

Contents

<i>Table of Cases</i>	xxix
<i>Table of International Agreements</i>	xxxvii
<i>Table of Statutes and Regulations</i>	xli

Part I. International Economic Law

1. Economic Law and the Laws of Economics	3
1.1 Introduction	3
1.2 A First Look at Comparative Advantage	4
1.3 Some Complications	5
1.4 From Economic Theory to Policy, Politics, and Law	7
2. Money, Exchange Rates, and the Balance of Payments	9
2.1 Introduction	9
2.2 Three Approaches to Exchange Rates and the Adjustment Process	10
(a) The Gold Standard	10
(b) Fixed Exchange Rates and the Bretton Woods Scheme	12
(c) Floating Exchange Rates	13
2.3 The Balance of Payments	15
(a) Balance of Payments Accounting Illustrated	15
(b) The Balance of Payments and the Bretton Woods Scheme	17
2.4 Some Preliminary Observations	18

Part II. The GATT/WTO System

3. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Origins and Overview	21
3.1 The Antecedents	21
3.2 The Birth of GATT: Almost by Accident	23
3.3 An Overview of the GATT	26
(a) The Architecture	26
(b) The Major Principles	28

3.4	A First Look at the Qualifications	30
(a)	Preservation of Existing Preferences	31
(b)	'Existing Legislation' and the Protocol of Provisional Application	32
(c)	Political Exclusions (Art. XXXV)	33
(d)	National Security (Art. XXI)	34
(e)	'General Exceptions'	35
(f)	Permissible Quantitative Restrictions	36
3.5	Rounding Out the Overview	38
(a)	The Escape Clause	38
(b)	Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas	39
(c)	Dumping and Subsidies	40
(d)	Waivers	41
(e)	Dispute Settlement in GATT	42
	Summary	44
4.	Evolution of the GATT and GATT Law	45
4.1	Introduction	45
4.2	MFN, Reciprocity and the Negotiating Rounds	46
(a)	The First Five Rounds (1947-61)	46
(b)	The Kennedy Round	49
4.3	The Tokyo Round and the Separate Codes	54
(a)	An Expanded Agenda	54
(b)	Separate Codes and the Question of MFN	55
(c)	Achievements and Failures of the Tokyo Round	58
4.4	The Uruguay Round	61
(a)	The Exploding Agenda	61
(b)	The Ups and Downs of the Uruguay Round	63
(c)	The Final Stage	66
	Summary	67
5.	The GATT/WTO System after the Uruguay Round: A Preliminary Survey	68
5.1	A First Look at the System	69
5.2	The Tokyo Round Agreements Revised I: The 'Unfair Trade' Regimes	72
(a)	Subsidies and Countervailing Measures	72
(b)	Dumping and Anti-Dumping	74
5.3	The Tokyo Round Agreements Revised II: The Lesser Agreements	76

(a)	Customs Valuation	76
(b)	Technical Barriers to Trade	78
(c)	Import Licensing Procedures	82
(d)	Government Procurement	83
5.4	The Agreement on Safeguards	87
(a)	Background of the Agreement	87
(b)	The Basic Commitments	89
(c)	The Requirement of Notification	91
(d)	The Question of Selectivity	92
(e)	Adjustment in Place of Protection	92
(f)	Incentives to Compliance	93
5.5	Trade-Related Investment Measures	94
(a)	Background: The Canada–United States Dispute over the Foreign Investment Review Act	94
(b)	From the <i>FIRA</i> Case to the TRIMs Agreement	96
5.6	Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights	98
(a)	Intellectual Property Before the Uruguay Round	98
(b)	Introducing Intellectual Property Protection into the GATT/WTO System	100
(c)	The TRIPs Agreement: An Overview	102
(d)	The TRIPs Agreement within the GATT/WTO System	105
(e)	TRIPs and the Developing Countries	106
(f)	TRIPs and Competition Law	107
	Summary	108
6.	The International Exchange of Services and the Creation of GATS	110
6.1	Introduction	111
(a)	Services in the World Economy	111
(b)	Services in the GATT/WTO System	111
6.2	Approaching the Barriers to Trade in Services	113
6.3	The General Agreement on Trade in Services: An Overview	115
(a)	The Scheme of the GATS	115
(b)	GATT and GATS Compared	116
6.4	The GATS: A Closer Look	117
(a)	Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment	117
(b)	Transparency and Fair Procedures	118
(c)	Market Access	119

(d)	National Treatment	119
(e)	Summary	120
6.5	Implementing the GATS	121
6.6	GATS and Financial Services	122
(a)	The Annex on Financial Services	122
(b)	The Commitments: Market Access and National Treatment	123
(c)	The Commitments: Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment	124
(d)	'Horizontal Commitments'	124
(e)	The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services	125
6.7	GATS and Telecommunications	125
(a)	The Revolution in Telecommunications	125
(b)	The Telecommunications Annexes	126
(c)	The Conditions of Competition and the Reference Paper	127
(d)	The Schedules of Commitments	130
6.8	Preliminary Reflections on Services in the WTO System	130

Part III. Dispute Resolution

7.	Dispute Resolution in the GATT, 1948–94	135
7.1	Introduction: Resolution of Legal Disputes between States	135
(a)	The World Court	136
(b)	Interstate Arbitration	137
7.2	GATT and Dispute Settlement: The Original Conception	138
7.3	Evolution of the GATT as a Forum for Disputes: Adjudication and Its Alternatives	140
(a)	The First Phase (1948–60)	140
(b)	A Pause in the Process (1963–70)	142
(c)	Dispute Settlement Revived (1970–9)	143
7.4	Dispute Settlement in the 1980s and the Uruguay Round	146
(a)	More Law, More Disputes, More Dispute Settlement	146
(b)	Dispute Settlement in the Uruguay Round	148
8.	Dispute Settlement in the WTO	151
8.1	An Overview of the System	152
(a)	From Complaint to Final Report	152

(b)	The Effect of a Decision and the Issue of Sovereignty	154
1.	Finding in Favour of Respondent	154
2.	Finding in Favour of Complainant	155
(c)	The Question of Compliance	157
(d)	Compensation and Retaliation	158
(e)	The System in Context	160
8.2	A Closer Look at the Panels	161
(a)	Selection of Panelists	161
(b)	Conflicts of Interest and the Question of Bias	162
(c)	Confidentiality	164
(d)	Information for the Panel	164
(e)	The Use of Experts	165
(f)	The Suggestion for Permanent Panelists	166
8.3	The Appellate Body	166
(a)	The Membership of the Appellate Body	167
(b)	Functioning of the Appellate Body	168
(c)	The Appeal Process and the Scope of Review	169
8.4	The Role of the Secretariat	171
8.5	Expanding the Controversy—Counterclaims and Third Party Participants	172
(a)	Counterclaims	172
(b)	Participation by Third Parties	173
8.6	Dispute Settlement and the Developing Countries	174
8.7	Nullification and Impairment	176
(a)	Violation Complaints	176
(b)	Non-Violation Complaints	177
8.8	The Understanding on Dispute Settlement and Unilateral Action: Herein of Section 301 and the <i>Bananas</i> Dispute	180
(a)	The Uruguay Round Bargain	180
(b)	Section 301 after the Uruguay Round	181
(c)	Section 301 on Trial	183
(d)	The <i>Bananas</i> Dispute	188
8.9	A Look Ahead and Some Reflections	194

Part IV. The Rules of International Trade in Detail

9.	The Question of Subsidies	199
9.1	Introduction	200
9.2	GATT and the Subsidies Question: Article XVI	201

9.3	GATT and the Subsidies Question: Article VI	206
9.4	The Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Code of 1979	208
	(a) The Basic Compromise	208
	(b) Procedural Aspects: Countervailing Duties and Required Determinations	210
	(c) The Question of Injury	212
	(d) Regulation of Subsidies	214
	(e) The Second Track	215
	(f) Subsidies and the Developing Countries	216
	(g) Summary	217
9.5	Subsidy Law: Some Illustrations	217
	(a) Direct Export Subsidies	218
	(b) Export Incentive Schemes	219
	(c) Export Credits and the OECD Arrangement	221
	(d) Defining a Subsidy: Charge on the Public Account or Benefit to the Recipient	225
	(e) United States Countervailing Duties against European Steel in the 1980s	227
	(f) Benefit versus Public Charge Revisited: Subsidies and Privatization	233
9.6	The Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures	234
	(a) Defining Subsidy	235
	(b) Red and Green Light Subsidies	236
	(c) Yellow Light Subsidies	237
	(d) The Question of Specificity	237
	(e) Measuring a Subsidy	238
	(f) Subsidies and the Developing Countries	239
	Conclusion	240
10.	Dumping and Anti-Dumping	242
10.1	Introduction and Overview	243
10.2	Economic Arguments: Pro and Con	245
10.3	Legislating the International Law of Dumping and Anti-Dumping (1947–94)	248
10.4	Establishing the Fact and the Margin of Dumping	250
	(a) The Export Price	250
	(b) Normal Value	252
	— The Basic Rule	252
	— Inadequate Home Market Sales	252
	— Sales Below Cost	253
	— Constructed Value	254

(c) Averaging	255
(d) Non-market Economies	256
(e) The Question of Exchange Rates	259
10.5 Determination of Injury	261
(a) The Elements of Injury	261
(b) The Link between Imports and Injury	263
(c) Margin of Dumping or Margin of Injury	266
(d) Cumulation	267
(e) Threat of Injury	268
(f) Material Retardation	271
10.6 Anti-Dumping, Antitrust and Public Interest	273
(a) Could Antitrust Replace Anti-Dumping Laws?	273
(b) Anti-Dumping, Competition, and the Public Interest	274
10.7 Anti-Circumvention Measures	276
10.8 The Anti-Dumping Proceeding	280
(a) Standing	281
(b) Preliminary Injury Finding	282
(c) Provisional Measures	283
(d) Assembling the Facts	284
(e) Transparency and the Right to be Heard	286
(f) Price Undertakings	286
(g) Judicial Review	287
10.9 Action on behalf of Third Countries	288
10.10 Review and Sunset	289
10.11 Dispute Settlement	290
Conclusion	293

Part V. Beyond the World Trade Organization

11. The Environment and International Economic Law	297
11.1 Introduction	298
11.2 Environmental Regulation Defined	300
11.3 The Growth of the Environmental Movement	302
(a) The Environment as a Popular Cause	302
(b) The Stockholm Conference (1972)	303
(c) A Flood of Treaties	303
(d) The Rio Conference (1992)	304

11.4	Translating the Environmental Movement into Positive International Law: Two Illustrations	306
	The Montreal Protocol	307
	(a) CFCs and the Ozone Layer: The Road to the Montreal Protocol	307
	(b) The Montreal Protocol and its Amendments	309
	(c) The Montreal Protocol and GATT	310
	The Basel Convention	311
	(d) Background: The Problem of Waste Disposal	311
	(e) The Basel Convention	312
	(f) The Basel Convention and GATT	313
	(g) Conclusion	313
11.5	Trade versus Environment: The <i>Tuna/Dolphin</i> Case	314
	(a) The Factual Background	314
	(b) The Restriction and Challenge	315
	(c) The Panel Findings	316
	(d) Aftermath of the <i>Tuna/Dolphin</i> Case	317
11.6	From Tuna to Shrimp, From Dolphins to Turtles	318
	(a) <i>Tuna/Dolphin II</i>	318
	(b) The <i>Shrimp/Turtle</i> Case	319
11.7	The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement and the <i>Beef Hormones</i> Case	323
	(a) The SPS Agreement	323
	(b) The <i>Beef Hormones</i> Case: Round I	324
	(c) The <i>Beef Hormones</i> Case: Round II	325
	(d) Burden of Proof	326
	(e) The Precautionary Principle	327
	(f) Risk Assessment	328
	(g) Discrimination	329
	(h) Lessons from the <i>Beef Hormones</i> Case: Some Tentative Conclusions	331
11.8	Some Closing Thoughts and a Look Ahead	332
	(a) Further Thoughts on the Precautionary Principle	332
	(b) Beyond the World Trade Organization?	335
12.	Competition Law <i>by Eleanor M. Fox</i>	340
12.1	Introduction: The Place of Competition Law in International Economic Law	341
12.2	The Origins and Evolution of Antitrust Law in the United States	342

12.3	The Adoption of Competition Law in Europe and Japan	344
12.4	The Reach of National Law and the Effects Doctrine	345
	(a) Protecting Competition in Domestic Markets	346
	(b) Opening Foreign Markets	350
	(c) Regulating Multijurisdictional Mergers	352
12.5	Modern Competition Law: Substantive Rules and Principles	353
	(a) Overview	353
	(b) Cartels and Boycotts	354
	(c) Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance	356
	(d) Vertical Restraints	358
	1. Vertical Restraints in General	358
	2. Licenses of Intellectual Property	360
	(e) Mergers	362
	(f) Joint Ventures and Alliances	365
	(g) Other Collaborations among Competitors	366
	(h) Government Action Defenses	366
12.6	Enforcement of Competition Law	368
	(a) The United States	368
	1. The Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission	368
	2. Private Enforcement of Federal Law	369
	3. Enforcement of Federal Law by State Attorneys General	370
	(b) The European Union	371
12.7	International Cooperation and Comity	373
	(a) Impairment of Foreign Market Access	373
	(b) International Codes	374
	(c) Bilateral Cooperation	375
	(d) Regional Cooperation	378
	(e) The Problem of Evidence	379
12.8	Competition Policy and World Economic Integration—A Look Ahead	379

Part VI. International Investment

	Introduction	387
13.	The Responsibility of Host States to Foreign Investors: Customary International Law	391
13.1	Before the First World War	391

13.2	Breakdown of the Consensus	392
(a)	The Russian Revolution and Repudiation of Private Property	392
(b)	The Mexican Revolution, the Social Function of Property, and the Calvo Doctrine	393
13.3	The Classical Western View	395
(a)	Judicial Sources	395
(b)	The Hull Formula	397
13.4	The Disconnect between Theory and Practice	403
(a)	The Havana Charter	404
(b)	The Wave of Expropriations (1945–70)	405
13.5	The UN's Attempts to Declare Customary Law	407
(a)	Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (1962)	407
(b)	From Permanent Sovereignty to the New International Economic Order	410
	Summary	414
14.	Dispute Settlement and International Investment	416
14.1	International Arbitral Tribunals	417
(a)	The <i>Libyan Nationalization Cases</i>	417
(b)	<i>AMINOIL v. Kuwait</i>	424
	Summary	430
14.2	The International Court of Justice	431
(a)	The <i>Anglo-Iranian Case</i> (1952)	432
(b)	The <i>Barcelona Traction Case</i> (1970)	433
(c)	The <i>ELSI Case</i>	435
14.3	International Law in National Courts	438
(a)	Litigation around the World	438
	1. The Classic English View	438
	2. The <i>Anglo-Iranian Cases</i> in National Courts	439
	3. The <i>Indonesian Tobacco Cases</i>	441
(b)	The Act of State Doctrine in the United States	444
	1. The <i>Sabbatino Case</i>	445
	2. Limiting the Act of State Doctrine	448
	Summary	453
	Summary	453

15. Evolving Standards of International Law on International Investment	455
15.1 The ICSID Convention	456
(a) Origins and Purpose of the Convention	456
(b) The Scheme of the Convention and the Question of Consent	457
(c) The Convention and International Law	458
(d) Gradual Acceptance of the Convention	460
15.2 The Iran–United States Claims Tribunal	461
(a) Background	461
(b) Constitution and Mandate of the Tribunal	462
(c) The Claims Tribunal and the Expropriation Cases	463
1. Eligible Claimants	464
2. Availability of the Forum	464
3. What is a Taking?	465
4. Standard of Compensation	466
5. The Quantum of Compensation	469
(d) The Iran–US Claims Tribunal and International Law	471
15.3 Bilateral Investment Treaties	473
(a) Introduction: The Spread of BITs	473
(b) The Content of BITs	474
1. Admission of the Investment	474
2. Fair and Equitable Treatment	475
3. ‘Full protection and security’	476
4. Expropriation	476
5. Compensation	480
6. Dispute Settlement	484
(c) BITs and International Law	486
15.4 The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)	488
(a) Introduction	488
(b) Covered Risks	489
(c) MIGA and International Law	490
Summary	493
 Part VII. The International Monetary System	
Introduction	497
16. The Bretton Woods System	499
16.1 Before Bretton Woods: Good and Bad Memories	500

16.2	The Bretton Woods Conference	502
16.3	The IMF as an Organization	503
16.4	The Fund Agreement as a Code of Conduct	507
16.5	The IMF and Exchange Controls	508
	(a) Current Transactions	508
	(b) Capital Transactions	509
	(c) The Question of Discrimination	510
16.6	The Fund as a Pool of Resources	511
	(a) Member States' Quotas	511
	(b) Drawing on the Fund	512
	(c) Conditions for Drawing	513
16.7	Drawing Rights and Stand-by Arrangements	515
	(a) Limitations on Drawing Rights	515
	(b) The Origins of Stand-by Arrangements	516
	(c) Stand-by Arrangements and Letters of Intent	517
	(d) The Legal Status of Stand-by Arrangements	517
16.8	Creation of Reserves: Special Drawing Rights in the IMF	519
	(a) The Problem of the Supply of Reserves	519
	(b) Creating Reserves by Conscious Decision: The First Amendment to the IMF Articles	520
	(c) Special Drawing Rights, Reconstitution, and Links to Development	521
	(d) Valuation of Special Drawing Rights	522
	(e) Interest and Charges	523
	(f) Special Drawing Rights in the International Monetary System	523
16.9	The Fixed Exchange Regime (1945–71)	524
	(a) The Par Value System	524
	(b) Demise of the Par Value System	525
	(c) Attempt at Repair: The Smithsonian Agreement	527
17.	The International Monetary Fund as Amended	529
17.1	The IMF in Transition	530
	(a) The Outline of Reform	531
	(b) Acceptance of Floating Exchange Rates	531
	(c) Amending the Articles of Agreement	532
17.2	Scope of the Amendments	533

17.3	New Article IV and the Law of Exchange Arrangements	534
	(a) Freedom to Choose	534
	(b) Obligations under Article IV	535
	(c) Overseeing the International Monetary System	537
17.4	Surveillance by the IMF	538
	(a) The Decision on Surveillance	538
	(b) The Reach of the Fund's Jurisdiction	539
	(c) Surveillance in Practice	541
	(d) Summary	544
17.5	Conditionality under the Amended Articles of Agreement	545
	(a) Conditionality Codified	545
	(b) Conditionality and the Changed Clientele of the IMF	546
	(c) The Guidelines on Conditionality	547
17.6	Special Facilities of the Fund: Resources Beyond the Formal Limits	549
	(a) The Extended Fund Facility	550
	(b) The Compensatory Financing Facility	550
	(c) The Oil Facility	551
	(d) Other Facilities for Unforeseen Contingencies	551
	(e) Supplementary Financing and Related Facilities	552
	(f) The Poverty Reduction Facilities	553
17.7	Borrowing by the Fund	556
	(a) The General Arrangements to Borrow	556
	(b) The New Arrangements to Borrow	559
	(c) Borrowing for Special Facilities	560
17.8	Enforcement of Obligations to the International Monetary Fund	561
	Summary	563
18.	The International Monetary System and Regional Crises	565
	Introduction	566
	<i>A. Latin America, 1982-95</i>	
18.1	Origins of the Crisis	567
18.2	The Crisis Erupts: The Case of Mexico	569
18.3	The Response of the International System: The Mexican Case Continued	571
	(a) The First Quick Fix	571
	(b) Managing the Medium Term	572

18.4	Precedent becomes Pattern: A Briefer Look at the Brazilian Case	575
	(a) Again a First Quick Fix	576
	(b) The Tap Turned Off, and On again	577
18.5	Rescheduling, Restructuring, and the Baker and Brady Plans	578
	(a) The First Assessment (1982–5)	578
	(b) The Baker Initiative (1985–8)	579
	(c) The Brady Initiative (1989–)	581
18.6	A New Mexican Crisis (1994–5)	585
	(a) The Collapse of the Peso	585
	(b) The Response of the International Community	586
	(c) Looking Back at the Crisis: Success of the Rescue	590
	Summary	591
	<i>B. South-east Asia, 1997–8</i>	
18.7	The Falling Dominoes	592
18.8	The Response of the IMF: Introducing Structural Reform	593
18.9	An Interim Appraisal	595
	<i>C. Russia, 1990–2000</i>	
18.10	The Collapse of the Soviet Union	597
18.11	Integrating Russia into the System	599
	(a) The First Steps	599
	(b) Enter the IMF: Phase I	600
18.12	Conditionality Maintained	603
	(a) Conditionality, Russian Style	603
	(b) Conditionality Modified: The Systemic Transformation Facility	604
18.13	Economics and Politics: Betting on Yeltsin (1996)	608
18.14	Conditionality, Crisis, and Corruption (1997–2000)	609
	(a) Building Confidence	609
	(b) Losing Confidence	611
	(c) Default	613
	(d) A Fresh Start?	614
	Summary	615

19. Other Institutions of the International Monetary System	617
19.1 The World Bank and its Affiliates	617
(a) The World Bank	617
(b) The International Development Association	620
(c) The International Finance Corporation	621
19.2 The Bank for International Settlements	622
(a) The Central Banks' Bank	622
(b) A Forum for Regulators	623
19.3 The Paris Club	624
19.4 The Group of Ten	627
(a) The Rise and Decline of the Group of Ten	627
(b) Working Party Three	629
19.5 The Group of Seven and Related Groups	630
(a) Origin of the G-7	630
(b) The G-7, the G-5, and Attempts to Manage Exchange Rates	631
(c) The Group of Seven in Other Contexts	636
20. The European Monetary System and the Rise of the Euro	638
20.1 The European Monetary System (1972-92)	638
(a) The Origin of the EMS	638
(b) The Exchange Rate Mechanism in Operation (1979-92)	640
20.2 Collapse of the EMS: Two Crises	644
(a) September 1992: The Pound and the Lira	644
(b) July-August 1993: The French Franc	645
(c) Some Lessons from the Experience of the EMS, (1979-93)	646
20.3 Economic and Monetary Union: The Treaty of Maastricht	647
(a) The Vision of Economic Union	647
(b) The Treaty of Maastricht	648
(c) From Maastricht to E-Day	651
20.4 The Constraints of the Euro Regime: The Stability and Growth Pact	653
20.5 Preliminary Reflections on the Euro Regime	655
(a) The First Years of the Euro	655
(b) The Mandate of the EMU	656
(c) The European Central Bank and the Politicians	657

(d)	The EMU and Member States	660
(e)	The EMU and the International Monetary System	661
21.	International Monetary Law and Private Activity	664
21.1	Exchange Controls, Exchange Contracts, and Article VIII(2)(b)	665
(a)	The IMF and Exchange Controls	665
(b)	Exchange Contracts and the Fund Agreement	666
1.	'Public Policy'	667
2.	'Exchange Contract'	667
3.	'... which involve the currency'	668
4.	'... Maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement'	669
21.2	Regulation of Banks: Intersection of Public and Private International Law	670
(a)	The Basle Concordat	671
(b)	The Concordat Revised	673
(c)	Another Disaster, Another Agreement: The BCCI Affair	674
21.3	More International Coordination: Capital Requirements for Banks	679
(a)	Development of Capital Adequacy Standards	679
(b)	The Basle Capital Adequacy Accord (1988)	683
(i)	Defining Capital	683
(ii)	Defining Assets: The Balance Sheet	684
(iii)	Defining Assets: Items not on the Balance Sheet	686
(c)	A Look Ahead	689
1.	Revising the Capital Adequacy Accord	689
2.	Beyond Banks	691
	Summary	692

Part VIII. Economic Controls for Political Ends

	Introduction	697
	The Question of Definition	698
22.	United Nations and Other Collective Sanctions	701
	<i>A. United Nations Sanctions</i>	
22.1	Sanctions by Order of the Security Council	701
22.2	The Predicate for Mandatory Sanctions	705

22.3	The Scope of Sanctions	706
	(a) What Sanctions May Be Ordered	706
	(b) The Increasing Use of Sanctions	708
	(c) The Pattern of Mandatory Sanctions	708
	(d) The Territorial Scope of Sanctions	710
	(e) The Duration of Sanctions	711
22.4	Compliance with Sanctions	713
22.5	Enforcement of Sanctions	715
22.6	Common Exemptions from Mandatory Sanctions	718
22.7	Non-binding Sanctions under United Nations Auspices	719
	<i>B. Economic Sanctions and Regional Arrangements: Collective Action in the OAS</i>	
22.8	The Compromise at San Francisco	720
22.9	The OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty	721
22.10	The Leading Precedents	723
	(a) Sanctions against Dominican Republic (1960)	723
	(b) Sanctions against Cuba (1962–)	724
22.11	The OAS, the UN Security Council, and the Haiti Case (1991–94)	725
	Summary	729
23.	Economic Sanctions without Benefit of Treaty	731
23.1	Introduction	731
23.2	The Range of National Sanctions: The United States as Model	733
	(a) Total Embargo	733
	(b) Assets Freeze and Financial Controls	734
	(c) Import Controls	735
	(d) Export Controls	736
23.3	United States Export Controls: A Closer Look	737
	(a) The System of Licenses	737
	(b) Country Groups	737
	(c) Multiple Objectives of Export Control	738
	(d) Enforcement and the Blacklist	739
23.4	Economic Sanctions and the Jurisdiction of States	740
	(a) Jurisdiction to Prescribe and Jurisdiction to Enforce	740
	(b) International Law and the Jurisdiction of States	741

(c)	Bank Deposits and the Freezing of Assets	745
(d)	Limits on Export Controls	748
(1)	Patrician Regulations in Tertian Courts	748
(2)	The <i>Siberian Pipeline</i> Case	750
(e)	Summary	754
23.5	Economic Sanctions and the GATT	755
(a)	Introduction	755
(b)	The Security Exception Article	756
(c)	Czechoslovakia and United States Sanctions (1948, 1951)	757
(d)	The Argentine Crisis and the GATT Decision (1982)	758
(e)	The Nicaragua Question (1983, 1985)	760
(f)	The Helms-Burton Act: EU v. USA	761
	Summary	764
	Afterword	765
	<i>Index of Subjects</i>	767
	<i>Index of Persons</i>	775