Contents

Prefe	ice	page xiii
Intro	oduction: Embodying Freedom	1
1.	Laying Foundations	7
	I. A Reasonable Conception of the Good Life Will Involve an	
	Understanding of Both Welfare and Right Action	7
	II. Welfare Is Multidimensional	8
	III. Reasonably Seeking to Flourish or to Help Another to Flourish	
	Requires Recognition, Fairness, and Respect	25
	IV. A Flourishing Life Is a Reasonable Life	40
2.	Rejecting Aggression	44
	I. Acting Reasonably Means Avoiding Aggression against Others	
	and Their Justly Acquired Possessions	44
	II. Aggression Involves Unreasonably Injuring Others' Bodies or	
	Interfering with Their Just Possessory Interests	44
	III. The Requirements of Practical Reasonableness Preclude Many	
	Choices Causing Injuries to Basic Aspects of Welfare	45
	IV. The Principle of Fairness Provides Good Reason to Avoid	
	Interfering with Others' Justly Acquired Possessions	49
	V. Just Possessory Claims Do Not Extend to Other Sentients or to	
	Abstract Patterns	89
	VI. Arguments for Exceptionless Possessory Claims Seem	
	Unpersuasive	132
	VII. Key Requirements of Practical Reasonableness Can Be	
	Encapsulated in the Nonaggression Maxim	153

3.	Safeguarding Cooperation	157
	I. The State Is Inimical to Peaceful, Voluntary Cooperation	157
	II. Peaceful, Voluntary Cooperation Is an Aspect of and a Crucial	
	Precondition for a Flourishing Life	157
	III. State Actors' Refusal to Cooperate with Others on a Peaceful,	
	Voluntary Basis Is Highly Problematic	159
	IV. The State Is Not Needed to Ensure Peaceful, Voluntary	
	Cooperation	165
	V. The State Is Not Needed to Ensure Peaceful, Voluntary	
	Cooperation in the Production of Crucial Public Goods	184
	VI. The State Is Dangerous	208
	VII. Embracing Peaceful, Voluntary Cooperation Means Rejecting	
	the State	232
	Appendix: The Fact That General Preemptive Defense Is a Public	
	Good Does Not Serve as a Plausible Justification for the State	234
4.	Enforcing Law	242
1	I. Forcibly Imposing Legal Requirements in a Stateless Society Is	
	Not Objectionable on the Same Grounds as Aggression	
	by the State	242
	II. There Might Seem to Be a Tension between Opposing the	
	State and Supporting the Idea of Law	243
	III. Legal Codes in a Stateless Society Would Have Varied Sources	
	and Contents, but Might Exhibit Common Features	244
	IV. Resolving Disputes between Participants in Structured Legal	
	Regimes Need Not Involve State-Like Injustice	249
	V. The Reality of Moral Constraints on Legal Rules Would Render	1 /
	the Notion of Consent Noncircular and Would Be Compatible	
	with Legal Polycentricity	250
	VI. A Regime Could Forcibly Resolve Conflicts with Outlaws	
	without Becoming Morally Indistinguishable from a State	257
	VII. A Legal Regime in a Stateless Society Would Be Morally	
	Distinguishable from a State in Important Ways	261
5.	Rectifying Injury	263
	I. Just Legal Regimes in a Stateless Society Can Effectively	
	Prevent, End, and Remedy Injuries	263
	II. Just Legal Regimes Would Use Civil Rather than Criminal	
	Justice Mechanisms to Rectify Injuries	263

Contents

	III. A Just Legal Regime in a Stateless Society Could Rectify Environmentally Mediated Injuries as well as Injuries to	
	Nonhuman Animals and Vulnerable Human Persons	302
	IV. Just Legal Regimes Can Rectify Injuries without the Involvement of the State	318
	myorvement of the state	310
6.	Liberating Society	320
	I. Just Legal Rules and Institutions in a Stateless Society Could	
	Facilitate Liberating Social Change Using Nonaggressive Means	320
	II. Techniques for Fostering Social Change Need Not Be	
	Aggressive	321
	III. Just Legal Rules and Institutions in a Stateless Society Would	
	Further Wealth Redistribution	328
	IV. Rectifying Injustice Could Help to Create Alternatives to	
	Workplace Hierarchies	351
	V. A Stateless Society's Legal Order Would Foster the Emergence	
	of a Free Culture	362
	VI. Just Legal Rules in a Stateless Society Would Conduce to	
	Positive but Nonaggressive Social Change	376
7.	Situating Liberation	378
	I. Just Legal Rules and Institutions in a Stateless Society Would	
	Embody Leftist, Anticapitalist, and Socialist Values	378
	II. The Project of Creating a Stateless Society with Just Legal	
	Rules and Institutions Is a Leftist Project	378
	III. The Project of Building a Stateless Society with Just Legal Rules	
	and Institutions Is an Anticapitalist Project	386
	IV. The Project of Fostering a Stateless Society with Just Legal	
	Rules Can Reasonably Be Described as Socialist	397
	V. The Model of Stateless Law Outlined Here Embodies a	
	Distinctively Leftist, Anticapitalist, and Socialist Antistatism	405
Coı	nclusion: Ordering Anarchy	407
Inde	ex	411
Aho	About the Author	
		415