## Contents

	A DE LA	
List	of illustrations	xiii
Ack	nowledgments	xiv
Pre	face Table 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19	xvi
1	Consciousness	1
	1.1 Intentionality and Phenomenality	2
	1.2 Transparency	5
	1.3 A Dilemma for Phenomenology	6
	1.4 Transparency and Intentionalism	9
	1.5 Against Transparency	10
	1.6 Conclusion	15
2	Consciousness—A Look Inside	18
	2.1 Some Discoverable Features of Intentional Experiences	18
	2.1.1 Intuitive Character	19
	2.1.2 Positing Character	22
	2.1.3 Directness	24
	2.1.4 Originary Character	29
	2.2 Some Further Features of Consciousness	34
	2.2.1 The For-Structure of Consciousness	34
	2.2.2 The Temporal Structure of Consciousness	44
	2.2.3 The Attentional Structure of Consciousness	47
	2.3 Conclusion	47
3	Intentionality and Meaning	50
	3.1 Some Components of a Linguistic Act	51
	3.2 What Meanings Aren't	54
	3.2.1 The Meaning of an Utterance is not the Utterance's	
	Object	54

	3.2.2 Meanings are not Linguistic Types or Tokens 3.2.3 Meanings are not Mental Acts	55 58
	3.3 The Objectivity of Meanings	62
	3.4 The Subjectivity of Meanings	68
	3.5 Meanings as Intentional Properties	71
	3.6 Objections to the Species View	73
	3.6.1 Thinking of What Does Not Exist	73
	3.6.2 The Situated Character of Intentionality	74
	3.7 Conclusion	77
4	The Mental Act	80
	4.1 The Intentional Essence of an Act	80
	4.2 Quality and Modification-Character	83
	4.3 Many-rayed, Compound, and Founded Acts	87
	4.4 The Intentional Relation	89
	4.4.1 Consciousness and Existence	90
	4.4.2 Immanence and Transcendence	
	4.5 Conclusion	
5	Meaning and Intuition	99
	5.1 Cognitive Fulfillment	101
	5.2 Authentic Intentionality	105
	5.2.1 Epistemic and Semantic Authenticity	106
	5.3 The Ideal Connections Among Meanings, Fulfilling Sense	
	and Objects  E 2 L Catagorial Magning and Intuition	112
	5.3.1 Categorial Meaning and Intuition 5.3.2 Manifolds and Fulfilling Senses	114
	5.3.3 Meaning Beyond Possible Originary Intuition	118
	5.4 Ideal Verificationism	122
	5.4.1 Ideal Verificationism and Realism	
	5.4.2 Yoshimi's Objection	
	5.5 Conclusion	129
6	Perception	132
	6.1 Adequate and Inadequate Intuition	135
	6.2 Transcendence and Constancy	137
	6.3 Transcendence and Horizons	
	6.4 Intuitive Fulfillment	
	6.5 Manifolds and Objects	142
	6.6 Why Perception is Direct	148

	6.7 Qualia and Separatism 6.8 Conclusion	
7	The Essential Inadequacy of Perception	156
	7.1 The Sense Datum Theory	157
	7.2 Perspectival Properties	
	7.3 The Perception of Depth	160
	7.4 Sensations	162
	7.5 Profiles  7.6 Explaining the Disagreement	166
	7.6 Explaining the Disagreement  7.7 Perception without Immanence	
	7.8 Kinesthetic Sensations and Motor Intentionality	175
	7.9 Conclusion	178
8	The Content of Perception	180
	8.1 Conceptualism	180
	8.2 Against Conceptualism	
	8.2.1 Conceptualism and the Fundamentality of	
	Perception abusing Issued and mails of E. II	183
	8.2.2 Conceptualism and Intentionality	
	8.2.3 Conceptualism, Perception, and Fulfillment	
	8.2.4 Perception and Empty Horizons	188
	8.2.5 Conceptualism and Knowledge	
	8.3 Naïve Realism	193
	8.3.1 Hallucination 8.3.2 Naïve Realism and the Inadequacy of Perception	200
	8.4 Perceiving Universals	203
	8.5 Conclusion	207
9	Knowledge	210
	9.1 Phenomenology and the Problem of Skepticism	210
	9.2 A Characterization of Knowledge	214
	9.3 Fulfillment Revisited	215
	9.4 The Principle of All Principles	217
	9.4.1 The Scope of the Principle of All Principles	219
	9.4.2 The Necessity of the Principle of All Principles	220
	9.4.3 The Principle of All Principles Is a Source, not a	
	Ground, of Knowledge	221
	9.4.4 The Principle of All Principles and Foundationalism	227
	9.4.5 The "Myth of the Given"	230

	9.5 Knowledge by Acquaintance	234
	9.6 Conclusion	237
10	Phenomenology	242
	10.1 The Things Themselves	242
	10.2 Transcendental Phenomenology	245
	10.3 The Transcendental Insight	246
	10.4 The Phenomenological Reduction	252
	10.4.1 The Hands-Off Principle	252
	10.4.2 The Reduction and Its Results	255
	10.5 Two Modest Conceptions of the Reduction	261
	10.5.1 The Quotation View	261
	10.5.2 The Bracketing View	264
	10.6 Conclusion	268
11	Phenomenology and Transcendental Idealism	270
	11.1 Phenomenology and the Question of Realism	270
	11.2 The Tension in Husserl's Thinking	273
	11.3 Realism in the Natural Attitude	274
	11.4 Realism in the Phenomenological Attitude	276
	11.5 Husserl Against "Realism"	283
	11.5.1 Husserl Against Naturalistic Realism	285
	11.6 Transcendental Idealism	288
	11.7 Conclusion	293
	and Objects nobsenses nobsenses 1.5.8	
Rih	liography	296
Ind		318
IIId	5.3.3 Tempe Beyond Postilile Cresmin Immeistion 2.8	5,0

9.1 Phenomenology and the Problem of Skepticism.

6.5 medianonal Principles of All Principlessand Foundationalists.