

Contents

Preface	11
1. Language Is the House of Being	23
1.1. Legal Concepts	26
1.2. Form and Formation	31
1.2.(a) Sentence Formation and Structure	36
1.2.(b) Word Formation and Structure	41
1.2.(c) Discourse Structure	46
1.3. Text	75
1.3.(a) Punctuation – Practical Advice	87
1.4. Ambiguity and Vagueness	99
1.5. Genre	121
1.6. Style	133
1.7. Canons of Construction	145
1.7.(a) Plain Meaning	154
1.7.(b) Common Law Literalism	161
1.7.(c) Supersession of Common Law	168
1.7.(d) Supersession by Foreign or Other Law	177
1.7.(e) Co-Relation of Canons	190
1.8. Design and Deference	197
1.9. Language Canons	206
2. What We Presuppose in Interpretation	221
2.1. Presuppositions of Statutory Interpretation	223

2.2. Common Sense Presuppositions	230
2.3. General Judgment Presuppositions	240
2.4. Moral Presuppositions	247
2.5. Pre-Requisites of Interpretation:	
Reader, Text, Author	261
2.6. Discourse and Social Act	280
2.7. Representational Perspective	295
2.8. Logical Presuppositions	
2.8.(a) Logical Form	310
2.8.(b) Detachability and Truth-Value	326
2.8.(c) Curtailment of Condition	340
3. Psychological Presuppositions	352
3.1. Ambiguity Advantage	352
3.2. Meaning/Sense Distinction	357
3.3. Intent in Intension, Intent in Extension	376
4. Aesthetic Function	381
4.1. Mimesis in Legal Discourse	399
5. Philosophical Presuppositions	416
5.1. Tracing the Meaning	416
5.2. Positive Law	433
5.3. Positivist Interpretation of Legal Discourse	441
5.4. Pragmaticism of Practical Construction	446

5.5. Formalism	461
5.6. Conventionalism, Realism, and the Rule of Change	469
5.7. Natural Law	489
Essay: <i>On Interpreting the Constitution</i>	523
References	529
Bibliography	530
Law Journals and Reviews	540
Internet Contributors: by Name	546
Internet Contributors: by Subject Matter	548
Endnotes	551