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This book began as a paper, "What Is Intrinsic Goodness?" that I hastily put together to fill in for a speaker who had withdrawn from a local conference. My aim was to contrast two ways of thinking about intrinsic value. One of them I called (following G. E. Moore) "absolute" goodness. The other is relativized to an individual: it is what is noninstrumentally good for someone. The distinction received some attention in my book *What Is Good and Why*, but I realized, soon after it appeared, that I needed to say far more about the notion of goodness that Moore championed. I would like to thank Martha Nussbaum for her comments on the paper I read, and I am also grateful to the criticism I received from Agnes Callard and Rosalind Hursthouse, who served as referees for *Classical Philology*, where my revised conference paper appeared.

I was able to give more serious attention to these issues when I received a Starr Fellowship from Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford, for the 2008–2009 academic year. I am deeply grateful to the faculty of LMH and particularly to my host, Christopher Shields, for their hospitality. To the Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences of