

Contents

Acknowledgements — IX

1 Introduction — 1

- 1.1 The challenges of diversity — 1
- 1.2 Leitkultur — 2
- 1.3 Liberal neutrality — 10

2 Defining liberal neutrality — 12

- 2.1 Neutrality is an ill-defined term — 12
- 2.2 Conceptions of neutrality — 15
 - 2.2.1 Neutrality of impact — 16
 - 2.2.2 Neutrality as equality of opportunity — 18
 - 2.2.3 Justificatory neutrality — 21
- 2.3 Contexts of neutrality — 25
 - 2.3.1 Constitutional essentials — 26
 - 2.3.2 Political decision-making — 28
 - 2.3.2.1 Neutrality as respectful non-identification — 30
 - 2.3.2.2 Relational neutrality — 31
 - 2.3.3 Neutral behaviour of state officials — 33
- 2.4 Neutrality as a two-fold concept — 39

3 The right and the good — 42

- 3.1 Neutrality versus toleration — 42
- 3.2 The right versus the good — 44
- 3.3 Theories of rights — 46
- 3.4 Thin versus thick conceptions of the good — 49
 - 3.4.1 Rawls's thin theory of the good — 53
 - 3.4.2 Dworkin's thin theory of the good — 56
- 3.5 Another complication — 58
- 3.6 Comprehensive versus political conceptions — 59
- 3.7 The need for a thin political theory of the good — 62

4 Grounding neutrality — 64

- 4.1 Society as a fair system of cooperation over time — 66
- 4.2 Citizens as equipped with two moral powers — 67
- 4.3 Citizens as free and equal persons — 69
 - 4.3.1 Citizens as free — 69
 - 4.3.2 Citizens as equal — 74

- 4.4 Citizens as free and equal as thin political conception — 80
- 4.5 The limits of the project — 82

5 Justifying the respect element — 84

- 5.1 Coercive power and the state — 85
 - 5.1.1 All state action involves coercion — 86
 - 5.1.2 All state action needs to be justifiable to the citizens affected — 87
 - 5.1.3 The state has no right to do wrong — 88
- 5.2 Justifying coercion — 91
 - 5.2.1 Reasonable agreement justifies coercion — 91
 - 5.2.1.1 The addressees of justification — 92
 - 5.2.1.2 The scope of the need for justification — 93
 - 5.2.1.3 The criteria for reasonable acceptability — 95
 - 5.2.1.4 What citizens can be reasonably expected to agree on — 97
 - 5.2.2 Protecting rights justifies coercion — 99
 - 5.2.2.1 Interest theories of rights — 99
 - 5.2.2.2 Choice theories of rights — 100
 - 5.2.2.3 Common ground — 101
 - 5.2.3 Protecting rights is the only justification for coercion — 102
 - 5.2.3.1 The right to be left alone — 102
 - 5.2.3.2 Reasons for state action have to outweigh the right to be left alone — 108
- 5.3 The respect element of neutrality — 111

6 Justifying the fairness element — 112

- 6.1 Treating people as equals — 112
- 6.2 Rawls's conception of citizens as equal — 114
- 6.3 Treating citizens as equals with regard to their two moral powers — 116
- 6.4 Respecting the two moral powers equally — 117
 - 6.4.1 Respecting the capacity for the right — 118
 - 6.4.2 Respecting the capacity for the good — 121
- 6.5 Formal versus fair political participation — 123
 - 6.5.1 Cultural differences — 126
 - 6.5.2 The implementation of neutrally justified rules — 131
- 6.6 The need to be aware of differences — 136

7 Implementing liberal neutrality — 138

- 7.1 Justificatory neutrality — 139
 - 7.1.1 Citizens as free — 140
 - 7.1.2 Citizens as equal — 142
 - 7.1.3 Enabling cooperation — 145
 - 7.1.4 Fair cooperation — 146
 - 7.1.5 The scope and limits of justificatory neutrality — 148
- 7.2 Procedural neutrality — 149
 - 7.2.1 Equal political rights and their fair value — 149
 - 7.2.2 Minority representation — 151
 - 7.2.3 Contestatory democracy — 157
- 7.3 Liberal neutrality in the headscarf case — 161

8 Conclusion — 166

- 8.1 Summary of the argument — 166
- 8.2 The three challenges of pluralism — 168
- 8.3 The third challenge — 169

9 Bibliography — 172**Index — 177**