

# Contents

Introduction	1
Two Distinctive Features	5
Outline	11
 I. THE FOIL: ANTI-PERFECTIONIST LIBERALISM	
1. Comprehensive Liberalism	19
1.1 Two Kinds of Liberal Theory	20
1.2 Kantian Liberalism	23
1.3 Millian Liberalism	26
1.4 Dworkin's Challenge Model of Ethics	30
2. Political Liberalism	34
2.1 The Fact of Reasonable Disagreement	36
2.2 Public Justification	40
2.3 A Thin Normative Rationale	47
2.3.1 Respect	49
2.3.2 Stability	53
2.3.3 The Reactive Attitudes	56
 II. PERFECTIONIST JUSTICE	
3. A Perfectionist Conception of Society	63
3.1 The Rawlsian Conception of Society	64
3.2 Why the Rawlsian Conception of Society?	68
3.3 An Alternative Conception of Society	73
3.4 The Perfectionist Conception as Cultural Interpretation	77
3.5 The Perfectionist Conception in Reflective Equilibrium	86
4. Perfectionist Principles of Justice	89
4.1 Rawls's Original Position: The Set-Up	90
4.2 Rawls's Original Position: The Selection of Principles	94
4.3 A Perfectionist Original Position: The Set-Up	97
4.4 A Perfectionist Original Position: The Selection of Principles	110



4.5 Are Judgements About Human Flourishing Especially Controversial?	116
4.6 Is the Perfectionist Original Position Redundant?	120
5. A Provisional Conception of Human Flourishing	126
5.1 Three Conceptions Unfit for Political Purposes	131
5.2 The Enjoyment of Moral, Intellectual and Artistic Excellence	133
5.3 Are the Three Excellences Too Abstract?	138
5.4 Provisionality	141
5.5 Arbitrariness	147
5.6 Are Enjoyment and Excellence Strictly Necessary?	151
6. Perfectionist Law and Public Policy	156
6.1 Preliminaries	158
6.2 Moral Excellence	160
6.3 Intellectual Excellence	164
6.4 Artistic Excellence	168
6.5 Indistinguishability: Doesn't Liberal Justice <i>Already</i> Give Perfection Its Due?	170
6.6 Extensional Differences	175
6.6.1 Rawls's Arguments from Unanimous Consent and Equality	177
6.6.2 Dworkin's Argument from Intergenerational Fairness	180
6.6.3 Wall's Argument from Equality and Fairness	182
6.6.4 Kramer's Argument from Warranted Self-Respect	184
6.7 Intensional Differences	189

### III. OBJECTIONS

7. Public Justification	197
7.1 A Road Not Taken	199
7.2 Perfectionist Public Reason	205
7.3 Is the Marriage of Perfectionism and Constructivism Well-Motivated?	213
7.4 Which Definition of Reasonableness is More Plausible?	218
7.5 Admissible Interpretations of the Excellences	225
7.6 A More Sectarian Definition of Reasonableness?	233
7.6.1 The Anti-Sectarian Desideratum	234
7.6.2 The Spirit of Public Reason Liberalism	236
7.6.3 Stability	238
7.6.4 Respect	240
7.6.5 Redundancy	241
7.7 An Overly Sectarian Definition of Reasonableness?	243



8. Freedom	247
8.1 The Place of Freedom Within Perfectionist Justice	248
8.2 Four Freedom-Based Objections Defused	250
8.3 Libertarian Full Self-Ownership	256
8.3.1 Three Implausible Implications	258
8.3.2 Two Libertarian Responses	262
8.4 Pragmatic Concerns	267
9. Paternalism	273
9.1 Why Is Perfectionist State Action Necessary?	274
9.2 A Non-Paternalistic Justification for Perfectionist State Action?	278
9.3 Why Paternalism (in the Quongian Sense) Is Not Objectionable	280
10. The Village Busybody	294
10.1 What Is the Quidnunc Mentality?	295
10.2 How the Quidnunc Mentality Objection Begs the Question	300
10.3 A Substantive Argument Against Perfectionist Duties?	305
10.4 Indistinguishability Rides Again	310
10.5 Addendum	312
Conclusion	317
Justicitis?	319
References	323
Index	338