xiv

Pre	face	xiv
Ack	knowledgments	XVi
Tab	ole of cases	xviii
Tab	ole of legislation	XXXi
Inti	roduction to EU law and intellectual property rights: scope and approach	xli
	CONTRITIONALAND ID I ANALINITEDEA CE	
1	COMPETITION AND IP LAW INTERFACE	
	I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES	1.01
	A. Introduction	1.01
	 A complex relationship 	1.01
	2. IP laws	1.15
	3. Competition laws	1.23
	 The early deference of EU competition law to IP law 	1.34
	B. Recent Trends	1.45
	 The modernization of competition law and the shift to a more economics-based 	
	approach	1.46
	The modernization and harmonization of IP law	1.49
	The evolving role of IP in commercial practice	1.54
	a. New business models	1.55
	b. Digital technologies	1.57
	c. Competition law authorities have adapted	1.60
	4. Competition law enforcement with sectoral variations?	1.61
	C. The Key Protagonists	1.69
	1. The European Commission	1.69
	a. DG Competition	1.72
	b. DG Connect	1.73
	c. DG Grow	1.74
	d. DG RTD ('Research and Innovation')	1.75
	2. Council, courts and Parliament	1.76
	D. IPRs in the Single Market	1.87
	 The single market imperative 	1.87
	2. Interplay between Articles 34–36 TFEU and 101–102 TFEU	1.88
	3. Exhaustion of rights	1.96
	4. Specific subject matter	1.100
	5. Essential function	1.105
	6. The importance of 'consent'	1.107
	7. International exhaustion/harmonizing initiatives	1.111
~		
2	ARTICLE 101 TFEU AND IP LICENSING	
	I. ARTICLE 101 TFEU AND LICENSING OF IP – GENERAL PRINCIPLES	2.04
	II. ARTICLE 101(1) TFEU – AN OVERVIEW	2.05
	A. Agreements, Concerted Practices/Unilateral Conduct	2.06
	B. Undertakings	2.15
	1. Economic undertakings	2.15

			2.	Economic activity	2.16
			3.	Independent undertakings	2.17
			4.	Principal/agent	2.19
		C.	Ob	ject or Effect of Restricting Competition	2.31
			1.	Object restrictions	2.32
			2.	Effects restrictions	2.47
			3.	Ancillary restraints	2.53
			4.	Extent of necessary effect on competition – de minimis	2.59
			5.	Effect on trade – a question of jurisdiction	2.66
				a. IPR as an entry barrier – the relevance of exhaustion	2.72
				b. The height of the barrier posed by IPRs	2.81
	111.	AR	TICL	E 101(2) TFEU AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF INFRINGEMENT	2.88
	IV.			E 101(3) TFEU	2.94
	V.	RES	TRI	CTIVE CLAUSES IN LICENCE AGREEMENTS	2.102
		A.	Exi	stence/Exercise/Specific Subject Matter	2.104
		B.		clusivity	2.129
,			1.	Manufacturing exclusivity	2.142
			2.		2.145
			3.	Exclusivity in the courts	2.151
		C.		ng and Bundling/Quality Control Obligations	2.174
		D.		strictions on Prices or Customers	2.195
		E.		ld of Use Restrictions	2.200
		F.		n-compete Obligations	2.211
		G.		sincentives for the Licensee to Develop/Exploit Own Technology/Grant Back	
				quirements	2.219
		Н.		yalty Payments on Unpatented/Partially Patented Products	2.245
		1.		st-Expiry Royalties	2.257
			1.	Introduction	2.257
			2.	The early approach of the Commission	2.259
			3.	The Court of Justice Rules	2.263
			4.	The Commission's approach in the 2014 Technology Transfer Guidelines	2.274
				The approach to post-expiry royalties in the US	2.278
		J.		Challenge Clauses	2.282
				plication of Article 101 TFEU to Different Types of IPR Licences	2.300
			1.		2.301
			2.		2.311
			3.	Copyright/design right licences	2.329
	TEC	LINI	\bigcirc I	OGY TRANSFER BLOCK EXEMPTION	
	ILC				2 04
	1.			IEW OF THE TTBER	3.04
	11.			SIONS OF THE TTBER – SUMMARY	3.12
				ticle 1 – The Definitions	3.14
				ticle 2 – The Exemption	3.22
				ticle 3 – The Market Share Thresholds	3.27
				ticle 4 – The Hardcore Restrictions	3.45
				ticle 5 – The Excluded Restrictions	3.47
		Г.		ticles 6–11 – Additional Provisions	3.48
			-	Article 6 – Withdrawal of the benefit of the block exemption	
			2.		3.51 3.52
				Article 8 – Application of market share thresholds Articles 9–11 – Relationship with other block exemptions, transitional period and	5.52
			т.	duration	3.56
	111.	GEI	VFR	AL COMMENTS ON THE TTBER	3.58
				stinction Between Competitors and Non-competitors	3.58
			1.	Blocking positions	3.64
			2.	Key takeaways on blocking positions	3.94

		B. Use of Market Share Thresholds	3.95
	IV.	THE APPLICATION OF THE CORE OPERATIVE PROVISIONS OF THE TTBER	3.102
		A. Hardcore Restrictions – Agreements Between Competitors	3.102
			3.103
			3.112
			3.115
			3.118
			3.119
		 Restrictions protecting the parties from each other Restrictions protecting licensees from each other (and the licensor from the 	5.115
			3.124
		licensees) D. Hardeare Destrictions - Agreements Between Non-competitors	
		B. Hardcore Restrictions – Agreements Between Non-competitors	3.135
		1. Price fixing (Article 4(2)(a))	3.136
		2. Passive sales restrictions on the licensee (Article 4(2)(b))	3.140
		a. Sales into reserved territories/customer groups (Article 4(2)(b)(i))	3.144
		b. Captive use limitation (Article 4(2)(b)(ii))	3.152
		c. Single customer supply obligations (Article 4(2)(b)(iii))	3.153
		d. Sales at the wholesale level only (Article 4(2)(b)(iv))	3.154
		e. Sales to authorized distributors only (Article 4(2)(b)(v))/sales to end-users must	
		be permitted (Article 4(2)(c))	3.155
		C. A Change in the Competitive Relationship of the Parties (Article 4(3))	3.159
		D. Excluded Restrictions (Article 5)	3.163
		1. Grant back obligations (Article 5(1)(a))	3.166
		2. No challenge provisions (Article 5(2)(b))	3.182
		3. Limiting developments outside the licence (Article 5(2))	3.192
	11.	OVER THE MARKET SHARE THRESHOLD MULTILATERAL LICENCES AND POOLING AGREEMENTS A. The Creation and Operation of a Technology Pool B. Agreements Between the Pool and Licensees SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS	4.07 4.10 4.15 4.21 4.31
5	OTHI. III. IV.	VERTICAL AGREEMENTS AND ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 101 TFEU TO OTHER AGREEMENTS RELATING TO IPRS HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS AND IP – GENERAL PRINCIPLES R&D AGREEMENTS/SPECIALIZATION AGREEMENTS A. The Definitions – Article 1 B. The Exemption – Article 2 C. Access to the Results of the Collaboration and to IPR – Articles 3 and 4 1. Access to results: 'foreground' IPR and knowhow 2. Access to pre-existing knowhow 3. Limits to permissible joint exploitation 4. Obligations to supply D. Market Share and Duration – Articles 6 and 7 E. The Hardcore Restrictions – Article 8 1. Restrictions on 0 output or sales 3. Restrictions on pricing or royalties	5.02 5.22 5.22 5.23 5.42 5.42 5.42 5.42 5.42 5.53 5.62 5.62 5.62 5.62 5.62 5.62 5.62 5.62
		4. Restrictions on active and passive sales/sales to resellers	5.71
		F. The Excluded Restrictions – Article 9	5.73
	V.	SPECIALIZATION AGREEMENTS OR PRODUCTION AGREEMENTS	5.79
	VI.	STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS	5.84

	A.	Introdu	ction	5.84
	B.	The App	oroach of the Commission under Article 101(1) TFEU – Introduction	5.89
	C.		dization Agreements – 'By Object' Restrictions	5.100
			dization Agreements – 'By Effect' Restrictions	5.102
	E.	FRAND		5.107
	F.	Good Fa	aith Disclosure	5.125
	G.		101 TFEU, IP and Standardization – Conclusion	5.133
VII.		3CONTR/		5.136
c ID F	101	ΛΙΝΔΝΙ	CE AND ABUSE	
0 IF, L			TORY REMARKS	6.01
	19.90 10.10.			6.10
		Domina	ince	6.21
	-	Abuse	of Article 100 TEELL	
		•	e of Article 102 TFEU	6.29
			102 TFEU: Bright Line/by Object or 'Effects'?	6.43
	_		102 TFEU – Constantly Evolving: Start With First Principles	6.56
	F.		rticle 102 TFEU Have Exceptions?	6.77
			pes IP Fit Into This Regime?	6.82
	н.		s to Deal – Overview	6.88
	1.		velopment of the Case Law	6.96
			Health	6.131
		a.	The Commission interim measures decision and IMS's appeal to the GC	6.134
		b.	The CJEU's preliminary ruling on the national court reference	6.139
		2. Mici		6.142
		a.	Indispensability	6.151
		b.	Elimination of competition	6.154
		C.	New product	6.158
		d.	Justification	6.164
		e.	Other interesting points	6.169
		f,	Refusals beyond Microsoft?	6.171
	J.		ypes of Abuse	6.180
		1. Tyin		6.182
		2. Unf	air licences	6.194
		3. Exc	essive royalties	6.207
		4. Excl	usivity	6.222
		5. Abu	use of the IP system	6.230
		a.	AstraZeneca – misuse of patent and regulatory systems	6.239
		b.	Boehringer Ingelheim – unmeritorious patents	6.257
		C.	Teva – divisional patents	6.259
		d.	Other IP related abuses – patent ambush	6.260
		e.	Collecting societies	6.266
11.	SU	MMARY (ON ARTICLE 102	6.286
	A.	Domina	ance	6.289
	B.	Abuse		6.292
7 MEI	RGE	RS AN	DIP	
1.	OV	ERVIEW		7.01
	A.	Introdu	ction	7.01
11.	JUI	RISDICTIO	ON.	7.11
	A.	EU Mer	ger Regulation	7.11
	B.	Concen	trations	7.14
	C.	Turnove	er Thresholds	7.27
	D.	Substar	ntive Appraisal	7.39
			oduction	7.39
			ovation concerns	7.42

		3.	Existing research and development programmes	7.47
		4.	General innovation concerns	7.56
		5.	Non-horizontal concerns	7.62
		6.	Procedural issues	7.83
		7.	Conclusion on innovation	7.86
		E. Bi	g Data Concerns	7.89
	III.	ANCIL	LARY RESTRICTIONS	7.96
		A. A	cquisitions and Joint Ventures	7.99
		B. Pr	rinciples Applicable to Common Restrictions in Acquisitions	7.100
		1.	Licence agreements	7.100
		2.	Non-competition clauses and IPR	7.105
		C. Pr	rinciples Applicable to Common Restrictions in Joint Ventures	7.112
		1.	Licence agreements	7.112
		2.	Non-competition covenants	7.114
	IV.	REME	DIES	7.119
		A. Ty	pes of Remedies	7.122
			Licence agreements	7.122
			Re-branding	7.135
			Interoperability	7.139
			Access to data	7.145
	V.	CONC	LUSION	7.15
8	IPR/	COM	PETITION LAW ISSUES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR	
	١.	INTRO	DUCTORY REMARKS	8.01
	11.	ARTIC	LE 101 AND IPR IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR	8.38
		A. R	&D/Product Development	8.4
		B. Li	censing Following the Research Phase	8.48
		1.	Post-expiry royalties	8.52
			a. The early decisions	8.53
			b. Ottung v Klee – the first Court case	8.57
			c. Ottung v Klee confirmed	8.64
			d. The implications of the case law	8.68
			e. What if a simple right to terminate is not commercially feasible?	8.77
			f. Summary	8.86
		2.	Grant back obligations	8.93
		C. C	o-marketing, Co-promotion and Authorized Generics	8.98
		D. Pa	arallel Trade	8.110
		E. A	greements at the Time of Generic Entry	8.117
			greements to Coordinate Higher Prices	8.12
	111.		ATION AND SETTLEMENTS	8.13
			undbeck	8.136
			Potential competition	8.145
			By object	8.156
		B. <i>Po</i>	aroxetine	8.165
		1.	Potential competition	8.168
			a. Relevance of the market context	8.168
		_	b. Factual considerations	8.169
		2.	Patent issues	8.17
		3.		8.175
			a. Market features	8.176
			b. Patent/settlement specific issues	8.178
			c. Agreement/factual specific issues	8.182
			d. Potential counter-arguments/scope of the patent	8.186
			e. Relevance and assessment of procompetitive effects in 'by-object' analysis	8.189
			By effects – effect of uncertainty – counterfactual	8.19° 8.194
		C. 36	ervier	0.194

		D.	Cephalon/Teva	8.206
		E.	Pay For Delay – Summary	8.210
	IV.	AR	TICLE 102 TFEU AND IPR IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR	8.214
		A.	Some Concepts	8.214
		B.	Dominance	8.215
			1. Relevance of the Anatomic Therapeutic Classification	8.216
			2. Market definition in generics/Paroxetine - the relevance of patents	8.237
			3. Dominance and IPRs in pharma	8.244
		C.	Abuse	8.253
			1. The abuse of patent/regulatory procedures	8.253
			a. AstraZeneca	8.254
			b. Pfizer Italy – divisional patents	8.280
			c. Reckitt Benckiser – UK – exclusionary strategy	8.285
			d. Boehringer Ingelheim – Commission – misuse of patent system	8.288
			e. Teva/Copaxone - Commission - misuse of divisional patents	8.291
			f. Denigration - Commission - Teva/Copaxone; Vifor/Pharmacosmos	8.297
			g. Spain – CNMC – Merck Sharp and Dohme misuse of legal procedures/	
			withholding information	8.300
			h. Use of blocking patents – Switzerland/EU – Novartis/Eli Lilly	8.302
			2. Pay for delay and other exclusionary strategies	8.304
			a. Les Laboratoires Servier (Servier)	8.305
			b. Paroxetine/generics	8.309
_	CO1	ADE	TITIONI I AVALCTANIDADDE AND EDANID	
9	COI		TITION LAW, STANDARDS AND FRAND	0.01
	1.		RODUCTORY REMARKS	9.01
	11.		NDARDS, SEPS AND FRAND – HISTORICAL AND TECHNICAL CONTEXT	9.05
	111.		SE LAW AND LEGISLATIVE/REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS	9.31
			Patent Ambush – Rambus	9.35
			Non-FRAND Terms – Qualcomm/Royalties	9.46
			IPCom – The Transfer of FRAND	9.54
			PAEs, Privateering and Portfolio Splitting	9.56
		_	Injunctions – A Straw in the Wind – Google/MMI	9.71
		r.	Seeking Injunctions, Imposing Unfair Terms – EU Investigations into Motorola Mobility Inc	0.72
			(MMI) and Samsung	9.73
			1. Commission investigations: Apple/Samsung; Microsoft and Apple/Motorola	9.78
			a. Dominance	9.85
			b. Abuse National courts and CIFIL reference in Humania, 7TF	9.91
				9.112
				9.123
				9.132
	1) /	NIO		9.144
	IV.	NO	N-COMPETITION LAW INITIATIVES	9.159
Index	(473