Contents

1. Practical Intelligence and the Virtues: An Aristotelian App	roach
 1.1 Deliberation 1.2 Phronesis 1.3 The Phronesis Controversy 	13 31
Part I. Phronesis, Virtue, and Right Action	3.5
2. Right Action for Virtue Ethics	37
 2.1 Right Action and Serious Practical Concerns 2.2 Two Constraints on Right Action 2.3 Must Virtue Ethics Accept the Act Constraint? 2.4 Can Virtue Ethics Accept the Act Constraint? 	39 44 46 65
3. Right Action and Virtuous Motives	72
3.1 The Structure of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics 3.2 Virtuous Acts and Virtuous Motivations 3.3 Why Virtues are Virtues 3.4 Reasons for Virtue	74 77 86 95
4. Right Action and 'The Virtuous Person'	103
 4.1 Doing Without 'The Virtuous Person' 4.2 'Virtuous Enough' 4.3 Ideals and Aspirations 4.4 Virtues, Persons, and 'The Virtuous Person' 4.5 Representing 'The Virtuous Person' 	104 112 123 130
Part II. The Enumeration Problem	143
5. The Enumeration Problem	145
Cr The Enumeration Droblem: An Introduction	145

xvi CONTENTS

6.	Indiv	riduating the Virtues	177
	6.1	From Individuation to Enumeration	178
	6.2	'The Same Reasons'	188
	6.3	Reasons, Individuation, and Cardinality	196
	6.4	Implications for Hard Virtue Ethics	204
7.	Mag	nificence, Generosity, and Subordination	209
	7.1	Magnificence as a Virtue	212
	7.2	Subordination, Specialization, and Cardinality	217
	7.3	Alternatives to the Subordination View	221
Par	t III.	Situations, Dispositions, and Virtues	237
8.	Situa	tions and Broad-Based Dispositions	239
	8.1	Situationism and Dispositionism	243
	8.2	Situationism and Personality	252
	8.3	Idiographic Predictions of Consistency	263
9.	Situa	tions and Dispositions: Examining the Evidence	268
	9.1	How to Test Broad-Based Dispositions for Cross-Situational	
		Consistency	269
	9.2	Putting Dispositions to the Test: Four Representative	
		Experiments	273
	9.3	Interpreting the Findings	278
10.	Fron	n Situationism to Virtue Theory	292
	10.1	Situationism: From Empirical to Philosophical Psychology	295
	10.2	Situationism and Virtue Theory: Normative Adequacy	304
	10.3	From Common Sense to Virtue Theory?	306
	10.4	Out-Sourcing the Empirical Work?	314
	10.5	A Cognitive-Affective Approach to the Virtues	323
Par	t IV.	Defending Hard Virtue Theory	333
II.	Phro	onesis and the Unity of the Virtues	335
	II.I	The Unity of Which Virtues?	339
	11.2	What Unifies the Virtues?	355
	11.3	Attributive and Model Theses	362

	CONTENTS	xvii
12.	Responsibility for Character	374
	12.1 Depth, Self-Construction, and Responsibility	374
	12.2 On Responsibility and 'Ultimate Responsibility' for Character	380
	12.3 What is Critical Distance?	388
	12.4 From Critical Distance to Responsibility	392
	12.5 Objections to the Critical Distance View	404
Wo	rks Cited	415
Inde	ex Locorum	429
Ger	neral Index	433