2	Competing explanations for China's behaviour towards sanctions against Guinea-Bissau	175
5.4.3	Explaining China's voting behaviour towards Guinea-Bissau sanctions: the lack of a rhetorical actor	177
5.4.4	Conclusion of the Guinea-Bissau case	181
5.5	Conclusion	182
6.	China's Unilateral Sanctions: Eight Classic Cases Revisited	191
6.1	China's use (or non-use) of unilateral sanctions in the eight classic cases	193
6.1.1	China-France dispute over French President Nicolas Sarkozy's meeting with the Dalai Lama	194
6.1.2	China-US dispute over arms sales to Taiwan	196
6.1.3	China-Japan dispute over a trawler collision in mutually claimed waters	197
6.1.4	China-Norway dispute over the Nobel Peace Prize award to Liu Xiaobo	198
6.1.5	China-Philippines dispute over the Scarborough Shoal	201
6.1.6	China-Vietnam dispute over an oil rig	205
6.1.7	China-Taiwan dispute over the newly elected Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen's refusal to explicitly endorse the '1992 Consensus'	207
6.1.8	China-South Korea dispute over the deployment of the US THAAD system	210
6.2	Evidence from the eight classic cases: summary and interpretation	214

7. Demystifying China's Sanctions Behaviour	223
7.1 China's unilateral sanctions behaviour: possible explanations	224
7.1.1 China was not yet powerful enough to employ unilateral sanctions effectively	224
7.1.2 The Chinese leadership was constrained by its domestic actors	226
7.1.3 China's participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) shaped its sanctions behaviour	229
7.1.4 History and culture shaped China's sanctions behaviour, leading Chinese leaders to prefer inducement over coercion	232
7.1.5 China's sanctions rhetoric constrained its behaviour	235
7.1.6 Limitations of the rhetoric-based hypothesis	246
7.2 Lessons from the 'eight classic cases'	250
8. China's Sanctions Dilemma	259
8.1 Policy and theoretical implications	264
8.2 The future of China's sanctions rhetoric and behaviour	270
8.3 Areas for further study	272
Appendix A	281
United Nations Security Council Meeting Records:	
Coverage of Speeches by Chinese Representatives, 1997-2016	
Appendix B	287
Complete List of Proposed United Nations Security Council Sanctions-Related Resolutions, 1971-2016	
Appendix C	309
China's Material Interests with Targeted Sanctions Regimes	
Bibliography	325
Index	367