

Contents—Outline

<i>Table of Cases</i>	xxi
<i>Table of Legislation, Regulation and Rules</i>	xli
<i>Table of Conventions, Charters and Treaties</i>	li
<i>Table of Constitutions</i>	liii
<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	lv

1. Introduction	1
1.1 Delegation, Governmental Power, and Private Parties	3
1.1.1 Delegation	3
1.1.2 Governmental power	6
1.1.3 Private parties	6
1.2 The Comparative Methodology	10
1.2.1 Justification of the methodology	10
1.2.2 Explanation of the methodology	13
1.2.3 The choice of jurisdictions	15
1.2.4 The scope of the comparison	17
1.3 The Structure of the Book	18

I. DELEGATION IN CONTEXT

2. The Jurisdictional Context of Private Delegation	23
2.1 Introduction	23
2.2 Constitutional Framework	24
2.2.1 United States	24
2.2.2 England	27
2.2.3 European Union	29
2.3 Distribution of Governmental Power	33
2.3.1 United States	33
2.3.1.1 Horizontal distribution of governmental power	33
2.3.1.2 Vertical distribution of governmental power	38
2.3.2 England	41
2.3.2.1 Horizontal distribution of governmental power	41
2.3.2.2 Vertical distribution of governmental power	45
2.3.3 European Union	45
2.3.3.1 Horizontal distribution of governmental power	45
2.3.3.2 Vertical distribution of governmental power	51

2.4	Experience of Private Delegation	54
2.4.1	United States	54
2.4.1.1	The historical, ideological, and political contexts of private delegation	54
2.4.1.2	The extent of private delegation	57
2.4.1.3	The techniques of private delegation	60
2.4.2	England	61
2.4.2.1	The historical, ideological, and political contexts of private delegation	61
2.4.2.2	The extent of private delegation	64
2.4.2.3	The techniques of private delegation	67
2.4.3	European Union	69
2.4.3.1	The historical, ideological, and political contexts of private delegation	69
2.4.3.2	The extent of private delegation	72
2.4.3.3	The techniques of private delegation	73
2.5	Conclusion	74
3.	The Benefits and Challenges of Private Delegation	75
3.1	Introduction	75
3.2	The Aims of Private Delegation: Efficiency and Effectiveness	77
3.2.1	Managerial explanations for efficiency and effectiveness	77
3.2.2	Political explanations for efficiency and effectiveness	81
3.2.3	Ensuring efficiency and effectiveness	82
3.3	Private Delegation and Democracy	84
3.3.1	Participatory democracy	85
3.3.1.1	Direct participatory democracy	86
3.3.1.2	Indirect participatory democracy	87
3.3.2	Liberal democracy	89
3.3.3	Civic republican democracy	91
3.3.4	Public choice democracy	92
3.3.5	Democratic experimentalism	95
3.3.6	Democracy in the European Union	96
3.4	Private Delegation and Accountability	98
3.4.1	Political accountability	101
3.4.2	Legal accountability	102
3.4.3	Financial accountability	103
3.4.4	Extended accountability	105
3.5	Private Delegation and Human Rights	108
3.5.1	Procedural rights	108
3.5.2	Free-standing rights	111

3.6 Private Delegation and Non-Profits	112
3.7 The Benefits and Challenges of Private Delegation: An Overview	114

II. CONTROLS ON DELEGATION

4. Constitutional Controls on Delegation	117
4.1 Introduction	117
4.2 United States	117
4.2.1 The federal non-delegation doctrine	118
4.2.1.1 Constitutional source	118
4.2.1.2 Control technique	119
(a) Judicial power	120
(b) Executive powers	121
(c) Legislative powers	123
4.2.1.3 Judicial attitude	125
4.2.2 State non-delegation doctrines	127
4.2.2.1 Overview	127
(a) Constitutional source	127
(b) Control technique	128
(c) Judicial attitude	129
4.2.2.2 Texas	130
(a) <i>Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Foundation, Inc v Lewellen</i>	130
(b) <i>FM Properties Operating Co v City of Austin</i>	131
(c) The <i>Boll Weevil</i> technique	133
4.2.3 The importance of judicial attitude	135
4.2.4 The civil service mandate	137
4.2.4.1 Restrained enforcement	138
4.2.4.2 Strict enforcement	139
4.2.4.3 The civil service mandate considered	141
4.3 European Union	142
4.3.1 Institutional balance	142
4.3.1.1 Constitutional source	142
4.3.1.2 Control technique	144
4.3.1.3 Judicial attitude	146
4.3.2 Article I-35	148
4.4 England	150
4.4.1 'Indistinct, indeterminate, unentrenched'	150
4.4.1.1 Procedural fairness	151
4.4.1.2 Separation of powers	155
4.4.2 Uncertain executive power	156
4.4.3 Parliamentary sovereignty	157

4.4.3.1	Review of legislative delegation	158	
4.4.3.2	Review of legislatively granted executive delegation power	158	
4.5	Constitutional Controls on the Delegator: An Overview		160
5.	Legislative and Regulatory Controls on Delegation		165
5.1	Introduction		165
5.2	European Union		168
5.2.1	Contracting out to a private delegate	168	
5.2.1.1	Substantive constraints	168	
5.2.1.2	Procedural requirements	170	
5.2.1.3	Supervisory obligations	171	
5.2.2	Grants to national authorities	173	
5.2.3	Grants to private delegates	173	
5.2.3.1	Substantive constraints	173	
5.2.3.2	Procedural requirements	174	
5.2.3.3	Supervisory obligations	174	
5.2.4	Delegation to private delegates via executive agencies	175	
5.2.5	Enforceability of the controls	176	
5.3	United States		177
5.3.1	Contracting	179	
5.3.1.1	Contracting out functions already performed by federal actors	179	
	(a) Substantive constraints	179	
	(b) Procedural requirements	183	
	(c) Supervisory obligations	185	
5.3.1.2	Contracting without replacing federal employees	186	
5.3.2	Assistance to states	187	
5.3.2.1	Circular A-102	187	
5.3.2.2	State procurement regimes	188	
5.3.3	Assistance to private actors	189	
5.3.4	Enforceability of the controls	190	
5.3.4.1	Assistance or contract?	190	
5.3.4.2	Enforcing A-76 and FAR	191	
5.3.4.3	Enforcing grant controls	196	
5.4	England		196
5.4.1	Contracting: central government	196	
5.4.1.1	Substantive constraints	197	
	(a) Functional controls	197	
	(b) Choice of delegate controls	199	
5.4.1.2	Procedural requirements	203	

5.4.1.3 Supervisory obligations	204
5.4.2 Grants: central government	209
5.4.3 Contract and grant: local government	210
5.4.4 Enforceability of the controls	213
5.5 Conclusion	218
5.5.1 The impact of legislative and regulatory controls on private delegation	218
5.5.2 The jurisdictions compared	221

III. CONTROLS ON PRIVATE PARTIES

6. Human Rights Controls on the Delegate	227
6.1 Introduction	227
6.2 Private Delegates and Human Rights: A Justification	228
6.2.1 The case for a 'new definition of the public sphere'	228
6.2.2 Refuting the case for a narrow definition of the public sphere	232
6.3 Private Delegates and Human Rights: The Jurisdictions	236
6.3.1 United States	236
6.3.1.1 State action doctrine under the federal Constitution	237
(a) Joint participation	238
(b) Nexus	238
(c) Public function	240
(d) Source of power	243
6.3.1.2 State action doctrine at the state level	244
6.3.2 England	245
6.3.2.1 Court of Appeal: <i>Poplar Housing</i> and <i>Leonard Cheshire</i>	248
6.3.2.2 House of Lords: <i>Aston Cantlow</i>	251
6.3.2.3 Court of Appeal: <i>YL</i>	257
6.3.2.4 House of Lords: <i>YL</i>	262
(a) Points of Consensus	263
(b) Points of Division	263
(c) Additional Issues	268
(d) Summary	269
6.3.2.5 Legislative intervention?	270
6.3.3 European Union	270
6.3.3.1 Bringing an action before the ECJ	274
6.3.3.2 The reach of Community rights	274
6.3.3.3 The Court's fundamental rights and the Charter	279
(a) Delegation by an EU institution	279
(b) Delegation by a Member State	279
6.4 Private Delegates and Human Rights: An Appropriate Test	282

7. Administrative Law Controls on the Delegate	289
7.1 Introduction	289
7.2 Sources of Administrative Law in the Jurisdictions	290
7.3 Content of Administrative Law in the Jurisdictions	294
7.4 Applicability of Administrative Law to Private Delegates	295
7.4.1 The 'institutional identity' criterion	297
7.4.1.1 United States: The federal APA	297
7.4.1.2 United States: state APAs	300
7.4.1.3 European Union	303
7.4.2 The 'procedure' criterion	303
7.4.2.1 England: Procedure determines applicability	304
7.4.2.2 United States state law: Procedure and scope distinct	308
7.4.2.3 European Union: Procedure and scope distinct	311
7.4.3 The 'source of power' criterion	311
7.4.3.1 England: The importance of the source of power	311
(a) Narrow understanding of statute	313
(b) Expansive understanding of contract	316
(c) Judicial attitudes	317
7.4.3.2 United States state law: The source of power as one factor	317
7.4.3.3 European Union: The source of power as one factor	319
7.4.4 The 'function' criterion	319
7.4.4.1 English law: The emergence of the function test	319
7.4.4.2 United States state law: Function in practice	321
7.4.4.3 European Union: Function in practice	323
7.5 Freedom of Information Legislation	323
7.6 Administrative Law Controls on the Delegate: An Overview	326
8. Private Law Controls on the Delegate	329
8.1 Introduction	329
8.2 General Comments	329
8.3 Contract	332
8.3.1 Contract design	333
8.3.1.1 The challenges	335
8.3.1.2 Responding to the challenges	338
(a) Oversight	339
(b) Encouraging competition	342
(c) Avoiding conflicts of interest	343
8.3.1.3 The special case of human rights	344
8.3.2 Enforceability	348
8.3.2.1 Enforceability by government	349

8.3.2.2	Enforceability by citizens	350
(a)	Third-party beneficiary rights in England	350
(b)	Third-party beneficiary rights in the US	353
(c)	Third-party beneficiary rights in the EU	358
8.3.2.3	Enforceability by the contractor	358
8.3.3	The limits of contract	364
8.4	Tort Law	367
8.4.1	Tort law as control	368
8.4.1.1	Common law tort	368
8.4.1.2	Constitutional torts	371
8.4.2	Extending governmental immunities to private delegates	371
8.4.2.1	United States	371
(a)	Federal law	371
(b)	State law	375
8.4.2.2	England	375
(a)	Common law tort	375
(b)	Constitutional torts	377
8.4.3	European Union	377
8.5	Private Law Controls on the Delegate: An Overview	379

IV. COMPARISONS, LAW AND DELEGATION

9.	Conclusion	385
9.1	Reviewing the Legal Systems	385
9.1.1	England	386
9.1.2	European Union	389
9.1.3	United States	391
9.1.4	Overview of the legal systems	393
9.2	Reviewing the Legal Controls	393
9.2.1	Controls on delegation	393
9.2.2	Controls on private parties	396
9.2.3	Controls on delegation and controls on private parties	397
9.2.4	Overview of controls	397
9.3	Concluding Observations	398
	<i>Bibliography</i>	401
	<i>Index</i>	445