

Contents

Table of Cases

xiii

PART I INTRODUCTION

| | |
|---|----|
| 1. The Evolution of the Law of Command Responsibility and the Principle of Legality | 3 |
| 1.1 The shortcomings of international criminal law and the recognition of command responsibility | 3 |
| 1.2 A doctrine born in sin—the <i>Yamashita</i> precedent | 5 |
| 1.3 The development of the law of command responsibility and the principle of legality | 8 |
| 1.4 The ICC and judicial law-making | 12 |
| 2. The Resurgence of International Criminal Justice and the Rebirth of Command Responsibility | 13 |
| 3. Command Responsibility under Customary International Law and the Statute of the International Criminal Court | 21 |
| 3.1 The <i>ad hoc</i> tribunals, the ICC and customary international law | 21 |
| 3.2 Superior responsibility in the ICC Statute | 24 |
| 3.2.1 Article 28 ICC Statute | 24 |
| 3.2.2 Disjointed doctrines of superior responsibility | 26 |
| 3.2.3 Different <i>mens rea</i> standards for military and non-military superiors | 30 |
| 3.2.4 Duty of superiors to take ‘necessary and reasonable’ measures under the ICC Statute | 31 |
| 3.2.5 Requirement of causality under the ICC Statute | 33 |

PART II NATURE AND SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

| | |
|--|----|
| 4. Command Responsibility as a <i>Sui Generis</i> Form of Liability for Omission | 37 |
| 4.1 Liability for omission | 37 |
| 4.1.1 General remarks—what sort of liability is it? | 37 |

| | | |
|-------|---|-----|
| 4.1.2 | Command responsibility and complicity | 39 |
| 4.1.3 | No liability for personal involvement in the crime, nor a form of strict liability | 44 |
| 4.1.4 | A pre-existing legal duty to act | 47 |
| 4.1.5 | Material ability to prevent or punish crimes | 53 |
| 4.2 | Responsible command | 53 |
| 4.3 | Division of labour between international law and domestic law | 56 |
| 4.4 | Personal dereliction of duty | 63 |
| 4.4.1 | Attributability | 63 |
| 4.4.2 | Duties of commanders and duties of subordinates | 65 |
| 4.4.3 | Duties of commanders and duties of states | 69 |
| 4.4.4 | Gravity of breach of duty | 72 |
| 4.5 | Connection with the underlying offence | 74 |
| 4.5.1 | Relation of superior–subordinate and effective control | 74 |
| 4.5.2 | <i>Mens rea</i> | 75 |
| 4.5.3 | The underlying offence | 79 |
| 4.5.4 | Requirement of causation | 82 |
| 4.6 | Extent of liability and sentencing | 89 |
| 4.7 | Overlap of types of liabilities | 94 |
| 5. | Scope of Application of the Doctrine of Command Responsibility—International and Internal Conflicts as well as Peacetime? | 96 |
| 6. | Military Commanders, Civilian Leaders, and Other Superiors, whether <i>De Jure</i> or <i>De Facto</i> | 100 |
| 6.1 | Military commanders | 100 |
| 6.2 | Civilian and other non-military leaders | 102 |
| 6.2.1 | General scope of application of the doctrine of superior responsibility | 102 |
| 6.2.2 | Civilian leaders | 103 |
| 6.3 | Paramilitary commanders and rebel leaders | 110 |
| 6.3.1 | Responsible command and paramilitary leaders | 110 |
| 6.3.2 | Specific evidential challenges | 113 |
| 6.4 | Leaders of terrorist groups | 114 |
| 6.4.1 | Undefined legal status of terrorists under international law | 114 |
| 6.4.2 | Difficulties involved in prosecuting leaders of terrorist outfits | 116 |
| 6.4.3 | Conclusions | 121 |
| 6.5 | <i>De jure</i> superiors and <i>de facto</i> superiors | 122 |
| 6.6 | Several superiors criminally responsible in relation to the same crimes | 123 |

PART III ELEMENTS OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND UNDERLYING OFFENCES

| | |
|---|-----|
| 7. General Remarks | 129 |
| 8. Underlying Offences | 131 |
| 8.1 Commission of a criminal offence and manner of commission | 131 |
| 8.2 Perpendicular command responsibility | 134 |
| 9. A Superior–Subordinate Relationship Between the Accused and Those Who Committed the Underlying Offences | 138 |
| 9.1 Relationship of subordination | 138 |
| 9.1.1 An inter-personal relationship | 138 |
| 9.1.2 <i>De jure</i> | 139 |
| 9.1.3 <i>De facto</i> | 142 |
| 9.1.4 Chain of command | 146 |
| 9.2 ‘Effective control’ | 156 |
| 9.2.1 Definition | 156 |
| 9.2.2 Parties to that relationship | 159 |
| 9.2.3 Establishing ‘effective control’ | 163 |
| 9.2.4 Threshold of ‘effective control’ and other forms of authority | 182 |
| 9.2.5 Relationships of authority in a civilian structure | 188 |
| 9.3 Requirement of temporal coincidence | 190 |
| 10. A Culpable State of Mind | 193 |
| 10.1 General remarks | 193 |
| 10.1.1 Requirement of knowledge: from <i>Yamashita</i> to the ICC | 193 |
| 10.1.2 Customary international law and the ICC | 194 |
| 10.2 Knowledge | 197 |
| 10.2.1 <i>Raison d’être</i> of the requirement of knowledge | 197 |
| 10.2.2 Timing of knowledge | 198 |
| 10.2.3 Knowledge of what? | 199 |
| 10.2.4 Categories and forms of knowledge | 208 |
| 10.3 Establishing the required <i>mens rea</i> | 213 |
| 10.3.1 Indicia of knowledge | 213 |
| 10.3.2 No imputation of knowledge | 216 |
| 10.3.3 Information in possession of the superior | 217 |
| 10.4 Intent not to act despite knowledge | 218 |
| 10.4.1 Knowledge insufficient | 218 |
| 10.4.2 Intentional failure to act | 219 |
| 10.5 Degree of fault | 223 |
| 10.5.1 No liability without fault | 223 |
| 10.5.2 Gross negligence | 224 |
| 10.6 Special intent crimes | 226 |

| | |
|--|------------|
| 11. Breach of a Duty and Consequential Failure to Prevent or to Punish Crimes of Subordinates | 229 |
| 11.1 A dual source of liability—failure to prevent or failure to punish crimes | 229 |
| 11.1.1 Two distinct duties—to prevent and to punish crimes | 229 |
| 11.1.2 Duty to prevent | 231 |
| 11.1.3 Duty to punish | 233 |
| 11.1.4 Relationship between the two duties | 234 |
| 11.2 Dereliction of duty | 235 |
| 11.2.1 General remarks—failure to adopt ‘necessary and reasonable’ measures | 235 |
| 11.2.2 ‘Necessary’ | 237 |
| 11.2.3 ‘Reasonable’ | 239 |
| 11.2.4 Assessing the propriety of the superior’s conduct | 242 |
| 11.2.5 Concluding remarks | 259 |
| 11.3 Seriousness of the breach of duty relevant to superior responsibility | 260 |
| 11.3.1 Criteria relevant to assess the gravity of the breach | 260 |
| 11.3.2 Gross violation of duty | 260 |
| 11.3.3 Disciplinary vs. penal sanctions | 262 |
| 11.4 Requirement of causality between the failure of the superior and the crimes | 263 |
| 11.5 Concluding remarks | 263 |

PART IV CONCLUSION

| | |
|---|------------|
| 12. Concluding Remarks: A Workable Standard of Liability for Superiors | 267 |
| <i>Annex: Relevant Provisions</i> | 273 |
| <i>Bibliography</i> | 285 |
| <i>Index</i> | 297 |