

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	vii
Preface	1
PART ONE: MORAL PLURALISM AND LAW	
Chapter 1. Judicial Responses to Moral Pluralism (I): The Rhetoric of Reassurance	7
1. Convoluted Rhetorical Style: Two Cases	8
2. The Strategy of Reassurance	18
Chapter 2. Judicial Responses to Moral Pluralism (II): Conventional Morality in Judicial Decisions	29
1. Conventional Morality and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review	31
2. Judicial Uses of "Conventional Morality"	38
3. Judges in Search of Consensus	44
4. Laundering Devices	47
Chapter 3. Philosophical Responses to Moral Pluralism	57
1. Rawls, or "The Deeper Bases of Agreement"	57
2. Walzer, or "Shared Understandings"	61
3. Harman, or Moral Relativism	70
PART TWO: LAW AND NEUTRALITY	
Chapter 4. The "Right/Good" Distinction, the Harm Principle, and Liberal Neutrality	89
1. The Priority of "the Right" over "the Good", and the Principle of Equal Moral Agency	91
2. The Impossibility of Political Neutrality?	99
3. Liberal Neutrality and "Distorted Preferences"	111
4. The "Priority of the Right over the Good" versus the Balancing Procedure	119
5. The Harm Principle and the Redistributive State	124
Chapter 5. Liberal Neutrality and the Special Protection of Minorities	133
1. Democracy and Minorities: The Meaning of Footnote Four	134
2. "Prejudice", "Principle" and "Neutrality"	137

Chapter 6	Liberal Neutrality and Theory of Punishment	149
1.	From Compensatory Justice to a Theory of Punishment	150
2.	The “Balance of Benefits and Burdens” Model Revisited	153
3.	Criminal Justice and Social Inequalities	160
4.	Liberal Neutrality and Criminal Punishment	162
Chapter 7.	Neutrality of Law Towards Religion	167
1.	Two Principles	167
2.	Legal Definition of Religion	171
3.	Real-Life Conflicts of Free Exercise and Non-Establishment	180
4.	The Importance of Neutrality	193
Postscript		197
Notes		201
Index		219