

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	<i>page ix</i>
<i>List of Tables</i>	<i>xi</i>
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	<i>xiii</i>
I The Process of Punishment	I
1.1 The Puzzle of Political Trials	3
1.2 Existing Explanations	5
1.3 A Theory of Judicial Repression	10
1.4 Contributions	14
1.5 Case Selection	18
1.6 Overview of the Book	24
2 A Theory of Judicial Repression	26
2.1 Rethinking Repression: Violence and Punishment in Perspective	29
2.2 The Theory: Explaining Judicial Repression	31
2.3 Observable Implications	52
3 Reading a Judicial Ritual	54
3.1 Background: Rise of a One-Party State in Kenya	55
3.2 A Judicial Ritual to Restore Order and Obedience	58
3.3 Demonstrations of Loyalty as the Trial Comes to a Close	70
3.4 Alternative Explanations	74
3.5 Beyond Kenya	78
4 Who Goes to Trial?	80
4.1 Threats to Autocratic Survival: Coup Plots	82
4.2 Data on Coup Plots in Postcolonial Africa	84
4.3 Testing Who Goes to Trial	99

4.4	Trial and Posttrial Outcomes	103
4.5	Conclusion	107
	Appendix 4A	108
5	Pathways of Punishment	110
5.1	The Case of Tanzania	113
5.2	The Case of Sierra Leone	131
5.3	Pathways of Punishment in Perspective	150
6	A Cooperative Judiciary	152
6.1	Background: Colonial Origins of Postcolonial Courts	154
6.2	Dilemmas of a Professionalized Judiciary	163
6.3	Cross-National Patterns of Judicial Cooperation	167
6.4	When Professionalization and Partisanship are Misaligned	170
6.5	Expanding the Jurist Pool Beyond Africa	175
6.6	Conclusion	190
7	Conclusion	192
7.1	Main Findings	193
7.2	Avenues for Future Research	196
7.3	Implications for Due Process in Emerging Democracies	201
	<i>Bibliography</i>	205
	<i>Index</i>	213