

**National Reports**  
**Canada**

**Denmark**

**Estonia**

**European Union**

**Finland**

**The Systemic Implications of the European Super League ruling of the European Court of Justice    240**

The FIFA and UEFA monopolistic and exclusionary model for the organisation of interclub professional football competitions in Europe is unlikely to survive following the ruling by the CJEU. The restrictions on market access cannot be objectively justified according to the CJEU. This finding leaves the referring national court with no real alternative than to simply apply the law as interpreted by the CJEU. Namely, that the current FIFA and UEFA rules are an abuse of a dominant position infringing EU competition law and therefore require significant and rapid amendment. The implications of the changes are likely to be momentous.

**The DMA Plus Expanding A Pro-Competition Approach to Digital Markets to Other Policies A Case of Net Neutrality    268**

The DMA is not only a regulation aiming to restore fairness and contestability in digital markets. It also epitomises a broader trend towards a more proactive approach to shaping competition in digital markets. The trend goes far beyond the DMA itself. Its asymmetric logic aiming to expand the regulatory toolbox is applicable in other EU legal regimes. This article proposes an operationalisation of the DMA rationale to one of the most essential parameters of competition in digital markets, the parameter which until recently has been unwisely prohibited: competition on speed with which content is being delivered to users.

**EU Artificial Intelligence Board: Proposals for A More Centralised and Proactive Enforcement    276**

The proposed AI Board must have more power and a central role as the authoritative body for the enforcement of the AI Act. This would help unanimity in enforcement and ensure adequate staffing, preventing national fragmentation. A tiered tax system would ensure sufficient funding and independence from regulatory capture. Only then can we talk of genuine EU-wide AI legislation.

**State Aid in the Nuclear Sector: What is the legal test?    280**

The article examines the pattern followed by the European Commission when assessing state aid to the flourishing nuclear sector. Aid generally implies that a reasonable market investor would not have acted in the same way. Such aid is allowed when it does not go beyond what is necessary to remedy market failure and to address Euratom Treaty objectives.

**MERGERS**  
**Judgment    N-127**

**ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES**  
**Infringement    N-128**

**ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES**  
**Decision    N-129**

**ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES**  
**Judgment    N-130**

**MERGERS**  
**Merger control    N-131**



<b>France</b>	<b>ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES</b> <b>Infringement N-132</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	<b>MERGERS</b> <b>Annual Report N-132</b>
<b>Ireland</b>	<b>MERGERS</b> <b>Merger control N-135</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES</b> <b>Judgment N-138</b>
<b>Poland</b>	<b>ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES</b> <b>Infringement N-139</b>
<b>Portugal</b>	<b>ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES</b> <b>Infringement N-139</b>
<b>Portugal</b>	<b>ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES</b> <b>Decision N-140</b>
<b>Portugal</b>	<b>ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES</b> <b>Investigation N-141</b>
<b>Romania</b>	<b>COMPETITION</b> <b>Annual Report N-141</b>
<b>Slovenia</b>	<b>COMPETITION POLICY</b> <b>Annual Report N-143</b>
<b>South Africa</b>	<b>MERGERS</b> <b>International merger control N-145</b>
<b>Spain</b>	<b>MERGERS</b> <b>Merger control N-147</b>
<b>Spain</b>	<b>ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES</b> <b>Enforcement N-147</b>
<b>Türkiye</b>	<b>ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES</b> <b>Decision N-148</b>
<b>United Kingdom</b>	<b>COMPETITION</b> <b>Annual Plan for 2024–2025 N-150</b>