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Equilibrium and stability in markets with differentiated production : scientific monograph
Autor: Nora Grisáková, Peter Štetka
ISBN: 9788075561022
NKP-CNB: cnb003394063
OKCZID: 128761965
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Citace (dle ČSN ISO 690):
GRISÁKOVÁ, Nora. Equilibrium and stability in markets with differentiated production: scientific monograph. České Budějovice: VSERS, 2022. 157 stran.
Anotace
Microeconomic theory perceives two extreme cases of market structures, namely a monopoly marketstructure and a perfectly competitive market structure. A duopolistic and subsequently an oligopolisticmarket can be considered as the first step in the transition from a monopoly market to a perfectlycompetitive market. The analytical expression of oligopoly equilibrium does not represent asimplification of the problem of a monopoly or a perfectly competitive market, it is much morecomplicated than any of the above market extremes. This complexity stems from the fact that acompany operating in an oligopolistic market must not only take into account the behaviour of allconsumers in the market through the market demand curve in its decision-making, but it must alsotake into account the behaviour of its competitors, including their reactions to their own decisions.The object of our research is the oligopolistic market in which three companies operate in anenvironment of quantitative, price or mixed competition. Companies as well as their production aredifferentiated, i.e. each of the companies uses its own production processes and technologies(resulting in their differentiated cost functions) and the companies' production is not homogeneous.In the current market conditions, it is very difficult (if not impossible) to find companies the productionof which is completely homogeneous, i.e. companies' products are perfect substitutes for consumers,and for this reason we consider this assumption to be one that brings the theoretical model closer tothe real functioning of the market. At the same time, we assume that the production of companies arenot perfect complements, but they are also not completely independent ones.The presented monograph focuses on the models of oligopolies and an analysis of the stability of theirequilibrium solutions under different assumptions of adapting the decisions of companies. We focuson the analysis of two basic models of oligopolies – the Cournot model and Bertrand model, while thebasic models of the duopoly are extended by a third company and the assumption of differentiationof companies and their production, while we also assume the possibility of mixed company strategies.With mixed company strategies, we assume that some companies in the market determine the optimalvolume of production and prices based on the Cournot strategy and some based on the Bertrandstrategy. Since these companies operate together in the oligopolistic market, we balance theoligopolistic market simultaneously for all companies. Following the equilibrium, we also examine itsstability found under different assumptions of adapting the strategies of companies over time. Fromthis point of view, we consider simple dynamics (simple expectations), where companies choose theiroptimal strategies according to the functions of reactions from the previous period. The second typeof adaptation of companies is a model with the so-called adaptive expectations, where the newproduction of companies is a weighted average of current production and production changingthrough the reaction functions from the previous period. The last type of expectations of companiesare heterogeneous expectations of companies, where each of the considered companies has differentexpectations regarding the development of an optimal strategy in the future. In this case, one companyis a rational player that creates its strategy in the future on the basis of expected marginal profits, thesecond player has adaptive expectations and the third behaves on the basis of the simple dynamics ofsystem development.
